E.1 Securitization Structures
E.1.1 Overview
In a securitization transaction, the reporting entity will typically transfer a
financial asset (or a portion of a financial asset) to another legal entity
(securitization entity). For a financial asset transfer to be accounted for as a
sale, the transferor must first consider whether it is required to consolidate
the transferee. If the financial asset is transferred to a consolidated
subsidiary, control over the transferred financial asset has not been
surrendered, and the transaction would not qualify as a sale. Second, even if
the transferee is not consolidated, the transferor must surrender control over
the asset transferred. As stated in ASC 860-10-40-5, control is considered to be
surrendered only if all three of the following conditions are met: (1) the asset
has been legally isolated, (2) the transferee has the ability to pledge or
exchange the asset, and (3) the transferor otherwise no longer maintains
effective control over the asset.
However, as stated in ASC 860-10-55-17D, "if the transferee is a
consolidated subsidiary of the transferor (its parent), the transferee shall
recognize the transferred financial assets in its separate entity financial
statements, unless the nature of the transfer is a secured borrowing with a
pledge of collateral.” Accordingly, to prepare stand-alone financial statements
of the subsidiary entity, the reporting entity would be required to evaluate
whether the transfer between the affiliates meets the conditions to qualify as a
sale, ignoring the fact that the entities are under common control.
The discussion below focuses on the consolidation considerations under ASC 810 related to a typical securitization (not on whether a transfer qualifies for sale accounting under ASC 860).
E.1.2 Variable Interests in a Securitization Entity
In its evaluation to determine whether it is required to consolidate a
securitization entity, the reporting entity must identify all the parties to the
transaction and identify which of those parties has a variable interest. While there is no
requirement for the transacting parties to compare their accounting conclusions,
each participant needs to understand the rights and obligations of each party
involved with the securitization entity to reach a conclusion about its own
accounting for its interest in the securitization entity.
E.1.2.1 Beneficial Interests Received
To purchase financial assets from the transferor, the securitization entity will
issue securities (beneficial interests) to investors either through a
private offering or a public offering. The transferor may retain some or all
of the beneficial interests issued by the securitization entity as
consideration for the financial assets transferred. As discussed in
Section
4.3.2, beneficial interests or debt instruments that
represent financing instruments of a legal entity are almost always variable
interests, even if the instruments are the most senior in the capital
structure of the legal entity. As liabilities, these instruments are
designed to absorb variability in the performance of the legal entity’s
assets because the beneficial interest holder is exposed to that legal
entity’s ability to pay (i.e., credit risk) and may be exposed to interest
rate risk, depending on the design of the legal entity.
E.1.2.2 Guarantees
A transferor may also provide credit enhancements to the securitization
structure to increase the likelihood that the other investors will receive
the cash flows to which they are entitled. Doing so improves the
marketability of the beneficial interests issued while the transferor
retains the risk of the underlying assets that it transferred to the
securitization entity. Since guarantees expose the transferor to expected losses of the transferee, these
arrangements are typically variable interests. However, whether such an
arrangement is a variable interest depends on the design of the legal entity
and the characteristics of that instrument. In addition, when analyzing a
guarantee of financial assets in a securitization entity, the transferor
must determine whether the specified asset(s) subject to the guarantee have
a fair value that is less than half of the total fair value of the
securitization entity’s assets. If the specified asset or assets are less
than half of the total fair value of the securitization entity’s assets, and
the transferor does not have any other interest in the legal entity, the
guarantee is not considered a variable interest in the entire legal entity
but rather a variable interest in specified assets within the transferee
entity (see Section
4.3.11).
E.1.2.3 Fees Paid to Decision Makers or Service Providers
Securitizations involve either a static portfolio of financial assets or a
managed portfolio of financial assets. In a static portfolio securitization,
the financial assets are held by the securitization entity until they are
repaid by the original obligor. In a managed portfolio securitization, an
asset manager will actively trade the underlying investments to maximize the
returns of the securitization entity.
A servicer or decision
maker that has the ability to make investment decisions of
the securitization entity will need to evaluate whether its decision-making
arrangement represents a variable interest in the securitization entity. If
the servicer’s or decision maker’s fee arrangement meets all three
conditions in ASC 810-10-55-37, then the arrangement would not be considered
a variable interest. If, as is often the case, the servicer also owns some
of the beneficial interests issued by the securitization entity, it is
likely that the servicer’s or decision maker’s fee arrangement represents a
variable interest. In addition, if the fee arrangement exposes the servicer
or decision maker to the risk of loss in the transferee, the fee arrangement
is a variable interest. However, a servicer or decision maker that does not
hold a variable interest in the securitization entity will never consolidate
the securitization entity. See Section 4.4 for a discussion of
decision-maker and service-provider fees.
E.1.3 Determining Whether a Securitization Entity Is a VIE
Not all SPEs are VIEs, but generally all securitization SPEs are VIEs. A
securitization entity usually does not issue equity instruments with voting
rights (or other interests with similar rights) that have the power to direct
the significant activities of the entity, and often the securitization entity’s
total equity investment at risk is not sufficient to permit the entity to
finance its activities without additional forms of credit enhancement or other
subordinated financial
support. Because securitization entities are typically
insufficiently capitalized, with little or no true “equity” for accounting
purposes, and are rarely designed to have a voting equity class that possesses
the power to direct the securitization entities’ activities, they are generally
VIEs. See Chapter 5 for
further discussion of determining whether a legal entity is a VIE.
E.1.4 Determining the Primary Beneficiary of a Securitization Entity
ASC 810 requires a reporting entity to identify the primary beneficiary of a securitization entity that is a VIE on
the basis of whether the reporting entity has both (1) the power to direct the
activities that most significantly affect the VIE’s economic performance and (2)
the obligation to absorb the VIE’s losses or the right to receive benefits from
the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE. Only one reporting
entity is expected to control a securitization entity. Although several deal
participants could have variable interests in the securitization entity,
typically only one would have the power to direct the activities that most
significantly affect the securitization entity’s economic performance. See Chapter 7 for further
discussion of identifying the primary beneficiary of a VIE.
