Chapter 5 — Determining Whether a Legal Entity Is a VIE
Chapter 5 — Determining Whether a Legal Entity Is a VIE
5.1 Introduction
ASC 810-10
25-37 The initial determination of whether a legal entity is a VIE shall be made on the date at which
a reporting entity becomes involved with the legal entity. For purposes of the Variable Interest Entities
Subsections, involvement with a legal entity refers to ownership, contractual, or other pecuniary interests that
may be determined to be variable interests. That determination shall be based on the circumstances on that
date including future changes that are required in existing governing documents and existing contractual
arrangements.
To determine which consolidation model a reporting
entity should apply to evaluate its variable interest in a legal
entity, the reporting entity must determine whether the legal entity
is a VIE. This determination must be made upon
a reporting entity’s initial involvement with a legal entity and reassessed upon the
occurrence of a reconsideration event (see Chapter 9 for a discussion of VIE
reconsideration events). If the legal entity is a VIE, a reporting entity with a
variable interest (see Chapter
4) in that legal entity applies the VIE provisions of ASC 810-10 to
determine whether it must consolidate the legal entity. If a legal entity is not a
VIE, it is considered a voting interest
entity, and a reporting entity applies the voting interest entity model
to determine whether it must consolidate the legal entity (see Appendix D for a discussion
of the voting interest entity model).
The consolidation conclusions under the VIE model can be different from those under the voting interest entity model. Because the differences between a VIE and a voting interest entity can be subtle, a reporting entity must have a complete understanding of all contractual arrangements (explicit and implicit) as well as the design and purpose of the legal entity.
Legal entities can differ in structure as well as legal form (e.g., corporations compared with limited partnerships and similar entities), which affects the method used to understand their design and purpose. In simple terms, the distinction is based on the nature and amount of the equity investment and the rights and obligations of the equity investors. If a legal entity has sufficient equity investment at risk to finance its operations, and those equity investors, through their equity investment at risk, make decisions that direct the significant activities of the legal entity, consolidation based on majority voting interest is generally appropriate. However, if equity is not sufficient, or the equity investors do not control the legal entity through their equity investment, the VIE model is used to identify the appropriate party, if any, to consolidate.
To qualify as a VIE, a legal entity needs to satisfy only one of the following characteristics (which are discussed in detail in the sections below):
- The legal entity does not have sufficient equity investment at risk (Section 5.2).
- The equity investors at risk, as a group, lack the characteristics of a controlling financial interest (Section 5.3).
- The legal entity is structured with disproportionate voting rights, and substantially all of the activities are conducted on behalf of an investor with disproportionately few voting rights (Section 5.4).
5.1.1 Application of VIE Guidance to Multitiered Legal-Entity Structures
Section 3.2.2
describes the application of the VIE framework to multitiered legal-entity
structures, noting that such an analysis begins at the bottom and proceeds to
the top. Each entity within the structure should then be evaluated on a
consolidated basis. The attributes and variable interests of the underlying
consolidated entities generally should become those of the parent company upon
consolidation. As a result of this framework, in certain structures, if a
lower-tiered legal entity is a VIE and consolidated by another legal entity (its
parent), the parent may be determined to be a VIE. For example, if the
lower-tiered legal entity is a VIE because of insufficiency of equity investment
at risk, when those attributes become those of the parent, the parent may also
be determined to be a VIE depending on the design of the legal entity and
whether the parent has other substantive activities or consolidated subsidiaries
(see Examples 3-4 and
3-5 in Section
3.2.2).
5.1.2 Anticipating Changes in the Design of a Legal Entity
In general, the assumptions a reporting entity uses to determine whether a legal entity is a VIE are
limited by the legal entity’s design as of the assessment date. In its evaluation, the reporting entity
should not consider contractual changes to the legal entity’s design that are anticipated but not
required. The governing documents and contractual arrangements establish a legal entity’s design
and usually give insight into why the legal entity was formed and the primary activities it is expected to
perform.
However, it would be appropriate to consider activities (and the potential funding sources of those
activities) that are expected to be undertaken by the legal entity in its ordinary course of business as a
result of its design. While a reporting entity must use judgment in determining whether an assumption
is within the scope of the legal entity’s design, it would be appropriate to assume that the legal entity will
enter into sales and purchase contracts as part of its ordinary course of business because its ability to
enter into such contracts affects the variability in the designed operations.
5.2 Sufficiency of Equity
ASC 810-10
15-14 A legal entity shall be subject to consolidation under the guidance in the Variable Interest Entities
Subsections if, by design, any of the following conditions exist. (The phrase by design refers to legal entities that
meet the conditions in this paragraph because of the way they are structured. For example, a legal entity under
the control of its equity investors that originally was not a VIE does not become one
because of operating losses. The design of the legal entity is important in the application of these provisions.)
- The total equity investment (equity investments in a legal entity are interests that are required to be reported as equity in that entity’s financial statements) at risk is not sufficient to permit the legal entity to finance its activities without additional subordinated financial support provided by any parties, including equity holders. For this purpose, the total equity investment at risk has all of the following characteristics:
-
Includes only equity investments in the legal entity that participate significantly in profits and losses even if those investments do not carry voting rights
-
Does not include equity interests that the legal entity issued in exchange for subordinated interests in other VIEs
-
Does not include amounts provided to the equity investor directly or indirectly by the legal entity or by other parties involved with the legal entity (for example, by fees, charitable contributions, or other payments), unless the provider is a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of the investor that is required to be included in the same set of consolidated financial statements as the investor
-
Does not include amounts financed for the equity investor (for example, by loans or guarantees of loans) directly by the legal entity or by other parties involved with the legal entity, unless that party is a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of the investor that is required to be included in the same set of consolidated financial statements as the investor.
-
Paragraphs 810-10-25-45 through 25-47 discuss the amount of
the total equity investment at risk that is necessary to
permit a legal entity to finance its activities without
additional subordinated financial support. . . .
A legal entity is not a VIE under this criterion if its total equity investment
at risk is sufficient to finance its activities without additional subordinated financial support. In establishing this
guidance, the FASB reasoned that an equity investment that is not sufficient to
permit a legal entity to finance its own activities without additional subordinated
financial support indicates that an analysis of voting rights is not an effective
way to determine whether a reporting entity has a controlling financial interest in
the legal entity. Therefore, the owner of a majority residual interest in a legal
entity with insufficient equity may not be the appropriate party to consolidate.
Nevertheless, in many instances, an equity investor with a majority of the voting
interests may still be deemed to hold a controlling financial interest and would
therefore consolidate the VIE if it is the party that has the power to direct the
most significant activities of the VIE.
To determine whether there is sufficient equity investment at risk to permit the legal entity to finance its activities without additional subordinated financial support, a reporting entity must perform the following steps:
- Step 1 — Identify whether an interest in a legal entity is considered GAAP equity (see Section 5.2.1).
- Step 2 — Determine whether the equity investment is “at risk” on the basis of the equity investment population (see Section 5.2.2).
- Step 3 — Determine whether the identified equity investment at risk is sufficient to finance the legal entity’s operations without additional subordinated financial support (see Section 5.2.3).
5.2.1 Identifying Whether an Interest in a Legal Entity Is Considered GAAP Equity (Step 1)
A reporting entity’s ultimate goal in performing the assessment in ASC
810-10-15-14(a) is to determine whether a legal entity is sufficiently
capitalized with equity that has the characteristics typical of equity. Doing so
requires identification of equity investment at risk, which first requires
identification of whether an interest is considered GAAP equity. For more
information, see Deloitte’s Roadmap Distinguishing Liabilities From
Equity.
While only an equity interest can be considered equity investment at risk, not
all equity interests will be considered equity investment at risk. An interest
classified outside the equity section (permanent or temporary, as described in
Section
5.2.1.1) of a legal entity’s balance sheet is not an equity
investment. Accordingly, an equity investment might include the following types
of interest:
-
Common stock.
-
Preferred stock.
-
Ownership interests in partnerships and similar entities.
-
Certain beneficial interests in trusts and securitizations in the infrequent circumstances in which they are considered legal-form equity and classified as GAAP equity.
The above list is not comprehensive and does not suggest that those interests are
equity investments; rather, it illustrates only that the types of interests
qualifying as equity may be diverse. However, the interests must be classified as GAAP equity for accounting purposes under U.S.
GAAP. This distinction applies even when the interest does not convey the right
to vote on decisions of the legal entity. By extension, the following types of
interests can never be considered equity for this purpose:
-
Debt.
-
A legal-form equity interest, including common stock, preferred stock, or ownership interests in partnerships and similar legal entities, that is classified as a liability under ASC 480-10.
-
Commitments to fund equity or to absorb losses.
-
Personal guarantees by an equity holder.
Interests that are not classified at the time of evaluation as equity for
accounting purposes cannot meet the definition of an equity investment at risk.
This applies even if an interest classified outside of equity has
characteristics that are very similar to equity (e.g., a shareholder loan
recognized outside of equity).