E.1.4.1 Power Analysis — Identifying the Activities That Most Significantly Affect the VIE
In securitizations, the economic performance of the legal entity is generally
most significantly affected by the performance of the underlying assets.
Accordingly, the activities that most significantly affect the economic
performance of the legal entity are typically the management by the servicer
of the delinquencies and defaults that inevitably occur or, in a managed
CLO, the activities of the collateral manager related to selecting,
monitoring, and disposing of collateral assets. Sometimes, in structures
like commercial paper (CP) conduits, the management of liabilities (e.g.,
selecting the tenor of CP) will also significantly affect the performance of
the legal entity, but generally it will not be the most significant
activity. Some of the factors that might affect the performance of the
underlying assets could be beyond the direct control of any of the parties
to the securitization (like voluntary prepayments) and therefore are not
considered in the power analysis.
E.1.4.1.1 Situations in Which Securitization Entities Will Not Have Ongoing Activities That Significantly Affect Their Economic Performance
In limited situations, the ongoing activities performed throughout the life of a
securitization entity (e.g., administrative activities in certain
resecuritization entities, such as Re-REMICs) may not be expected to
significantly affect the legal entity’s economic performance even though
they are necessary for the VIE’s continued existence. In such
situations, the primary beneficiary determination will need to focus on
the activities performed and the decisions made at the VIE’s inception
as part of the VIE’s design, because in these situations the initial
design had the most significant effect on the economic performance of
the VIE. However, it would not be appropriate to determine the primary
beneficiary solely on the basis of decisions made at the VIE’s inception
as part of the VIE’s design when there are ongoing activities that will
significantly affect the economic performance of the VIE. See Section 7.2.3.2
for further discussion of legal entities that have no ongoing
activities.
E.1.4.2 Economics Analysis — Interests That Could Potentially Be Significant to the VIE
The VIE model indicates that a reporting entity must assess the VIE’s purpose
and design when evaluating whether the reporting entity has (1) the
obligation to absorb losses of the VIE or (2) the right to receive benefits
from the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE. This
assessment includes a consideration of all risks and associated variability
that are absorbed by any of the VIE’s variable interest holders. In most
securitization structures, any party with a significant beneficial interest in the securitization entity will
meet this criteria because probability is not considered. Accordingly, the
consolidation evaluation generally focuses on which of those parties has
power over the securitization entity. See Section 7.3.3 for further discussion
of when an interest would be considered more than insignificant.
E.1.5 Illustrative Examples
Cases A through F in ASC 810-10-55 below illustrate the application of the consolidation assessment for typical securitization structures.
ASC 810-10 (Case A: Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitization)
Case A: Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitization
55-96 A VIE is created and financed with $94 of investment grade 7-year fixed-rate bonds (issued in 3
tranches) and $6 of equity. All of the bonds are held by third-party investors. The equity is held by a third party,
who is also the special servicer. The equity tranche was designed to absorb the first dollar risk of loss and to
receive any residual return from the VIE. The VIE uses the proceeds to purchase $100 of BB-rated fixed-rate
commercial mortgage loans with contractual maturities of 7 years from a transferor. The commercial mortgage
loans contain provisions that require each borrower to pay the full scheduled interest and principal if the loan
is extinguished prior to maturity. The transaction was marketed to potential bondholders as an investment in a
portfolio of commercial mortgage loans with exposure to the credit risk associated with the possible default by
the borrowers.
55-97 Each month, interest received from all of the pooled loans is paid to the investors in the fixed-rate
bonds, in order of seniority, until all accrued interest on those bonds is paid. The same distribution occurs when
principal payments are received.
55-98 If there is a shortfall in contractual payments from the borrowers or if the loan collateral is liquidated
and does not generate sufficient proceeds to meet payments on all bond classes, the equity tranche and then
the most subordinate bond class will incur losses, with further losses impacting more senior bond classes in
reverse order of priority.
55-99 The transferor retains the primary servicing responsibilities. The primary servicing activities performed
are administrative in nature and include remittance of payments on the loans, administration of escrow
accounts, and collections of insurance claims. Upon delinquency or default by the borrower, the responsibility
for administration of the loan is transferred from the transferor as the primary servicer to the special servicer.
Furthermore, the special servicer, as the equity holder, has the approval rights for budgets, leases, and property
managers of foreclosed properties.
55-100 The special servicer is involved in the creation of the VIE and required at the creation date that
certain loans, which it deemed to be of high risk, be removed from the initial pool of loans that were going to
be purchased by the VIE from the transferor. The special servicer also reviewed the VIE’s governing documents
to ensure that the special servicer would be allowed to act quickly and effectively in situations in which a loan
becomes delinquent. The special servicer concluded the VIE’s governing documents allowed the special servicer
to adequately monitor and direct the performance of the underlying loans.
55-101 For its services as primary servicer, the transferor earns a fixed fee, calculated as a percentage of the
unpaid principal balance on the underlying loans. The special servicer also earns a fixed fee, calculated as a
percentage of the unpaid principal balance on the underlying loans. The fees paid to the primary and special
servicer are both of the following:
- Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide the services
- Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
No party has the ability to remove the primary servicer or the special servicer.
The following diagram illustrates the scenario
described above in the FASB’s Case A:
ASC 810-10 (Case A, continued)
55-102 To evaluate the facts and circumstances and determine which reporting entity, if any, is the primary
beneficiary of a VIE, paragraph 810-10-25-38A requires that a reporting entity determine the purpose and
design of the VIE, including the risks that the VIE was designed to create and pass through to its variable interest
holders. In making this assessment, the variable interest holders of the VIE determined the following:
- The primary purposes for which the VIE was created were to provide liquidity to the transferor to originate additional loans and to provide investors with the ability to invest in a pool of commercial mortgage loans.
- The VIE was marketed to debt investors as a VIE that would be exposed to the credit risk associated with the possible default by the borrowers with respect to principal and interest payments, with the equity tranche designed to absorb the first dollar risk of loss. Additionally, the marketing of the transaction indicated that such risks would be mitigated by subordination of the equity tranche.
- The VIE is not exposed to prepayment risk because the commercial mortgage loans contain provisions that require the borrower to pay the full scheduled interest and principal if the loan is extinguished prior to maturity.
55-103 The special servicer and the bondholders are the variable interest holders in the VIE. The fees paid
to the transferor do not represent a variable interest on the basis of a consideration of the conditions in
paragraphs 810-10-55-37 through 55-38. The fees paid to the special servicer represent a variable interest
on the basis of a consideration of the conditions in those paragraphs, specifically paragraph 810-10-55-37(c),
because of the special servicer holding the equity tranche. If the special servicer was only receiving fees and did
not hold the equity tranche and if its related parties did not hold any variable interests in the VIE, then the fees
would not be a variable interest.
55-104 Paragraph 810-10-25-38B requires that a reporting entity identify which activities most significantly
impact the VIE’s economic performance and determine whether it has the power to direct those activities. The
economic performance of the VIE is most significantly impacted by the performance of its underlying assets.
Thus, the activities that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance are the activities that most
significantly impact the performance of the underlying assets. The special servicer has the ability to manage
the VIE’s assets that are delinquent or in default to improve the economic performance of the VIE. Additionally,
the special servicer, as the equity holder, can approve budgets, leases, and property managers on foreclosed
property. The special servicing activities are performed only upon delinquency or default of the underlying
assets. However, a reporting entity’s ability to direct the activities of a VIE when circumstances arise or events
happen constitutes power if that ability relates to the activities that most significantly impact the economic
performance of the VIE. A reporting entity does not have to exercise its power in order to have power to direct
the activities of a VIE. The special servicer’s involvement in the design of the VIE does not, in isolation, result
in the special servicer being the primary beneficiary of the VIE. However, in this situation, that involvement
indicated that the special servicer had the opportunity and the incentive to establish arrangements that
result in the special servicer being the variable interest holder with the power to direct the activities that most
significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
55-105 The bondholders of the VIE have no voting rights and no other rights that provide them with the
power to direct the activities that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
55-106 The activities that the primary servicer has the power to direct are administrative in nature and do
not most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance. In addition, the primary servicer, and its related
parties, do not hold a variable interest in the VIE. Thus, the primary servicer cannot be the primary beneficiary of
the VIE.
55-107 If a reporting entity has the power to direct the activities of a VIE that most significantly impact the
VIE’s economic performance, then under the requirements of paragraph 810-10-25-38A, that reporting entity
also is required to determine whether it has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially be
significant to the VIE or the right to receive benefits from the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE.
55-108 The special servicer, for its servicing activities, receives a fixed fee that provides it with the right to
receive benefits of the VIE. The fees paid to the special servicer are both of the following:
- Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide the services
- Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
Therefore, the fees meet the criteria in paragraph 810-10-25-38H, and they should not be considered for
purposes of evaluating the characteristic in paragraph 810-10-25-38A(b). The special servicer, as the equity
tranche holder, has the obligation to absorb losses and the right to receive benefits, either of which could
potentially be significant to the VIE. As equity tranche holder, the special servicer is the most subordinate tranche
and therefore absorbs the first dollar risk of loss and has the right to receive benefits, including the VIE’s actual
residual returns, if any.
55-109 On the basis of the specific facts and circumstances presented in this Case and the analysis performed,
the special servicer would be deemed to be the primary beneficiary of the VIE because:
- It is the variable interest holder with the power to direct the activities of the VIE that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
- As the equity tranche holder, it has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE and the right to receive benefits from the VIE, either of which could potentially be significant to the VIE.
ASC 810-10 (Case B: Asset-Backed Collateralized Debt Obligation)
Case B: Asset-Backed Collateralized Debt Obligation
55-110 A VIE is created and financed with $90 of AAA-rated fixed-rate debt securities, $6 of BB-rated fixed-rate
debt securities, and $4 of equity. All debt securities issued by the VIE are held by third-party investors. The
equity tranche is held 35 percent by the manager of the VIE and 65 percent by a third-party investor. The VIE
uses the proceeds to purchase a portfolio of asset-backed securities with varying tenors and interest rates.
55-111 The transaction was marketed to potential debt investors as an investment in a portfolio of asset-backed securities with exposure to the credit risk associated with the possible default by the issuers of the asset-backed securities in the portfolio and to the interest rate risk associated with the management of the portfolio. The equity tranche was designed to absorb the first dollar risk of loss related to credit risk and interest rate risk and to receive any residual returns from a favorable change in interest rates or credit risk that affects the proceeds received on the sale of investments in the portfolio.
55-112 The assets of the VIE are managed within the parameters established by the underlying trust
documents. The parameters provide the manager with the latitude to manage the VIE’s assets while maintaining
an average portfolio rating of single B-plus or higher. If the average rating of the portfolio declines, the VIE’s
governing documents require that the manager’s discretion in managing the portfolio be curtailed.
55-113 For its services, the
manager earns a base, fixed fee, and a performance fee
in which it receives a portion of the VIE’s profit above
a targeted return. The fees paid to the manager are both
of the following:
-
Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide the services
-
Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
The manager can be removed, without cause (as distinguished from with cause), by a simple majority decision
of the AAA-rated debt holders. As the debt of the entity is widely dispersed, no one party has the ability to
unilaterally remove the manager. If removal of the manager occurs, the manager will continue to hold a 35
percent equity interest in the VIE.
55-114 The third-party equity investor has rights that are limited to administrative matters.
The following diagram illustrates the scenario
described above in the FASB’s Case B:
ASC 810-10 (Case B, continued)
55-115 To evaluate the facts and circumstances and determine which reporting entity, if any, is the primary
beneficiary of a VIE, paragraph 810-10-25-38A requires that a reporting entity determine the purpose and
design of the VIE, including the risks that the VIE was designed to create and pass through to its variable interest
holders. In making this assessment, the variable interest holders of the VIE determined the following:
- The primary purposes for which the VIE was created were to provide investors with the ability to invest in a pool of asset-backed securities, to earn a positive spread between the interest that the VIE earns on its portfolio and the interest paid to the debt investors, and to generate management fees for the manager.
- The transaction was marketed to potential debt investors as an investment in a portfolio of asset-backed securities with exposure to the credit risk associated with the possible default by the issuers of the asset-backed securities in the portfolio and to the interest rate risk associated with the management of the portfolio. Additionally, the marketing of the transaction indicated that such risks would be mitigated by the support from the equity tranche.