5.2.1.1 Mezzanine or Temporary Equity
Instruments accounted for as mezzanine or temporary equity would qualify for
inclusion in a legal entity’s total equity investment at risk if those
instruments meet the conditions in ASC 810-10-15-14(a). This guidance is
consistent with ASC 815-10-15-76, which indicates that “[t]emporary equity
is considered stockholders’ equity for purposes of the scope exception in
paragraph 815-10-15-74(a) even if it is required to be displayed outside of
the permanent equity section.”
However, interests classified as temporary equity may not significantly
participate in the profits and losses of the legal entity and thus fail to
meet the requirement in ASC 810-10-15-14(a)(1) for inclusion in equity
investment at risk (see Section 5.2.2).
5.2.1.2 Personal Guarantee or Commitment to Fund
If an amount has only been guaranteed or committed (and not funded) by the equity holder as of the date of the VIE analysis, neither the amount guaranteed nor the fair value of the guarantee is considered equity investment
at risk.
5.2.1.3 Instruments With a Similar Risks-and-Rewards Profile of Equity
A legal entity may be capitalized with equity as well as with other instruments
that cannot be reported as equity under U.S. GAAP in the legal entity’s
financial statements (e.g., participating subordinated debt). Sometimes the
risks-and-rewards profile of such an instrument is similar to that of an
equity investment. Whether interests in a legal entity qualify as equity
investment at risk depends, in part, on their form. Instruments that cannot
be reported as equity in a legal entity’s financial statements cannot
qualify as equity investment at risk.
ASC 810-10-25-47 describes the following situation in which subordinated debt
does not qualify as equity investment at risk:
[I]f a legal entity has a very small equity
investment relative to other entities with similar activities and
has outstanding subordinated debt that obviously is effectively a
replacement for an additional equity investment, the equity would
not be expected to be sufficient.
5.2.1.4 Equity of a Foreign Entity
An interest that is classified as equity under foreign GAAP does not automatically result in a conclusion that it represents equity investment at risk under ASC 810.
Example 5-1
A reporting entity holds a variable interest in a foreign entity that prepares
its financial statements in accordance with its
home-country GAAP. The reporting entity has an
investment in the foreign entity that is classified
as equity under the investee’s foreign GAAP but that
does not qualify as equity under U.S. GAAP. This
interest is not an equity investment under the VIE
model. Even though the foreign entity reports the
instrument as equity under its home-country GAAP,
the financial instrument in the foreign entity still
must qualify for recognition as equity under U.S.
GAAP.
5.2.2 Determining Whether the Equity Investment Is “At Risk” (Step 2)
An interest classified as equity may not have the substantive characteristics of equity. Since the VIE consolidation framework is intended to apply to entities whose equity voting interests may not be the most appropriate determining factor in the identification of which party should consolidate, the FASB reasoned that equity interests that are not “at risk” should not be included in the sufficiency-of-equity test. To be considered part of the equity investment at risk, equity interests must:
- Participate significantly in profits and losses.
- Not be issued in exchange for subordinated interests in other VIEs.
- Not be received from the legal entity or by parties involved with the legal entity unless that party is a parent, a subsidiary, or an affiliate of the investor that is required to be included in the same set of consolidated financial statements as the investor.
- Not be financed by the legal entity or other parties involved with the legal entity unless that party is a parent, a subsidiary, or an affiliate of the investor that is required to be included in the same set of consolidated financial statements as the investor.
5.2.2.1 Significant Participation in Profits and Losses
Equity investment at risk includes only equity investments in the legal entity
that participate significantly in profits and losses even if those
investments do not carry voting rights. This characteristic is based on the
contractual rights of an equity investment, not an assessment of
probability. The determination of whether a legal entity participates
significantly in profits and losses should be based on the legal entity’s
profits and losses under GAAP, not the legal entity’s variability in returns
(i.e., expected losses
and expected residual returns; see
Section
2.3). An equity investment must participate significantly in both
profits and losses. An interest that participates in one but not the
other is not at risk.
A reporting entity must determine whether an equity instrument participates
significantly in the profits and losses of the potential VIE as a whole on
the basis of the design of the potential VIE as of the date of the
evaluation under ASC 810-10-15-14(a). Generally, instruments that
participate on a pro rata basis in the profits and losses, based on GAAP, of
all the potential VIE’s assets and liabilities are considered to participate
significantly in the profits and losses of the potential VIE as a whole. By
contrast, instruments that participate in the profits and losses of
specified assets may not be considered to participate significantly in the
profits and losses of the potential VIE as a whole and therefore would not
qualify as equity investment at risk.
Example 5-2
A limited partnership is formed in which the general partner holds a 2 percent
interest and the limited partners hold the remaining
equity interests. Profits and losses of all assets
and liabilities of the partnership are distributed
pro rata according to ownership interests. There are
no other arrangements between the entity and the
general and limited partners. In this scenario, even
though the general partner only absorbs and receives
2 percent of the profits and losses of the limited
partnership, its equity interest participates pro
rata in the profits and losses of the limited
partnership as a whole. Therefore, the general
partner’s equity interest participates significantly
in the profits and losses of the limited
partnership.
Example 5-3
Two unrelated parties, Enterprise A and Enterprise B, each contribute $10
million for equity investments in a legal entity.
The legal entity uses the proceeds from the equity
issuance, along with another $80 million obtained
from the issuance of debt, to invest in two
buildings, each worth $50 million. The common stock
is classified in equity. Enterprise A contractually
absorbs only the profits and losses of Building 1,
and B contractually absorbs only the profits and
losses of Building 2. In this example, even though
the common stock is classified in equity, neither
the equity of A nor that of B qualifies as an equity
investment at risk because neither significantly
participates in the profits and losses of the entity
as a whole. The parties should evaluate their
interest under the “silo” provisions in ASC
810-10-25-57 to determine whether silos exist (see
Chapter 6).
5.2.2.1.1 Fixed-Rate, Nonparticipating Preferred Stock
Fixed-rate, nonparticipating preferred-stock or other fixed-return instruments
classified in equity typically would not participate in fluctuations in
a legal entity’s profits and losses. Accordingly, such interests
typically would not participate significantly in the legal entity’s
profits and losses. A reporting entity may determine, upon evaluating
all the facts and circumstances, that a fixed-rate instrument
participates significantly in the profits and losses of the legal
entity. For example, the legal entity may have very little expected variability in profits and
losses (e.g., the legal entity holds fixed-rate assets that have little
risk).
5.2.2.1.2 Contracts and Instruments That Protect an Equity Investor
Contracts and instruments that are separate from the equity interest and entered into with a party other than the investee generally do not cause the equity investment to fail to be at risk.
Whether an equity interest participates significantly in the profits and losses
of a legal entity generally is only based on the terms of the contracts
or instruments with the legal entity. Therefore, a contract or
instrument entered into with a party other than the investee that is
separate from the equity interest itself does not disqualify the equity
investment from being at risk. Contracts and instruments may affect the
holder’s total return but do not directly affect returns from the legal
entity on the equity investment. Therefore, the equity investment would
be at risk as long as it meets the other conditions in ASC
810-10-15-14(a).
Put rights, total return swaps, guarantees, and similar arrangements with
parties related to the legal entity may result in a conclusion that the
equity interest is not at risk under ASC 810-10-15-14(a)(4) (see
Section
5.2.2.4.1).
Note that if the direct holder of the equity interest is acting solely as an agent for the counterparty to the other instrument or contract, a reporting entity should attribute the direct holding to the counterparty in evaluating the accounting requirements under the VIE model.
5.2.2.2 Equity Investments Issued in Exchange for Subordinated Interests in Other VIEs
Equity investment at risk does not include equity interests that the legal entity issued in exchange for subordinated interests in other VIEs. An equity interest can be considered at risk for only one legal entity.
Example 5-4
Entity A (the reporting entity) contributes cash to Entity B (a legal entity
that is a VIE) in exchange for common stock. Entity
A contributes its investment in B to Entity C (a
newly formed legal entity) in exchange for C’s
common stock. Each common stock investment is
classified as equity in the balance sheet of the
respective issuer. By using its investment in B to
fund its investment in C, A has received an equity
investment in exchange for a subordinated interest
in another legal entity. The equity investment in
both B and C is funded with only one cash
contribution. Hence, the common stock in B, but not
the common stock in C, will be considered at
risk.
5.2.2.3 Equity Investments Provided to the Equity Investor by the Legal Entity or by Parties Involved With the Legal Entity
Equity investment at risk does not include amounts (e.g., fees, charitable contributions, or other payments) provided to the equity investor directly or indirectly by the legal entity or by other parties involved with the legal entity unless the provider is a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of the investor that must be included in the same set of consolidated financial statements as the investor.