- The equity tranche was designed to absorb the first dollar risk of loss related to credit risk and interest rate risk and to receive any residual returns from a favorable change in interest rates or credit risk that affects the proceeds received on the sale of asset-backed securities in the portfolio.
55-116 The third-party debt investors, the third-party equity investor, and the manager are the variable
interest holders in the VIE. The fees paid to the manager also represent a variable interest on the basis of a
consideration of the conditions in paragraphs 810-10-55-37 through 55-38, specifically paragraph 810-10-55-37(c), because of the manager holding the equity tranche. If the manager was only receiving fees and did not
hold the equity tranche and if its related parties did not hold any variable interests in the VIE, then the fees
would not be a variable interest.
55-117 Paragraph 810-10-25-38B requires that a reporting entity identify which activities most significantly
impact the VIE’s economic performance and determine whether it has the power to direct those activities. The
economic performance of the VIE is most significantly impacted by the performance of the VIE’s portfolio of
assets. Thus, the activities that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance are the activities that
most significantly impact the performance of the portfolio of assets. The manager has the ability to manage
the VIE’s assets within the parameters of the trust documents. If the average rating of the portfolio declines,
the VIE’s governing documents require that the manager’s discretion in managing the portfolio be curtailed.
Although the AAA-rated debt holders can remove the manager without cause, no one party has the unilateral
ability to exercise the kick-out rights over the manager. Therefore, such kick-out rights would not be considered
in this primary beneficiary analysis.
55-118 The debt holders of
the VIE do not have voting rights or other rights that
provide them with the power to direct activities that
most significantly impact the VIE’s economic
performance. Although the AAA-rated debt holders can
remove the manager without cause, no one party has the
unilateral ability to exercise the kick-out rights over
the manager.
55-119 The third-party equity investor has the power to direct certain activities. However, the activities that
the third-party equity investor has the power to direct are administrative and do not most significantly impact
the VIE’s economic performance.
55-120 If a reporting entity has the power to direct the activities of a VIE that most significantly impact the
VIE’s economic performance, then under the requirements of paragraph 810-10-25-38A, that reporting entity
also is required to determine whether it has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially
be significant to the VIE or the right to receive benefits from the VIE that could potentially be significant to the
VIE. The manager, as the 35 percent equity tranche holder, has the obligation to absorb losses and the right
to receive benefits. As equity tranche holder, the manager has the most subordinate tranche and therefore
absorbs 35 percent of the first dollar risk of loss and has the right to receive 35 percent of any residual benefits.
The fees paid to the manager are both of the following:
- Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide the services
- Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
Therefore, the fees meet the criteria in paragraph 810-10-25-38H, and they should not be considered for
purposes of evaluating the characteristic in paragraph 810-10-25-38A(b). Through the equity interest, the
manager has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE and the right to receive benefits from the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE.
55-121 On the basis of the specific facts and circumstances presented in this Case and the analysis
performed, the manager would be deemed to be the primary beneficiary of the VIE because:
- It is the variable interest holder with the power to direct the activities of the VIE that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance (and no single entity has the unilateral ability to exercise kick-out rights).
- Through its equity interest, it has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE and the right to receive benefits from the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE.
ASC 810-10 (Case C: Structured Investment Vehicle)
Case C: Structured Investment Vehicle
55-122 A VIE is created and financed with $94 of AAA-rated fixed-rate short-term debt with a 6-month
maturity and $6 of equity. The VIE uses the proceeds to purchase a portfolio of floating-rate debt with an
average life of four years and varying interest rates and short-term deposits with highly rated banks. The short-term
debt securities and equity are held by multiple third-party investors. Upon maturity of the short-term debt,
the VIE will either refinance the debt with existing investors or reissue the debt to new investors at existing
market rates.
55-123 The primary purpose of the VIE is to generate profits by maximizing the spread it earns on its asset
portfolio and its weighted-average cost of funding. The transaction was marketed to potential debt investors
as an investment in a portfolio of high-quality debt with exposure to the credit risk associated with the possible
default by the issuers of the debt in the portfolio. The equity tranche is designed to absorb the first dollar risk
of loss related to credit, liquidity, changes in fair value, and interest rate risk and to receive any benefit from a
favorable change in credit, changes in fair value, and interest rates.
55-124 The VIE is exposed to liquidity risk because the average tenor of the assets is greater than its liabilities.
To mitigate liquidity risk, the VIE maintains a certain portion of its assets in short-term deposits with highly rated
banks. The VIE has not entered into a liquidity facility to further mitigate liquidity risk.
55-125 The sponsor of the VIE was significantly involved with the creation of the VIE. The sponsor performs
various functions to manage the operations of the VIE, which include:
- Investment management — This management must adhere to the investment guidelines established at inception of the VIE. These guidelines include descriptions of eligible investments and requirements regarding the composition of the credit portfolio (including limits on country risk exposures, diversification limits, and ratings requirements).
- Funding management — This function provides funding management and operational support in relation to the debt issued and the equity with the objective of minimizing the cost of borrowing, managing interest rate and liquidity risks, and managing the capital adequacy of the VIE.
- Defeasance management — An event of defeasance occurs upon the failure of the rating agencies to maintain the ratings of the debt securities issued by the VIE at or above certain specified levels. In the event of defeasance, the sponsor is responsible for overseeing the orderly liquidation of the investment portfolio and the orderly discharge of the VIE’s obligations. This includes managing the market and credit risks of the portfolio.
55-126 For its services, the sponsor receives a fixed fee, calculated as an annual percentage of the aggregate
equity outstanding, and a performance-based fee, calculated as a percentage of the VIE’s profit above a
targeted return. The fees paid to the sponsor are both of the following:
- Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide the services
- Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
55-127 The debt security holders of the VIE have no voting rights. The equity holders have limited voting rights
that are typically limited to voting on amendments to the constitutional documents of the VIE.