ASC 810-10-15-14(a) requires the reporting entity to identify whether equity
investment is at risk (i.e., to determine whether the equity investor’s
“skin in the game” is sufficient to warrant a consolidation analysis under
the voting interest entity model). If an equity investment is accompanied by
a contemporaneous return of investment — or a guaranteed return of
investment — the substance of the investment is not at risk. That is, if the
equity investor is assured a return of investment at the time of making its
investment, the transaction contains a round-trip component. If the equity
investment is removed immediately from the legal entity, or otherwise
returned to the investor by a party involved with the legal entity, the risk
of loss does not substantively exist for that equity investment.
Example 5-5
Entities Z and X (both reporting entities) form Entity Y (a legal entity). Entities Z and X each contribute cash to Y in exchange for common stock in Y. Concurrently with this transaction, X agrees to pay Z an up-front fee equal in amount to Z’s cash investment in Y. In this circumstance, though Z has not withdrawn its cash investment in Y, because it has received a cash payment equal in amount to the cash investment, the equity investment contributed by Z is not considered to be at risk.
Considerable judgment is required in the assessment of an arrangement’s facts and circumstances to determine whether the arrangement represents a return of investment sufficient to disqualify an equity interest from treatment as equity investment at risk. Matters requiring assessment include the type, timing, source, and amount of a payment as well as whether the payment is contingent on any circumstances. For example, a fee arrangement after the formation of a venture, in which a venturer is paid an at-market fee for providing services to the venture, does not reduce the equity investment at risk.
ASC 810-10-15-14(a) specifically excludes arrangements between a parent, a
subsidiary, or an affiliate of the equity investor when that party is
required to be included in the same consolidated financial statements as the
investor. Such a circumstance does not involve a return of investment but
instead merely reshuffles it through intercompany accounts without affecting
the consolidated financial statements.
5.2.2.3.1 Equity Received for Promises to Perform Services (“Sweat Equity”)
Equity investments acquired by an equity investor in exchange for promising to
perform services, commonly referred to as “sweat equity,” cannot be
included in equity investment at risk, because the equity is received in
lieu of a fee for services performed. Similarly, equity investments
acquired as a result of past services performed are not considered
equity investment at risk.
Example 5-6
Three investors form Entity X to conduct research and development activities. Entity X issues equity with a par amount of $15 million ($5 million to each investor). Investor A contributes $5 million in cash. Investor B issues a guarantee that the fair value of the completion of the research and development activities will be at least $90 million. Investor C enters into an agreement with X to provide research scientists who will each work for 500 hours to complete the activities.
Only A’s $5 million in equity is considered equity at risk because B and C received their equity as payment from X for the guarantee (promise to stand ready) and the performance of services, respectively.
5.2.2.3.2 Fees Received for Services Performed at Inception or in the Future
Fees paid or the incurrence of an obligation to pay fees to the equity investor
at the inception of the potential VIE (e.g., a developer or structuring
fee) typically reduces the potential VIE’s equity investment at risk.
The amount of the fee represents a return of the investor’s equity at
risk. Since the equity investment is returned (or will be returned over
time in the form of a payable), the portion of the investor’s equity
investment returned in fees is not at risk (see Example 5-5).
By contrast, if the fees expected to be paid to, or incurred by, the investor in
the future are commensurate with the service to be provided (at market
rates, see Section 4.4.1), the
equity investment at risk should not be reduced for these future fees.
If future fees are in excess of market rates, and the equity investor is
unconditionally entitled to the fees, the present value of the excess
should reduce the potential VIE’s equity investment at risk because the
above-market fees received are, in substance, a guaranteed return of
equity.
5.2.2.3.3 Legal Entity’s Equity Obtained in Exchange for Intangible Assets
A reporting entity may acquire a legal entity’s equity in exchange for
intangible assets that are contributed to the legal entity. We believe
that equity acquired in such a manner may be considered equity
investment at risk if the contributed intangible assets meet the
requirements to be recognized as an asset separately from goodwill in
accordance with ASC 805. For a discussion of the requirements for
recognizing intangible assets, see Deloitte’s Roadmap Business Combinations.
Example 5-7
Investor A and Investor B form
Entity X to manufacture an FDA approved drug.
Investor A contributes $10 million in cash and B
contributes technology with an approximate fair
value of $10 million in exchange for each
investor’s equity in X. The technology meets the
requirements to be recognized as an asset
separately from goodwill in accordance with ASC
805.
Entity X’s equity investment at risk is $20
million. The equity received by both A and B is
considered at risk.
5.2.2.4 Equity Financed for the Equity Investor by the Legal Entity or Other Parties Involved With the Legal Entity
Equity investment at risk does not include amounts financed for the equity investor (e.g., by loans or guarantees of loans) directly by the legal entity or by another party involved with the legal entity1 unless that party is a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of the investor that is required to be included in the same set of consolidated financial statements as the investor.
This does not mean that a reporting entity must use its own capital (i.e., not have borrowing relationships) to acquire an interest in a legal entity. Rather, the reporting entity should use judgment and analyze the individual facts and circumstances carefully. For example, a reporting entity may borrow cash from a third-party bank and use a portion of the proceeds on borrowing to fund an equity investment in a legal entity. This situation is clearly different from one in which, instead of a third-party bank, the reporting entity borrows directly from the legal entity.
Transactions and relationships existing “around the legal entity” (see Section 4.3.10.1) are relevant in this assessment. This concept was discussed at the 2004 AICPA Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments by an SEC staff member, Associate Chief Accountant Jane Poulin, who stated, in part:
We have seen a number of questions about whether certain aspects of a relationship that a variable interest holder has with a variable interest entity (VIE) need to be considered when analyzing the application of FIN 46R. These aspects of a relationship are sometimes referred to as “activities around the entity.” It might be helpful to consider a simple example. Say a company (Investor A) made an equity investment in a potential VIE and Investor A separately made a loan with full recourse to another variable interest holder (Investor B). We have been asked whether the loan in this situation can be ignored when analyzing the application of FIN 46R. The short answer is no. First, FIN 46R specifically requires you to consider loans between investors as well as those between the entity and the enterprise in determining whether equity investments are at risk, and whether the at risk holders possess the characteristics of a controlling financial interest as defined in paragraph 5(b) of FIN 46R [ASC 810-10-15-14(b)]. It is often
difficult to determine the substance of a lending relationship and
its impact on a VIE analysis on its face. You need to evaluate the
substance of the facts and circumstances. The presence of a loan
between investors will bring into question, in this example, whether
Investor B’s investment is at risk and depending on B’s ownership
percentage and voting rights, will influence whether the at risk
equity holders possess the characteristics of a controlling
financial interest.
Other “activities around the entity” that should be considered when applying FIN 46R include equity investments between investors, puts and calls between the enterprise and other investors and non-investors, service arrangements with investors and non-investors, and derivatives such as total return swaps. There may be other activities around the entity that need to be considered which I have not specifically mentioned. These activities can impact the entire analysis under FIN 46R including the assessment of whether an entity is a VIE as well as who is the primary beneficiary. [Footnotes omitted]
If financing of the equity investment is provided to the equity investor by an
unrelated third party that is not involved with either the legal entity or
other parties involved with the legal entity, the investment can be treated
as equity investment at risk as long as the other criteria in ASC
810-10-15-14(a) are also met. Conversely, if one equity investor provides
financing to another equity investor, the investment made by the equity
investor who received the financing generally would be excluded from equity
investment at risk.
In unusual circumstances, the equity investment may be at risk when (1) one
equity investor provides financing to another equity investor and (2) the
borrowing equity investor is acting solely in the capacity of agent for the
other equity investor (see Example 5-10).
Example 5-8
Enterprises A, B, and C each contribute $100 to form Entity D. Enterprise A’s
$100 contribution was funded by a loan from Bank Z
(an unrelated enterprise). Therefore, A’s equity
does not fail to meet the criterion in ASC
810-10-15-14(a)(4) because its loan was from an
unrelated party that is not involved with either the
legal entity or other parties involved with the
legal entity.
Example 5-9
Enterprises A, B, and C each contribute $100 to form Entity D. Enterprise A’s
$100 contribution was funded by a loan from
Enterprise B (a bank), another party involved with
D. Assume that A is not acting as an agent for B. In
addition, B does not have to be included in A’s
consolidated financial statements.
Enterprise A has financed its equity investment by obtaining a loan directly
from another party that is involved with D.
Subsequently, A’s equity fails to meet the criterion
in ASC 810-10-15-14(a)(4) because its loan was from
another party involved with D that does not need to
be included in A’s consolidated financial
statements. Therefore, A’s $100 contribution would
not qualify as equity investment at risk.
Example 5-10
Enterprises B and C each contribute $50 to form a legal entity. Enterprise B funds its equity investment by obtaining a $50 loan from C. Under a separate agreement, B is required to vote its interest in the legal entity (in all matters) in accordance with C’s instructions; therefore, a principal-agent relationship exists. Assume that B and C are not included in the same set of consolidated financial statements.
In this example, all of B’s equity is considered equity investment at risk. Even
though B obtained its equity through a loan from C
(a party involved with the entity), B’s equity is
still considered equity investment at risk because B
is merely acting as C’s agent.