The following diagram illustrates the scenario
described above in the FASB’s Case C:
ASC 810-10 (Case C, continued)
55-128 To evaluate the facts and circumstances and determine which reporting entity, if any, is the primary
beneficiary of a VIE, paragraph 810-10-25-38A requires that a reporting entity determine the purpose and
design of the VIE, including the risks that the VIE was designed to create and pass through to its variable interest
holders. In making this assessment, the variable interest holders of the VIE determined the following:
- The primary purposes for which the VIE was created were to provide investors with the ability to invest in a pool of high-quality debt, to maximize the spread it earns on its asset portfolio over its weighted-average cost of funding, and to generate management fees for the sponsor.
- The transaction was marketed to potential debt investors as an investment in a portfolio of high-quality debt with exposure to the credit risk associated with the possible default by the issuers of the debt in the portfolio.
- The equity tranche is negotiated to absorb the first dollar risk of loss related to credit, liquidity, fair value, and interest rate risk and to receive a portion of the benefit from a favorable change in credit, fair value, and interest rates.
- The principal risks to which the VIE is exposed include credit, interest rate, and liquidity risk.
55-129 The third-party debt investors, the third-party equity investors, and the sponsor are the variable
interest holders in the VIE. The fees paid to the sponsor represent a variable interest on the basis of a
consideration of the conditions in paragraphs 810-10-55-37 through 55-38, specifically paragraph 810-10-55-37(c), because of the sponsor having an implicit variable interest in the VIE as discussed in paragraph 810-10-55-132. If the sponsor was only receiving fees and did not have the implicit variable interest and if its related
parties did not hold any variable interests in the VIE, then the fees would not be a variable interest.
55-130 Paragraph 810-10-25-38B requires that a reporting entity identify which activities most significantly
impact the VIE’s economic performance and determine whether it has the power to direct those activities.
The economic performance of the VIE is significantly impacted by the performance of the VIE’s portfolio of
assets and by the terms of the short-term debt. Thus, the activities that significantly impact the VIE’s economic
performance are the activities that significantly impact the performance of the portfolio of assets and the terms
of the short-term debt (when the debt is refinanced or reissued). The sponsor manages the VIE’s investment,
funding, and defeasance activities. The fact that the sponsor was significantly involved with the creation of the
VIE does not, in isolation, result in the sponsor being the primary beneficiary of the VIE. However, the fact that
the sponsor was involved with the creation of the VIE indicated that the sponsor had the opportunity and the
incentive to establish arrangements that result in the sponsor being the variable interest holder with the power
to direct the activities that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
55-131 The debt security holders of the VIE have no voting rights and no other rights that provide them with
the power to direct the activities that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance. Although the
equity holders have voting rights, they are limited to voting on amendments to the constitutional documents
of the VIE, and those rights do not provide the equity holders with the power to direct the activities that most
significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
55-132 If a reporting entity has the power to direct the activities of a VIE that most significantly impact the
VIE’s economic performance, then under the requirements of paragraph 810-10-25-38A, that reporting entity
also is required to determine whether it has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially be
significant to the VIE or the right to receive benefits from the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE.
The sponsor considered whether it had an implicit financial responsibility to ensure that the VIE operates as
designed. Based on paragraphs 810-10-25-51 and 810-10-25-54, the sponsor determined that it has an implicit
financial responsibility and that such obligation requires the sponsor to absorb losses that could potentially
be significant to the VIE. This determination was influenced by the sponsor’s concern regarding the risk to its
reputation in the marketplace if the VIE did not operate as designed. The fees paid to the sponsor are both of
the following:
- Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide the services
- Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
Therefore, the fees meet the criteria in paragraph 810-10-25-38H, and they should not be considered for
purposes of evaluating the characteristic in paragraph 810-10-25-38A(b).
55-133 On the basis of the specific facts and circumstances presented in this Case and the analysis
performed, the sponsor would be deemed to be the primary beneficiary of the VIE because:
- It is the variable interest holder with the power to direct the activities of the VIE that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
- Through its implicit financial responsibility to ensure that the VIE operates as designed, it has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE.
ASC 810-10 (Case D: Commercial Paper Conduit)
Case D: Commercial Paper Conduit
55-134 A VIE is created by a reporting entity (the sponsor) and financed with $98 of AAA-rated fixed-rate
short-term debt with a 3-month maturity and $2 of subordinated notes. The VIE uses the proceeds to purchase
a portfolio of medium-term assets with average tenors of three years. The asset portfolio is obtained from
multiple sellers. The short-term debt and subordinated notes are held by multiple third-party investors. Upon
maturity of the short-term debt, the VIE will either refinance the debt with existing investors or reissue the debt
to new investors.
55-135 The sponsor of the VIE provides credit enhancement in the form of a letter of credit equal to 5 percent
of the VIE’s assets and it provides a liquidity facility to fund the cash flow shortfalls on 100 percent of the short-term
debt. Cash flow shortfalls could arise due to a mismatch between collections on the underlying assets of
the VIE and payments due to the short-term debt holders or to the inability of the VIE to refinance or reissue
the short-term debt upon maturity.
55-136 A credit default of the VIE’s assets resulting in deficient cash flows is absorbed as follows:
- First by the subordinated note holders
- Second by the sponsor’s letter of credit
- Third by the short-term debt holders.
The sponsor’s liquidity facility does not advance against defaulted assets.
55-137 The VIE is exposed to liquidity risk because the average life of the assets is greater than that of its
liabilities. The VIE enters into a liquidity facility with the sponsor to mitigate liquidity risk.
55-138 The transaction was marketed to potential debt investors as an investment in a portfolio of highly
rated medium-term assets with minimal exposure to the credit risk associated with the possible default by the
issuers of the assets in the portfolio. The subordinated notes were designed to absorb the first dollar risk of
loss related to credit. The VIE is marketed to all investors as having a low probability of credit exposure due to
the nature of the assets obtained. Furthermore, the VIE is marketed to the short-term debt holders as having
protection from liquidity risk due to the liquidity facility provided by the sponsor.
55-139 The sponsor of the VIE performs various functions to manage the operations of the VIE. Specifically,
the sponsor:
- Establishes the terms of the VIE
- Approves the sellers permitted to sell to the VIE
- Approves the assets to be purchased by the VIE
- Makes decisions regarding the funding of the VIE including determining the tenor and other features of the short-term debt issued
- Administers the VIE by monitoring the assets, arranging for debt placement, compiling monthly reports, and ensuring compliance with the VIE’s credit and investment policies.
55-140 For providing the letter of credit, liquidity facility, and management services, the sponsor receives
fixed fees that are calculated as an annual percentage of the asset value. The short-term debt holders and
subordinated note holders have no voting rights. The fees paid to the sponsor for its management services are
both of the following:
- Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide the services
- Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
The following diagram illustrates the scenario
described above in the FASB’s Case D:
ASC 810-10 (Case D, continued)
55-141 To evaluate the facts and circumstances and determine which reporting entity, if any, is the primary
beneficiary of a VIE, paragraph 810-10-25-38A requires that a reporting entity determine the purpose and
design of the VIE, including the risks that the VIE was designed to create and pass through to its variable interest
holders. In making this assessment, the variable interest holders of the VIE determined the following:
- The primary purposes for which the VIE was created were to provide investors with the ability to invest in a pool of highly rated medium-term assets, to provide the multiple sellers to the VIE with access to lower-cost funding, to earn a positive spread between the interest that the VIE earns on its asset portfolio and its weighted-average cost of funding, and to generate fees for the sponsor.
- The transaction was marketed to potential debt investors as an investment in a portfolio of highly rated medium-term assets with minimal exposure to the credit risk associated with the possible default by the issuers of the assets in the portfolio. The subordinated debt is designed to absorb the first dollar risk of loss related to credit and interest rate risk. The VIE is marketed to all investors as having a low probability of credit loss due to the nature of the assets obtained. Furthermore, the VIE is marketed to the short-term debt holders as having protection from liquidity risk due to the liquidity facility provided by the sponsor.
- The principal risks to which the VIE is exposed include credit, interest rate, and liquidity.
55-142 The short-term debt holders, the third-party subordinated note holders, and the sponsor are the
variable interest holders in the VIE. The letter of credit and liquidity facility provided by the sponsor protect
holders of other variable interests from suffering losses of the VIE. Therefore, the sponsor’s fees for the letter
of credit and liquidity facility are not eligible for the evaluation in paragraph 810-10-55-37 and are variable
interests in the VIE. The fees paid to the sponsor for its management services represent a variable interest on
the basis of a consideration of the conditions in paragraphs 810-10-55-37 through 55-38, specifically paragraph
810-10-55-37(c), because of the sponsor providing the letter of credit and liquidity facility and the fees for the
letter of credit and liquidity facility. If the sponsor was only receiving management fees, did not provide the
letter of credit and liquidity facility, and did not receive fees for the letter of credit and liquidity facility and if its
related parties did not hold any variable interests in the VIE, then the management fees would not be a variable
interest.
55-143 Paragraph 810-10-25-38B requires that a reporting entity identify which activities most significantly
impact the VIE’s economic performance and determine whether it has the power to direct those activities.
The economic performance of the VIE is significantly impacted by the performance of the VIE’s portfolio of
assets and by the terms of the short-term debt. Thus, the activities that significantly impact the VIE’s economic
performance are the activities that significantly impact the performance of the portfolio of assets and the terms
of the short-term debt (when the debt is refinanced or reissued). The sponsor manages the operations of
the VIE. Specifically, the sponsor establishes the terms of the VIE, approves the sellers permitted to sell to the
VIE, approves the assets to be purchased by the VIE, makes decisions about the funding of the VIE including
determining the tenor and other features of the short-term debt issued, and administers the VIE by monitoring
the assets, arranging for debt placement, and ensuring compliance with the VIE’s credit and investment
policies. The fact that the sponsor was significantly involved with the creation of the VIE does not, in isolation,
result in the sponsor being the primary beneficiary of the VIE. However, the fact that the sponsor was involved
with the creation of the VIE may indicate that the sponsor had the opportunity and the incentive to establish
arrangements that result in the sponsor being the variable interest holder with the power to direct the activities
that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
55-144 The short-term debt holders and subordinated note holders of the VIE have no voting rights and
no other rights that provide them with power to direct the activities that most significantly impact the VIE’s
economic performance.
55-145 If a reporting entity has the power to direct the activities of a VIE that most significantly impact the
VIE’s economic performance, then under the requirements of paragraph 810-10-25-38A, that reporting entity
also is required to determine whether it has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially be
significant to the VIE or the right to receive benefits from the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE.
The fees paid to the sponsor for its management services are both of the following:
- Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide the services
- Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
Therefore, the management fees meet the criteria in paragraph 810-10-25-38H, and they should not be
considered for purposes of evaluating the characteristic in paragraph 810-10-25-38A(b). However, the sponsor
still, through its letter of credit and liquidity facility fees, receives benefits from the VIE that could potentially
be significant to the VIE. The sponsor, through its letter of credit and liquidity facility, also has the obligation to
absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE.
55-146 On the basis of the specific facts and circumstances presented in this Case and the analysis
performed, the sponsor would be deemed to be the primary beneficiary of the VIE because:
- It is the variable interest holder with the power to direct the activities of the VIE that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
- Through its letter of credit and liquidity facility, the sponsor has the obligation to absorb losses that could potentially be significant to the VIE, and, through its fees for the letter of credit and liquidity facility, the sponsor has the right to receive benefits that could potentially be significant to the VIE.
ASC 810-10 (Case E: Guaranteed Mortgage-Backed Securitization)
Case E: Guaranteed Mortgage-Backed Securitization
55-147 A VIE is created and financed with $100 of a single class of investment-grade 30-year fixed-rate debt
securities. The VIE uses the proceeds to purchase $100 of 30-year fixed-rate residential mortgage loans from
the transferor. The VIE enters into a guarantee facility that absorbs 100 percent of the credit losses incurred
on the VIE’s assets. The assets acquired by the VIE are underwritten by the transferor in accordance with the
parameters established by the guarantor. Additionally, all activities of the VIE are prespecified by the trust
agreement and servicing guide, which are both established by the guarantor. No critical decisions are generally
required for the VIE unless default of an underlying asset is reasonably foreseeable or occurs.