5.2.2.4.1 Put Options, Call Options, and Total Return Swaps
An equity interest subject to a put option, call option, or total return swap in
which the counterparty is a party unrelated to the legal entity would
not disqualify the equity investment from being at risk. Depending on
the terms, a purchased put, a written call, or a total return swap
entered into by an equity investor with the potential VIE or a party
involved with the potential VIE may result in the disqualification of
the investor’s equity from being considered equity investment at risk
under ASC 810-10-15-14(a)(1) or ASC 810-10-15-14(a)(4).
The following table provides an analysis of whether an equity interest subject
to a purchased put, a written call, or a total return swap qualifies as
equity investment at risk under ASC 810-10-15-14(a)(1) or ASC
810-10-15-14(a)(4), respectively:
Table 5-1 Analysis of Equity Interests
Original Reporting Entity Holds
Equity in a Potential VIE and:
|
Counterparty Is:
|
Participates Significantly in
Profits and Losses (Compliant With ASC
810-10-15-14(a)(1)?)
|
Not Financed by the Legal Entity
or Certain Other Parties (Compliant With ASC
810-10-15-14(a)(4)?)
|
---|---|---|---|
Purchases a physically settled, fixed-price put on its equity investment. | Unrelated to the potential VIE. | Yes. Although the original reporting entity is protected from losses via its fixed-price put option, the equity interest itself will remain outstanding even if the put is exercised; thus, the equity interest participates in both the profits and losses of the potential VIE. | Yes. The counterparty is not the potential VIE or another party involved with the potential VIE. |
Writes a physically settled, fixed-price call on its equity investment. | Unrelated to the potential VIE. | Yes. Although the counterparty can obtain some of the original reporting entity’s upside, the equity interest itself will remain outstanding even if the counterparty exercises its call; thus, the equity interest participates in both the profits and losses of the potential VIE. | Yes. The counterparty is not the potential VIE or another party involved with the potential VIE. |
Enters into a net-cash-settled total return swap indexed to the all-in return on its equity investment.* | Unrelated to the potential VIE. | Yes. The equity interest itself participates in both the profits and losses of the potential VIE. | Yes. The counterparty is not the potential VIE or another party involved with the potential VIE. |
Purchases a physically settled, fixed-price put on its equity investment. | The potential VIE. | No. The fixed-price put option purchased from the potential VIE allows the original reporting entity to simply put its equity instrument to the potential VIE to protect it from incurring losses. Thus, the equity interest does not participate significantly in the potential VIE’s losses. | No. The fixed-price put option purchased from the potential VIE is economically
equivalent to the original reporting entity’s
receipt of a loan guarantee from the potential VIE
pertaining to the original reporting entity’s
investment in the potential VIE.*** |
Writes a physically settled, fixed-price call on its equity investment. | The potential VIE. | No. The fixed-price call option written to the potential VIE results in the significant participation of the original reporting entity only in the potential VIE’s losses but not its profits (provided that the potential VIE acts rationally by exercising the call option when the fair value of the original reporting entity’s equity interest exceeds the fixed strike price). | Yes. The equity interest was not “financed” by the potential VIE. |
Purchases a physically settled, fixed-price put on its equity investment. | A party related to the potential VIE. | Yes. Although the original reporting entity is protected from losses via its
fixed-price put option, the equity interest itself
will remain outstanding even if the put is
exercised; thus, the equity interest participates
in both the profits and losses of the potential
VIE.† | No. The fixed-price put option purchased from the party related to the potential
VIE is economically equivalent to the original
reporting entity’s receipt of a loan guarantee
from the counterparty pertaining to the original
reporting entity’s investment in the potential
VIE.**, *** |
Writes a physically settled, fixed-price call on its equity investment. | A party related to the potential VIE. | Yes. Although the counterparty can obtain some of the original reporting entity’s upside, the equity interest itself will remain outstanding even if the counterparty exercises its call; thus, the equity interest participates in both the profits and losses of the potential VIE. | Yes. The equity interest was not “financed” by the party related to the potential VIE, except for deep in-the-money call options. |
Enters into a net-cash-settled total return swap indexed to the all-in return on its equity investment.* | A party related to the potential VIE. | Yes. The equity interest itself participates in both the profits and losses of the potential VIE. |
Generally, no. The total return swap entered into
with a party related to the potential VIE is
economically equivalent to the original reporting
entity’s receipt of a loan from the counterparty
to finance the original reporting entity’s
investment in the potential VIE. However, the equity investment may be at risk if the original reporting entity
that holds the equity is acting solely as an agent
for the other party related to the potential VIE.
For guidance on determining whether the
arrangement between the two equity investors is
essentially a principal-agent relationship, see
Section 5.2.2.4.** |
* A total return swap on the equity interest is an arrangement in which (1) the
original reporting entity will receive a fixed
return (or variable interest rate return) and an
amount equal to the decline in value of the equity
interest and (2) the counterparty will receive all
of the cash returns on the equity interest and the
appreciation in value of the equity interest. In
effect, a total return swap transfers
substantially all of the risk and return related
to the equity interest in the potential VIE
without necessarily transferring the equity
interest. See Section 4.3.7
for considerations related to whether a
counterparty to a total return swap has a variable
interest in the potential VIE.
** It is assumed in this example that the related
party counterparty is not the reporting entity’s
parent, subsidiary, or affiliate that is required
to be included in the same set of consolidated
financial statements as the entity.
*** We have historically viewed fixed-price put
options to be the economic equivalent of a loan.
That view was premised on the fact that a
nonrecourse loan and a purchased put option give
an investor similar down-side protections. While
we appreciate that some may continue to hold that
view, our perspective on the issue has evolved.
Although purchased put options and nonrecourse
loans provide similar down-side protections,
substantive differences between them exist related
to form and substance. Notably, a loan provides
capital to the investor to make an investment,
whereas the purchased put option does not provide
any capital to the option’s holder up front. That
is, a lender provides capital to the borrower when
the lender extends a loan; an option’s writer does
not extend financing to the buyer of the put
option up front. On the basis of that distinction,
we have updated our interpretation related to this
matter and believe that a purchased put option
should be considered analogous to a loan
guarantee. The down-side protection provided by
the put option is economically equivalent to a
guarantee of the financing deployed to invest in
the entity. We do not believe that it matters
whether the put option guarantees a lender’s
capital or that of the investor — we consider the
two scenarios to be economically equivalent.
† We understand that some may
believe that as a result of such provisions, the
put option’s holder does not participate
significantly in profits and losses because the
investor with the put option is protected from the
potential VIE’s losses. In reaching this
conclusion, some look to the remarks by SEC
Associate Chief Accountant Jane Poulin at the 2004
AICPA Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB
Developments (see Section
5.2.2.4). |
5.2.3 Determining Whether the Identified Equity Investment at Risk Is Sufficient to Finance the Legal Entity’s Operations Without Additional Subordinated Financial Support (Step 3)
Once the amount of equity investment at risk is quantified in step 1 (see
Section 5.2.1)
and step 2 (see Section
5.2.2), a reporting entity must determine whether the equity
investment at risk is sufficient to finance the legal entity’s operations
without additional subordinated financial support. If not, the legal entity is a
VIE. The purpose of this assessment is to identify whether a legal entity is
sufficiently capitalized. Merely having at-risk equity is not enough; the legal
entity must be able to finance its operations with that equity investment at
risk. The reporting entity must use judgment to determine sufficiency since the
various risk tolerances, investment objectives, and liquidity requirements of
investing can influence the level of capital in a legal entity. The FASB’s
guidance below is intended to help the reporting entity determine whether equity
investment at risk is sufficient.
ASC 810-10
25-45 An equity investment at risk of less than 10 percent of the legal entity’s total assets shall not be
considered sufficient to permit the legal entity to finance its activities without subordinated financial support
in addition to the equity investment unless the equity investment can be demonstrated to be sufficient. The
demonstration that equity is sufficient may be based on either qualitative analysis or quantitative analysis
or a combination of both. Qualitative assessments, including, but not limited to, the qualitative assessments
described in (a) and (b), will in some cases be conclusive in determining that the legal entity’s equity at risk is
sufficient. If, after diligent effort, a reasonable conclusion about the sufficiency of the legal entity’s equity at
risk cannot be reached based solely on qualitative considerations, the quantitative analyses implied by (c) shall
be made. In instances in which neither a qualitative assessment nor a quantitative assessment, taken alone,
is conclusive, the determination of whether the equity at risk is sufficient shall be based on a combination of
qualitative and quantitative analyses.
- The legal entity has demonstrated that it can finance its activities without additional subordinated financial support.
- The legal entity has at least as much equity invested as other entities that hold only similar assets of similar quality in similar amounts and operate with no additional subordinated financial support.
- The amount of equity invested in the legal entity exceeds the estimate of the legal entity’s expected losses based on reasonable quantitative evidence.