55-148 The transaction was marketed to potential debt security holders as an investment in a portfolio
of residential mortgage loans with exposure to the credit risk of the guarantor and to the prepayment risk
associated with the underlying loans of the VIE. Each month, the security holders receive interest and principal
payments in proportion to their percentage ownership of the underlying loans.
55-149 If there is a shortfall in contractually required loan payments from the borrowers or if the loan is
foreclosed on and the liquidation of the underlying property does not generate sufficient proceeds to meet the
required payments on all securities, the guarantor will make payments to the debt securities holders to ensure
timely payment of principal and accrued interest on the debt securities.
55-150 The guarantor also serves as the master servicer for the VIE. As master servicer, the guarantor
services the securities issued by the VIE. Generally, if a mortgage loan is 120 days (or 4 consecutive months)
delinquent, and if other circumstances are met, the guarantor has the right to buy the loan from the VIE. The
master servicer can only be removed for a material breach in its obligations. As compensation for the guarantee
and services provided, the guarantor receives a fee that is calculated monthly as a percentage of the unpaid
principal balance on the underlying loans.
55-151 As master servicer, the guarantor also is responsible for supervising and monitoring the servicing of
the residential mortgage loans (primary servicing). The VIE’s governing documents provide that the guarantor
is responsible for the primary servicing of the loans; however, the guarantor is allowed to, and does, hire the
transferor to perform primary servicing activities that are conducted under the supervision of the guarantor.
The guarantor monitors the primary servicer’s performance and has the right to remove the primary servicer at
any time it considers such a removal to be in the best interest of the security holders.
55-152 The primary servicing activities are performed under the servicing guide established by the guarantor.
Examples of the primary servicing activities include collecting and remitting principal and interest payments,
administering escrow accounts, and managing default. When a loan becomes delinquent or it is reasonably
foreseeable of becoming delinquent, the primary servicer can propose a default mitigation strategy in which
the guarantor can approve, reject, or require another course of action if it considers such action is in the best
interest of the security holders. As compensation for servicing the underlying loans, the transferor receives a
fee that is calculated monthly as a percentage of the unpaid principal balance on the underlying loans.
The following diagram illustrates the scenario
described above in the FASB’s Case E:
ASC 810-10 (Case E, continued)
55-153 To evaluate the facts and circumstances and determine which reporting entity, if any, is the primary
beneficiary of a VIE, paragraph 810-10-25-38A requires that a reporting entity determine the purpose and
design of the VIE, including the risks that the VIE was designed to create and pass through to its variable interest
holders. In making this assessment, the variable interest holders of the VIE determined the following:
- The primary purposes for which the VIE was created were to provide investors with the ability to invest in a pool of residential mortgage loans with a third-party guarantee for 100 percent of the principal and interest payments due on the mortgage loans in the VIE, to provide the transferor to the VIE with access to liquidity for its originated loans and an ongoing servicing fee, and to generate fees for the guarantor.
- The transaction was marketed to potential debt security holders as an investment in a portfolio of residential mortgage loans with exposure to the credit risk of the guarantor and prepayment risk associated with the underlying assets of the VIE.
- The principal risks to which the VIE is exposed include credit risk of the underlying assets, prepayment risk, and the risk of fluctuations in the value of the underlying real estate. The credit risk of the underlying assets and the risk of fluctuations in the value of the underlying real estate are fully absorbed by the guarantor.
55-154 The debt securities
holders and the guarantor are the variable interest
holders in the VIE. The fees paid to the transferor do
not represent a variable interest on the basis of a
consideration of the conditions in paragraphs
810-10-55-37 through 55-38. The guarantee arrangement
protects holders of other variable interests from
suffering losses in the VIE because the guarantor is
required to fully absorb the credit risk of the
underlying assets of the VIE and the risk of
fluctuations in the value of the underlying real estate.
Therefore, the guarantor’s fees are not eligible for the
evaluation in paragraph 810-10-55-37.
55-155 Paragraph 810-10-25-38B requires that a reporting entity identify which activities most significantly
impact the VIE’s economic performance and determine whether it has the power to direct those activities. The
economic performance of the VIE is most significantly impacted by the performance of its underlying assets.
Thus, the activities that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance are the activities that most
significantly impact the performance of the underlying assets. The guarantor, who is also the master servicer,
has the ability (through establishment of the servicing terms, to appoint and remove the primary servicer, to
direct default mitigation, and to purchase defaulted assets) to manage the VIE’s assets that become delinquent
(or may become delinquent in the reasonably foreseeable future) to improve the economic performance of the
VIE.
55-156 Prepayment risk is also a risk that the VIE was designed to create and pass through. However, no
variable interest holder has the power to direct activities related to such risk.
55-157 Because the guarantor is able to appoint and replace the primary servicer and direct default
mitigation, the primary servicer does not have the power to direct the activities that most significantly impact
the VIE’s economic performance. In addition, the primary servicer and its related parties do not hold a variable
interest in the VIE. Thus, the primary servicer cannot be the primary beneficiary of the VIE. Furthermore, the
security holders have no voting rights and, thus, no power to direct the activities that most significantly impact
the VIE’s economic performance.
55-158 If a reporting entity
has the power to direct the activities of a VIE that
most significantly impact the VIE’s economic
performance, then under the requirements of paragraph
810-10-25-38A, that reporting entity also is required to
determine whether it has the obligation to absorb losses
of the VIE that could potentially be significant to the
VIE or the right to receive benefits from the VIE that
could potentially be significant to the VIE. The
guarantor, through its fee arrangement, receives
benefits, which may or may not potentially be
significant under this analysis; however, the guarantor
has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that
could potentially be significant through its guarantee
obligation. Therefore, the fees are not eligible for the
evaluation in paragraph 810-10-25-38H, and they should
be considered for purposes of evaluating the
characteristic in paragraph 810-10-25-38A(b).
55-159 On the basis of the specific facts and circumstances presented in this Case and the analysis
performed, the guarantor would be deemed to be the primary beneficiary of the VIE because:
- It is the variable interest holder with the power to direct the activities of the VIE that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
- Through its guarantee, it has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE.