25-46 Some legal entities may require an equity investment at risk greater than 10 percent of their assets to
finance their activities, especially if they engage in high-risk activities, hold high-risk assets, or have exposure to
risks that are not reflected in the reported amounts of the legal entities’ assets or liabilities. The presumption
in the preceding paragraph does not relieve a reporting entity of its responsibility to determine whether a
particular legal entity with which the reporting entity is involved needs an equity investment at risk greater than
10 percent of its assets in order to finance its activities without subordinated financial support in addition to the
equity investment.
25-47 The design of the legal entity (for example, its capital structure) and the apparent intentions of the
parties that created the legal entity are important qualitative considerations, as are ratings of its outstanding
debt (if any), the interest rates, and other terms of its financing arrangements. Often, no single factor will be
conclusive and the determination will be based on the preponderance of evidence. For example, if a legal
entity does not have a limited life and tightly constrained activities, if there are no unusual arrangements that
appear designed to provide subordinated financial support, if its equity interests do not appear designed to
require other subordinated financial support, and if the entity has been able to obtain commercial financing
arrangements on customary terms, the equity would be expected to be sufficient. In contrast, if a legal
entity has a very small equity investment relative to other entities with similar activities and has outstanding
subordinated debt that obviously is effectively a replacement for an additional equity investment, the equity
would not be expected to be sufficient.
Sufficiency of equity can be demonstrated by qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis, or a combination of both. However, the FASB clearly emphasized that a diligent qualitative assessment should be performed first, including whether (1) the legal entity has demonstrated that it can finance its activities without additional subordinated financial support and (2) the legal entity has at least as much equity invested as other entities that hold only similar assets of similar quality in similar amounts and operate with no additional subordinated financial support. If the qualitative analysis is not conclusive, the reporting entity can perform a quantitative analysis of whether the legal entity’s equity investment at risk exceeds the legal entity’s expected losses (see Appendix C for details on calculating expected losses). Conversely, if a qualitative assessment is conclusive, a quantitative approach is unnecessary.
The qualitative analysis requires, in part, a consideration of quantitative
measures (e.g., percentage of equity investment at risk compared to total
assets). To perform the assessment correctly, the reporting entity must first
determine the appropriate ratio of equity investment at risk to total assets by
comparing, on a fair value basis as of the assessment date, the equity
investment at risk to total assets.
Under U.S. GAAP, a reporting entity must sometimes use carryover historical cost to record initial equity contributions made in the form of nonmonetary assets (e.g., formation of a joint venture or a contribution of nonmonetary assets pursuant to SAB Topic 5.G). Nonetheless, a reporting entity should use the fair value of the asset (e.g., fixed asset, intellectual property) as of the contribution date, not the carrying value of the asset in the contributor’s books before the transfer, as the amount of the equity investment at risk.
When performing the quantitative assessment, the reporting entity should not
include amounts reported as components of other comprehensive income or loss in
the equity investment at risk. Because the assessment is performed on a fair
value basis, such amounts are already reflected in the fair value of the equity
investment at risk and therefore should not be double-counted.
ASC 810-10 provides a rebuttable presumption that a ratio of under 10 percent of equity investment at risk to total assets is not sufficient. This test is often misconstrued to mean that an equity investment in excess of 10 percent is sufficient. However, it should not be interpreted that way because the test is one directional and nondeterminative. The 10 percent presumption is intended to supersede guidance that existed before the effective date of FIN 46(R), as explained in paragraph E23 in the Basis for Conclusions of FIN 46(R):
Because precisely estimating expected losses may be difficult and an entity may need an equity investment greater than its expected losses, the Board established a presumption that an equity investment is insufficient to allow an entity to finance its activities unless the investment is equal to at least 10 percent of the entity’s total assets. Another reason for that presumption is to emphasize that the requirement for 3 percent equity referred to in EITF Issue No. 90-15, “Impact of Nonsubstantive Lessors, Residual Value Guarantees, and Other Provisions in Leasing Transactions,” is superseded and that an equity investment as small as 3 percent is insufficient for many variable interest entities. The Board intends that presumption to apply in one direction only. That is, an equity investment of less than 10 percent is presumed to be insufficient, but an equity investment of 10 percent is not presumed to be sufficient.
If the proportion of equity investment at risk to total assets (again, both on a
fair value basis) is under 10 percent, additional facts and circumstances would
be considered, and the hurdle for concluding that equity investment at risk is
sufficient would be raised significantly.
There are two qualitative approaches to assessing the sufficiency of the legal entity’s equity investment at risk. The first is to evaluate whether the legal entity has demonstrated that it can finance its activities without additional subordinated financial support. Such an evaluation will require consideration of facts and circumstances, and it may be difficult for the legal entity to demonstrate that it can finance its activities without such additional support when the legal entity is capitalized with a variety of forms of equity investment. Certain factors, such as the following, may indicate that a legal entity does not have sufficient equity investment at risk to finance its operations:
- The existence of non-investment-grade debt may indicate that a lender does not view the legal entity as having sufficient capitalization.
- A venture that has external borrowings that require a parental guarantee may likewise indicate that a lender does not view the legal entity as sufficiently capitalized. However, this could be overcome if the guarantees are normal for similar legal entities or if investment-grade debt could have been obtained in the absence of the guarantee (or both).
Other factors, such as the following, may indicate the opposite (i.e., that a
legal entity does have sufficient equity investment at risk to finance its
operations):
-
The existence of investment-grade debt may indicate that third parties deem the legal entity to be sufficiently capitalized.
-
The absence of subordinated financial support within the legal entity’s capital structure may, depending on how long the legal entity has operated, indicate that the legal entity has the wherewithal to finance its own operations on the strength of its equity investment at risk alone.
The negative factors above may prove difficult to overcome. However, neither group of indicators is determinative nor should it be considered in isolation (i.e., without an assessment of the associated facts and circumstances). Reporting entities will need to exercise considerable judgment in qualitatively assessing sufficiency.
The second approach to assessing the sufficiency of the legal entity’s equity investment at risk is to evaluate evidence provided by other entities that have demonstrated their ability to finance operations without additional subordinated financial support. The comparable entities, however, must be extremely similar to the legal entity being analyzed. The following is a nonexhaustive list of the factors that should be considered in the assessment of similarity:
- The location of the entities, both physically and in terms of where the entities do business.
- The industry sector in which the entities operate.
- The size of the entities’ assets, liabilities, equity, results of operations, and cash flows.
- The risks to which the entities are exposed, both internally and externally.
- The regulatory environment in which the entities operate.
If, after using these approaches, the results
are still inconclusive, a reporting entity would perform a quantitative
analysis. In doing so, the reporting entity would determine whether the legal
entity’s expected losses can be absorbed in total by the
equity investment at risk or whether other instruments absorb expected losses
(see Appendix C for
guidance on calculating expected losses). In its simplest form, the quantitative
analysis can be characterized as follows:
Equity investment at risk > Expected losses = Sufficient equity investment at risk
However, in a manner similar to the qualitative assessment described above, reporting entities must use judgment when performing the quantitative assessment.
Example 5-11
A legal entity is formed with (1) a $50 million equity investment that meets the
conditions in ASC 810-10-15-14(a) for being “at risk”
and (2) $950 million in high-credit-quality senior debt
(e.g., AAA-rated). The high credit rating of the debt
suggests the independent rating agencies believe that
variable interests other than the debt holders will
absorb the legal entity’s expected losses. If the only
variable interest besides the debt is the equity, the
equity is considered to be sufficient to finance the
legal entity’s activities without additional
subordinated financial support.
Although the reporting entity has reached a conclusion about the sufficiency of
the legal entity’s equity at risk, the reporting entity
must still analyze the legal entity to determine whether
it fails to meet any of the characteristics in ASC
810-10-15-14(b) and (c) before concluding that the legal
entity is not a VIE. See Sections 5.3 and
5.4, respectively.
Example 5-12
A legal entity is formed with (1) a 1 percent equity investment that meets the
conditions in ASC 810-10-15-14(a) for being “at risk”
and (2) 99 percent debt, which contractually receives a
high rate of return in relation to the interest rate of
an investment-grade instrument with similar terms. Since
the legal entity only has 1 percent equity and has
issued subordinated debt in exchange for agreeing to pay
a high rate of return, a qualitative analysis would
demonstrate that the legal entity is a VIE because the
equity investment at risk is not sufficient.
Regardless of whether a reporting entity is analyzing a potential VIE qualitatively or quantitatively, any future financings that are required by the governing or contractual arrangements that exist as of the evaluation date (or that are contemplated by the involved parties in a manner consistent with the design of the potential VIE) should be included in the determination of the sufficiency of equity investment at risk. The reporting entity may only consider financings and activities associated with the current design of the potential VIE. Commitments to fund equity or to absorb losses are not considered GAAP equity (see Section 5.1.2).