ASC 810-10 (Case F: Residential Mortgage-Backed Securitization)
Case F: Residential Mortgage-Backed Securitization
55-160 A VIE is created and financed with $100 of 30-year fixed-rate debt securities. The securities are issued
in 2 tranches (a $90 senior tranche and a $10 residual tranche). The senior tranche securities are investment
grade and are widely dispersed among third-party investors. The residual tranche securities are held by the
transferor. The VIE uses the proceeds to purchase $100 of 30-year fixed-rate residential mortgage loans from
a transferor. A default on the underlying loans is absorbed first by the residual tranche held by the transferor.
All activities of the VIE are prespecified by a pooling and servicing agreement for the transaction. No critical
decisions are generally required for the VIE unless default of an underlying asset is reasonably foreseeable or
occurs.
55-161 The transaction was marketed to potential senior debt security holders as an investment in a portfolio
of residential mortgage loans with exposure to the credit risk of the underlying loan borrowers and to the
prepayment risk associated with the underlying loans of the VIE. Each month the security holders receive
interest and principal payments in proportion to their percentage of ownership of the underlying loans. The
residual tranche was designed to provide a credit enhancement to the transaction and to absorb the first dollar
risk of loss related to credit.
55-162 The primary servicing responsibilities are retained by the transferor. No party has the ability to remove
the transferor as servicer.
55-163 The servicing activities are performed in accordance with the pooling and servicing agreement.
Examples of the servicing activities include collecting and remitting principal and interest payments,
administering escrow accounts, monitoring overdue payments, and overall default management. Default
management includes evaluating the borrower’s financial condition to determine which loss mitigation strategy
(specified in the pooling and servicing agreement) will maximize recoveries on a particular loan. The acceptable
default management strategies are limited to the actions specified in the pooling and servicing agreement and
include all of the following:
- Modifying the terms of loans when default is reasonably foreseeable
- Temporary forbearance on collections of principal and interest (such amounts would be added to the unpaid balance on the loan)
- Short sales in which the servicer allows the underlying borrower to sell the mortgaged property even if the anticipated sale price will not permit full recovery of the contractual loan amounts.
55-164 As compensation for servicing the underlying loans, the transferor receives a fee, calculated monthly
as a percentage of the unpaid principal balance on the underlying loans. Although the servicing activities,
particularly managing default, are required to be performed in accordance with the pooling and servicing
agreement, the transferor, as servicer, has discretion in determining which strategies within the pooling and
servicing agreement to utilize to attempt to maximize the VIE’s economic performance. The fees paid to the
transferor are both of the following:
- Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide those services
- Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
The following diagram illustrates the scenario
described above in the FASB’s Case F:
ASC 810-10 (Case F, continued)
55-165 To evaluate the facts and circumstances and determine which reporting entity, if any, is the primary
beneficiary of a VIE, paragraph 810-10-25-38A requires that a reporting entity determine the purpose and
design of the VIE, including the risks that the VIE was designed to create and pass through to its variable interest
holders. In making this assessment, the variable interest holders of the VIE determined the following:
- The primary purposes for which the VIE was created were to provide investors with the ability to invest in a pool of residential mortgage loans and to provide the transferor to the VIE with access to liquidity for its originated loans and an ongoing servicing fee and potential residual returns.
- The transaction was marketed to potential senior debt security holders as an investment in a portfolio of residential mortgage loans with credit enhancement provided by the residual tranche and prepayment risk associated with the underlying assets of the VIE. The marketing of the transaction indicated that credit risk would be mitigated by the subordination of the residual tranche.
- The principal risks to which the VIE is exposed include credit of the underlying assets, prepayment risk, and the risk of fluctuations in the value of the underlying real estate.
55-166 The debt security holders and the transferor are the variable interest holders in the VIE. The fee paid
to the transferor (in its role as servicer) represents a variable interest on the basis of a consideration of the
conditions in paragraphs 810-10-55-37 through 55-38, specifically paragraph 810-10-55-37(c), because of the
transferor holding the residual tranche. If the transferor was only receiving fees and did not hold the residual
tranche and if its related parties did not hold any variable interests in the VIE, then the fees would not be a
variable interest.
55-167 Paragraph 810-10-25-38B requires that a reporting entity identify which activities most significantly
impact the VIE’s economic performance and determine whether it has the power to direct those activities. The
economic performance of the VIE is most significantly impacted by the performance of its underlying assets.
Thus, the activities that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance are the activities that most
significantly impact the performance of the underlying assets. The transferor, as servicer, has the ability to
manage the VIE’s assets that become delinquent (or are reasonably foreseeable of becoming delinquent) to
improve the economic performance of the VIE. Additionally, no party can remove the transferor in its role
as servicer. The default management activities are performed only after default of the underlying assets or
when default is reasonably foreseeable. However, a reporting entity’s ability to direct the activities of a VIE
when circumstances arise or events happen constitutes power if that ability relates to the activities that most
significantly impact the economic performance of the VIE. A reporting entity does not have to exercise its power
in order to have power to direct the activities of a VIE.
55-168 Prepayment risk is also a risk that the VIE was designed to create and pass through. However, no
variable interest holder has the power to direct matters related to such risk.
55-169 The senior security holders have no voting rights and, thus, no power to direct the activities that most
significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
55-170 If a reporting entity has the power to direct the activities of a VIE that most significantly impact the
VIE’s economic performance, then under the requirements of paragraph 810-10-25-38A, that reporting entity
also is required to determine whether it has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially
be significant to the VIE or the right to receive benefits from the VIE that could potentially be significant to the
VIE. The transferor, through its residual tranche ownership, has the obligation to absorb losses and the right to
receive benefits, either of which could potentially be significant to the VIE. The fees paid to the transferor are
both of the following:
- Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide those services
- Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
Therefore, the fees meet the criteria in paragraph 810-10-25-38H and should not be considered for purposes
of evaluating the characteristic in paragraph 810-10-25-38A(b).
55-171 On the basis of the specific facts and circumstances presented in this Case and the analysis
performed, the transferor would be deemed to be the primary beneficiary of the VIE because:
- It is the variable interest holder with the power to direct the activities of the VIE that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
- Through its residual tranche ownership, it has the obligation to absorb losses and the right to receive benefits, either of which could potentially be significant to the VIE.