The existence of a requirement to provide future financings does not
automatically indicate that there is insufficient equity investment at risk to
finance a legal entity’s operations without additional subordinated financial
support. A reporting entity should consider whether the legal entity can finance
its current operations and activities with equity that exists as of the
evaluation date and without additional subordinated financial support. The fact
that equity commitments are outstanding does not necessarily mean that there is
insufficient equity. For example:
-
A commitment to fund future acquisitions or expansion activity would not necessarily indicate that a legal entity is insufficiently capitalized currently. The reporting entity should consider whether the acquisitions are currently necessary to operate the business.
-
A legal entity may choose to fund a substantial amount of its capital with equity despite its ability to obtain investment-grade debt. Such a scenario is not an indicator that the legal entity’s equity commitments outstanding are insufficient equity investment at risk if the legal entity has (1) received sufficient equity (i.e., without considering future equity to be received from equity commitments outstanding) to finance its operations without additional financial support and (2) elected to finance the remaining capital with additional equity.
Reporting entities should carefully consider all the facts and circumstances associated with future financing arrangements.
Example 5-13
Investors A and B each contributed $20
million in return for an equity investment in Entity C,
a legal entity that used the proceeds from the equity
issuance to purchase a warehouse. Entity C plans to
convert the warehouse into a condominium building, which
it intends to sell upon completion of the conversion. In
addition, A and B have each agreed to provide an
additional $80 million of financing for the conversion
on an as-needed basis. Because C was designed to
purchase and convert the warehouse, the commitments made
by A and B would lead to the conclusion that C is
insufficiently capitalized and is therefore a VIE.
Note that C’s status as a VIE would need to be
reconsidered upon each additional equity funding in
accordance with the guidance in ASC 810-10-35-4(d). See
Section 9.1.4 for additional
information.
Example 5-14
Company A forms Entity C to acquire and operate Company
X. Company A contributes $100 million in return for an
equity investment in C. In addition, Investor B, an
unrelated third party, contributes $100 million in
return for an equity investment in C. Company A and
Investor B have each agreed to provide additional
financing for any future acquisitions that C may make.
Although A and B have agreed to fund C’s future
acquisitions, this agreement alone would not lead to a
conclusion that C is insufficiently capitalized. Because
C was designed to purchase and operate X, the assessment
of whether C is insufficiently capitalized should only
include C’s current activities (i.e., acquiring and
operating X).
5.2.3.1 Whether a Quantitative Analysis Overrides a Qualitative Analysis
A quantitative analysis will not override a conclusive qualitative analysis. In the VIE assessment, a qualitative assessment may be preferable to an expected loss calculation for the following reasons:
- The qualitative approach may help a reporting entity avoid the detailed estimates and computations of the quantitative approach (which could require significant effort and costs).
- While a quantitative approach may appear more precise and less subjective, the reporting entity may lack objective evidence on which to base the estimates and assumptions used to make the computation, resulting in imprecision and subjectivity.
Reasoned professional judgment that takes into account all facts and circumstances (including qualitative and quantitative considerations) is often as good as, or even better than, mathematical computations based on estimates and assumptions.
Example 5-15
Enterprise A contributes $1,000 in return for an equity investment in Entity B, a legal entity, which represents equity investment at risk. Enterprise A must assess whether B’s equity at risk is sufficient to finance its activities without additional subordinated financial support. Enterprise A initially determines that the available qualitative evidence regarding the sufficiency of B’s equity at risk is not conclusive. Therefore, A performs an expected loss calculation and determines that B’s expected losses are $995.
Although B’s $1,000 equity at risk exceeds the calculated expected losses of $995, the relatively insignificant difference between the two amounts provides little assurance that the quantitative approach alone is adequate in the assessment of the sufficiency of the equity at risk. In this case, A must consider this quantitative analysis as well as the qualitative evidence to determine whether B’s equity at risk is sufficient.
5.2.3.2 Existence of Subordinated Debt
In a qualitative assessment of the sufficiency of equity investment at risk, the existence of subordinated debt is a factor indicating that a legal entity’s total equity investment at risk may not be sufficient to absorb expected losses. That is, by virtue of its subordination, subordinated debt is expected to absorb expected losses beyond a legal entity’s equity investment at risk. However, the existence of subordinated debt should not be considered determinative in itself; an evaluation of the sufficiency of equity at risk should be based on all facts and circumstances.
Example 5-16
Entity D is formed with $50 of equity investment at risk and $50 of long-term
debt. The long-term debt consists of two issuances:
Debt A, $45, and Debt B, $5. Debt B is subordinate
to Debt A. Because D was recently formed, it could
not obtain senior debt (Debt A) in an
investment-grade form.
In a qualitative assessment, the existence of subordinated debt is a factor indicating that D does not have sufficient equity at risk. That factor should be considered along with all other facts and circumstances (e.g., a 50 percent ratio of equity at risk frequently exceeds expected losses). If the qualitative assessment is inconclusive, a quantitative analysis (i.e., calculation of expected losses/residual returns) should be performed to determine whether D is a VIE.
Example 5-17
Assume that in the example above it was determined that Entity D was a VIE. Two
years later, D engages in additional business
activities beyond those that were considered at
formation and is an established, profitable
business. Given its desire to further expand its
business, D issues a new tranche of debt (Debt C)
whose rank is identical in seniority (e.g., priority
in liquidation) to that of Debt B. Because of its
stable financial condition, the tranche of debt is
rated investment-grade. Given the identical priority
in liquidation of Debt B and Debt C, one can infer
that Debt A (which is senior to Debt B) and Debt B
would be rated investment-grade as well. No other
debt securities are outstanding, and no other
evidence of subordinated financial support (e.g.,
guarantees) is noted. Assume that a reconsideration
event under ASC 810-10-35-4(c) has occurred because
the additional business activities increase D’s
expected losses (see Chapter 9).
Therefore, the variable interest holders must
determine whether D is still a VIE.
In a qualitative assessment, D’s ability to issue investment-grade debt that has
the same priority in liquidation as Debt B is one
factor indicating that D, as of the reconsideration
date, has sufficient equity at risk. In other words,
in the absence of other forms of subordinated
financial support, D would not have been able to
obtain an investment-grade rating on the new debt if
its existing equity at risk was not sufficient.
However, all other facts and circumstances existing
as of the reconsideration date should be considered.
If the qualitative assessment is not conclusive, a
quantitative analysis should be performed to
determine whether D is a VIE as of the
reconsideration date.
Example 5-18
Entity M is formed with equity and three issuances of debt. One of the debt instruments is investment-grade, while the other two are unrated debt. At formation, a qualitative assessment provides conclusive evidence that M has sufficient equity at risk. There are no other factors that would cause M to be a VIE.
Five years later, M has incurred losses in several periods and disposes of two
significant lines of business. Entity M also obtains
additional financing in the form of subordinated
debt that is rated as below investment-grade. Entity
M continues to maintain an investment-grade rating
on its other tranches of debt. Assume that a
reconsideration event under ASC 810-10-35-4(d) has
occurred because M has curtailed its activities in a
way that decreases its expected losses (see
Chapter 9). Therefore, the variable
interest holders must determine whether M is a VIE
as of the reconsideration date.
While M continues to have investment-grade debt outstanding, the subsequent
issuance of subordinated debt is, in a qualitative
assessment, one factor indicating that M does not
have sufficient equity at risk (in other words, if M
had sufficient equity at risk to finance its
activities, the issuance of subordinated debt that
is below investment-grade would be unnecessary).
However, all other facts and circumstances existing
as of the reconsideration date should be considered.
If the qualitative assessment is inconclusive, a
quantitative analysis should be performed to
determine whether M is a VIE as of the
reconsideration date.
5.2.3.3 Determining Whether a Variable Interest Is Subordinated Financial Support
Not all variable interests should be considered subordinated financial support.
Interests in a legal entity that are considered variable interests because
they absorb expected losses of the legal entity are not necessarily
subordinated financial support. Variable interests, as defined in ASC
810-10-20, are “contractual, ownership, or other pecuniary interests in a
VIE that change with changes in the fair value of the VIE’s net assets
exclusive of variable interests.” ASC 810-10-55-19 further indicates that
variable interests absorb or receive the expected variability created by
assets, liabilities, or contracts of a VIE that are not, themselves,
variable interests.
The determination of whether a variable interest is subordinated financial
support will be based on how that interest absorbs expected losses compared
with other variable interests in the legal entity. The determination will be
based on all facts and circumstances. If the terms of the arrangement cause
the variable interest to absorb expected losses before or at the same level
as the most subordinated interests (e.g., equity, subordinated debt), or the
most subordinated interests are not large enough to absorb the legal
entity’s expected losses, the variable interest would generally be
considered subordinated financial support. For example, investment-grade
debt is a variable interest that would generally not be considered
subordinated financial support. See Section 4.2.1.2.3 for additional
discussion.
Example 5-19
An investor holds a common-stock investment of $50 and a debt instrument of $60
in a legal entity. The only other variable interest
is $40 of preferred stock held by an unrelated third
party. The common and preferred stock are considered
equity at risk in accordance with ASC
810-10-15-14(a), and the expected losses of the
entity are $40. The entity is designed so that
common and preferred stock absorb expected losses
before the debt.
In this example, the common stock, preferred stock, and debt are all considered
variable interests because they are expected to
absorb some of the potential VIE’s variability.
However, because the common and preferred stock
($90) are expected to absorb 100 percent of the
expected losses ($40), the debt is not considered
subordinated financial support.
5.2.3.4 Interaction Between Minimum Regulatory Capital and the Sufficiency of Equity Investment at Risk
Certain entities operate in regulatory environments in which an external party — sometimes a governmental agency — establishes requirements for the minimum level of capital a reporting entity must maintain. For example, the levels of capitalization that reporting entities in the banking industry are required to maintain may be influenced by their exposure (i.e., financial positions taken, including derivative exposure). The minimum level of capital required by regulation may be less than the 10 percent rebuttable presumption discussed in Section 5.2.3. Although meeting the minimum level of regulatory capital is not enough evidence alone to support a conclusion that equity investment at risk is sufficient, the consideration of regulatory capital requirements (and compliance with those requirements) may be appropriate in the assessment of whether a legal entity has sufficient capital to finance its operations.
5.2.4 Development-Stage Entities
Before the adoption of ASU 2014-10,2 certain entities could qualify for specialized accounting under ASC 915 as
development-stage entities. Such entities were, by definition, in a stage of
development as opposed to conducting operations in accordance with their
principal plan. Accordingly, those qualifying entities differed in nature from
other entities, often being capitalized only to the extent required to perform a
specific task related to development.
Although ASU 2014-10 removed the concept of a development-stage
entity, we believe that it is still necessary to consider the design of a legal
entity in the determination of whether its equity investment at risk is
sufficient. That is, considering only the legal entity’s current stage of
development may be appropriate in the assessment of sufficiency of equity.
Specifically, if a legal entity is in the development stage and there is
substantial uncertainty about whether the legal entity will proceed to the next
stage, it may be appropriate to consider only the current stage in the
sufficiency assessment. This approach is consistent with the assessment of power
of a multiple-stage entity as well as the evaluation of forward starting rights
(including puts, calls, and forward contracts) in a primary-beneficiary
assessment. See Section 7.2.9.1 for a
discussion of forward starting rights in a primary-beneficiary assessment. For
additional discussion of whether a substantive contingency exists regarding
proceeding to the next stage of development, see Section 7.2.9.2.
A reporting entity should initially assess whether a
development-stage entity is a VIE on the date on which it first becomes involved
with the legal entity. This assessment must be reconsidered upon the occurrence
of any of the events in ASC 810-10-35-4. For a development-stage entity, this
would include, but not be limited to:
-
Funding of additional equity.
-
Commencement of additional activities (e.g., entering a subsequent “phase” of development).
Example 5-20
Entity D is a development-stage entity. Investor A and Investor B each
contributed $1 million of equity financing to D. Entity
D’s current activities consist of product development
and marketing surveys (“phase I”). Upon successful
completion of phase I, D plans to commence test
marketing (i.e., selling these products in selected
areas) (“phase II”). During the final phase of D’s
development stage, it plans to engage in limited-scale
production and selling efforts (“phase III”). Entity D’s
by-laws allow A and B to fund additional equity upon the
completion of phase I and phase II. However, it is not
certain that D will proceed to phase II.
In the assessment of whether D has sufficient equity at risk under ASC
810-10-15-14(a), only the current phase of D’s
development needs to be considered. Thus, if, at
inception, the $2 million of equity capital is deemed
sufficient to finance phase I, D would be considered to
have sufficient equity investment at risk. This
determination should be reassessed at the commencement
of phase II and phase III, upon the funding of
additional equity financing, or upon the occurrence of
any of the events in ASC 810-10-35-4.
Example 5-21
Entity A is a biopharmaceutical entity whose purpose and
design are to complete phase II clinical trials.
Currently, A is developing a drug candidate that is in
phase I clinical trials, and A has concluded that there
is substantial uncertainty about its ability to complete
such trials. At the inception of the phase I clinical
trials, A received an additional equity investment. Upon
receiving that investment, A determined that it should
assess whether under ASC 810-10-15-14(a) there was
sufficient equity for completing the phase I clinical
trials. Although A expects to need additional
subordinated financial support to conduct phase II
clinical trials, those trials represent the next stage
for A as a development-stage entity. Accordingly, any
additional subordinated financial support needed for
phase II clinical trials would not be considered in the
assessment of the sufficiency of equity for phase I
clinical trials.
It may be appropriate for A to consider only its current
clinical trial phase (i.e., I, II, or III) when
assessing whether it has sufficient equity at risk under
ASC 810-10-15-14(a). However, an entity generally should
take into account its overall purpose and design and the
associated risks when performing such an assessment. On
the basis of the nature of the underlying intellectual
property, there may be circumstances in which an entity
concludes that there is limited uncertainty that it will
move from one phase of clinical trials to the next. In
such instances, it would not be appropriate to limit the
assessment of the sufficiency of equity to simply the
completion of the current phase of clinical trials.
Footnotes
1
This relationship may be an indicator of a de facto agency relationship under
ASC 810-10-25-43(b). See Section 8.2.3.2.
2
ASU 2014-10 eliminated the specialized approach for
considering sufficiency of equity investment at risk for
development-stage entities. That guidance became effective for public
business entities for annual periods beginning after December 15, 2015,
and interim periods therein. For entities other than public business
entities, the guidance became effective for annual periods beginning
after December 15, 2016, and for interim periods beginning after
December 15, 2017. Reporting entities that have historically applied
this exception should consider the impact of ASU 2014-10 on their
historical conclusions.
5.3 Equity Investors, as a Group, Lack the Characteristics of a Controlling Financial Interest
A reporting entity determines whether it holds a controlling financial interest in a legal entity differently under the VIE model than it does under the voting interest entity model. The voting interest entity model focuses on the voting rights conveyed by equity interests. Since the holder of an interest other than equity may control the legal entity, the voting interest entity model may not yield an appropriate consolidation conclusion if the equity interests at risk collectively do not possess the characteristics that are typical of equity interests. Accordingly, a legal entity is considered a VIE if the at-risk holders as a group, through their equity investment at risk, lack any of the following three qualities, which are the “typical” characteristics of an equity investment:
- The power to direct the most significant activities of the legal entity (see Section 5.3.1).
- The obligation to absorb the expected losses of the legal entity (see Section 5.3.2).
- The right to receive the expected residual returns of the legal entity (see Section 5.3.3).
The rights of the equity investor group must be a characteristic of the equity investment at risk itself and not a characteristic of other interests held by the current holders of the equity investment at risk. For example, an interest outside the equity investment at risk may permit its holder to direct the most significant activities of the legal entity. If that substantively separate interest is held by a party that is also an owner of equity investment at risk, it should not be combined with the equity investment at risk in this analysis because by design, the rights and obligations do not inure to the equity interest itself. See Section 5.3.1.1.2.
Each individual equity investment at risk need not possess all three characteristics, but the total equity investment at risk must possess them all. By implication, as long as the group of equity investors possesses these three characteristics through their equity investment at risk, the failure of any one at-risk equity investor to possess the characteristics would not make the legal entity a VIE.
The following are situations (not all-inclusive) in which a legal entity is a VIE because the at-risk equity investors as a group lack one or more of the three characteristics:
- Holders of variable interests other than equity investment at risk (e.g., debt holders, providers of guarantees, counterparties on derivative transactions that represent variable interests, providers under service contracts that represent variable interests) have sufficient voting rights or contractual rights to prevent the holders of the equity “at risk” from having the power to direct the activities of the entity that most significantly affect the legal entity’s economic performance.
- Holders of variable interests other than equity investment at risk protect the equity investment at risk from expected losses or cap the return on the equity investment at risk.
- Holders of equity that is not considered at risk have the power to direct the activities of the legal entity (or a single party and its related parties hold substantive participating rights over those decisions).
Example 5-22
The financing of Entity 1 consists of $100 million in equity investment at risk
(two investors each hold $50 million of the at-risk equity) and $200 million in
convertible debt held by a single unrelated investor. The convertible debt
carries 66 percent of the voting rights on all matters subject to shareholder
vote (including those activities that most significantly affect the entity’s
economic performance). Because the convertible debt is not considered equity at
risk, and the convertible debt holder can exercise power through voting on the
activities that most significantly affect the entity’s economic performance, the
holders of equity investment at risk, as a group, fail to possess the
power-to-direct characteristic in ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(1) through their equity
investment at risk (see the next section). Therefore, Entity 1 is a VIE.
5.3.1 The Power to Direct the Most Significant Activities of the Legal Entity
ASC 810-10
15-14 A
legal entity shall be subject to consolidation under the guidance in the
Variable Interest Entities Subsections if, by design, any of the following
conditions exist. (The phrase by design refers to legal entities that
meet the conditions in this paragraph because of the way they are structured.
For example, a legal entity under the control of its equity investors that
originally was not a VIE does not become one because of operating losses. The
design of the legal entity is important in the application of these
provisions.) . . .
b. As a group the holders of the equity investment at risk lack any one of the following three characteristics:
- The power, through voting rights or similar rights, to direct the activities of a legal entity that most significantly impact the entity’s economic performance.
- For legal entities other than limited partnerships, investors lack that power
through voting rights or similar rights if no
owners hold voting rights or similar rights (such
as those of a common shareholder in a
corporation). Legal entities that are not
controlled by the holder of a majority voting
interest because of noncontrolling shareholder
veto rights (participating rights) as discussed in
paragraphs 810-10-25-2 through 25-14 are not VIEs
if the holders of the equity investment at risk as
a group have the power to control the entity and
the equity investment meets the other requirements
of the Variable Interest Entities Subsections.01. If no owners hold voting rights or similar rights (such as those of a common shareholder in a corporation) over the activities of a legal entity that most significantly impact the entity’s economic performance, kick-out rights or participating rights (according to their VIE definitions) held by the holders of the equity investment at risk shall not prevent interests other than the equity investment from having this characteristic unless a single equity holder (including its related parties and de facto agents) has the unilateral ability to exercise such rights. Alternatively, interests other than the equity investment at risk that provide the holders of those interests with kick-out rights or participating rights shall not prevent the equity holders from having this characteristic unless a single reporting entity (including its related parties and de facto agents) has the unilateral ability to exercise those rights. A decision maker also shall not prevent the equity holders from having this characteristic unless the fees paid to the decision maker represent a variable interest based on paragraphs 810-10-55-37 through 55-38.
- For limited partnerships, partners lack that power if neither (01) nor (02) below exists. The guidance in this subparagraph does not apply to entities in industries (see paragraphs 910-810-45-1 and 932-810-45-1) in which it is appropriate for a general partner to use the pro rata method of consolidation for its investment in a limited partnership (see paragraph 810-10-45-14).01. A simple majority or lower threshold of limited partners (including a single limited partner) with equity at risk is able to exercise substantive kick-out rights (according to their voting interest entity definition) through voting interests over the general partner(s).A. For purposes of evaluating the threshold in (01) above, a general partner’s kick-out rights held through voting interests shall not be included. Kick-out rights through voting interests held by entities under common control with the general partner or other parties acting on behalf of the general partner also shall not be included.02. Limited partners with equity at risk are able to exercise substantive participating rights (according to their voting interest entity definition) over the general partner(s).03. For purposes of (01) and (02) above, evaluation of the substantiveness of participating rights and kick-out rights shall be based on the guidance included in paragraphs 810-10-25-2 through 25-14C. . . .
- For legal entities other than limited partnerships, investors lack that power
through voting rights or similar rights if no
owners hold voting rights or similar rights (such
as those of a common shareholder in a
corporation). Legal entities that are not
controlled by the holder of a majority voting
interest because of noncontrolling shareholder
veto rights (participating rights) as discussed in
paragraphs 810-10-25-2 through 25-14 are not VIEs
if the holders of the equity investment at risk as
a group have the power to control the entity and
the equity investment meets the other requirements
of the Variable Interest Entities Subsections.
If interests other than the equity investment at risk
provide the holders of that investment with these characteristics or if
interests other than the equity investment at risk prevent the equity holders
from having these characteristics, the entity is a VIE. . . .
A legal entity can be structured to give a number of different involved parties
the ability to make decisions related to the legal entity (e.g., the equity holders, the
holders of interests other than equity such as debt, or a decision maker). For legal entities other than limited partnerships, a legal
entity would be considered a VIE (regardless of the sufficiency of the equity investment
at risk) if an interest or party outside the equity investment at risk is making the
decisions that most significantly affect the legal entity’s economic performance. A
limited partnership or similar entity would be considered a VIE unless the limited
partners hold substantive kick-out or participating
rights.
The legal form of a legal entity (e.g., corporation, partnership, LLC) can
affect its governance and, accordingly, which party has the ability to make decisions.
Generally, a legal entity structured as a limited partnership is required by applicable
partnership law to have a general partner responsible for governing the limited
partnership and has, by its nature, a decision maker. By contrast, other legal entities,
such as corporations, have equity holders that generally make decisions, even if those
decisions are delegated to another party. Accordingly, the determination of whether the
equity holders, as a group, have the power to direct the most significant activities of a
legal entity is based on the entity’s legal form. Possession of the “power to direct”
characteristic is assessed differently depending on whether the legal entity is a limited
partnership (or similar entity) or any other type of legal entity. See Section 5.3.1.2.1 for a discussion of
what is meant by a “similar entity.”
As noted above, if participating rights are held by an interest or party outside the equity investment at risk, a legal entity would be considered a VIE. The legal form of the legal entity, however, governs which definition of participating rights (i.e., the VIE definition or the voting interest entity definition) is used in the determination of whether the legal entity is a VIE or voting interest entity. If the legal entity is an entity other than a limited partnership, the VIE definition is used. As discussed in Section 5.3.1.1.3.5, the analysis for a legal entity other than a limited partnership focuses on whether participating rights are related to the most significant activities, while the analysis for a limited partnership (or similar entity) focuses on whether the rights are related to decisions made in the ordinary course of business (see Section 5.3.1.2.7 for further discussion).
Note that for limited partnerships and entities other than limited partnerships, different definitions of participating rights are not used in the identification of the primary beneficiary of a VIE; rather, the VIE definition of participating rights applies to both types of legal entities. Accordingly, the primary-beneficiary analysis focuses on whether the participating rights are related to the activities that most significantly affect the VIE’s economic performance (see Section 7.2.10.4 for further discussion).
5.3.1.1 The Power to Direct the Most Significant Activities of an Entity Other Than a Limited Partnership (or Similar Entity)
ASC 810-10
15-14 A
legal entity shall be subject to consolidation under the guidance in the
Variable Interest Entities Subsections if, by design, any of the following
conditions exist. (The phrase by design refers to legal entities that
meet the conditions in this paragraph because of the way they are
structured. For example, a legal entity under the control of its equity
investors that originally was not a VIE does not become one because of
operating losses. The design of the legal entity is important in the
application of these provisions.) . . .
b. As a group the holders of the equity investment at risk lack any one of the following three characteristics:
- The power, through voting rights or similar rights, to direct the activities of a legal entity that most significantly impact the entity’s economic performance.
- For legal entities other than limited partnerships, investors lack that power through voting rights or similar rights if no owners hold voting rights or similar rights (such as those of a common shareholder in a corporation). Legal entities that are not controlled by the holder of a majority voting interest because of noncontrolling shareholder veto rights (participating rights) as discussed in paragraphs 810-10-25-2 through 25-14 are not VIEs if the holders of the equity investment at risk as a group have the power to control the entity and the equity investment meets the other requirements of the Variable Interest Entities Subsections.01. If no owners hold voting rights or similar rights (such as those of a common shareholder in a corporation) over the activities of a legal entity that most significantly impact the entity’s economic performance, kick-out rights or participating rights (according to their VIE definitions) held by the holders of the equity investment at risk shall not prevent interests other than the equity investment from having this characteristic unless a single equity holder (including its related parties and de facto agents) has the unilateral ability to exercise such rights. Alternatively, interests other than the equity investment at risk that provide the holders of those interests with kick-out rights or participating rights shall not prevent the equity holders from having this characteristic unless a single reporting entity (including its related parties and de facto agents) has the unilateral ability to exercise those rights. A decision maker also shall not prevent the equity holders from having this characteristic unless the fees paid to the decision maker represent a variable interest based on paragraphs 810-10-55-37 through 55-38. . . .
If interests other than the equity investment at risk
provide the holders of that investment with these characteristics or if
interests other than the equity investment at risk prevent the equity
holders from having these characteristics, the entity is a VIE. . . .
The evaluation of whether the at-risk equity holders, as a group, have power to direct the most significant activities of a legal entity other than a limited partnership (or similar entity) focuses on whether the voting rights or similar rights of the at-risk holders’ equity investment at risk allow them to direct the activities that most significantly affect the legal entity’s economic performance. In making this determination, the reporting entity would:
- Identify the group of equity investors that has equity investment at risk (see Section 5.2). If an equity investor has inconsequential equity (e.g., less than 1 percent of the outstanding equity) but has been granted decision-making rights, that investor would generally not be considered part of the group of equity investors at risk.
- Identify the most significant activities that affect the economic performance of the legal entity (see Section 5.3.1.1.1).
- Evaluate whether, as a group, the equity investors at risk unilaterally have the power over all of the most significant activities through their equity interest itself (i.e., not through a substantively separate management contract or other interest in the entity; see Section 4.3 for a discussion of various variable interests) (Section 5.3.1.1.2).
- If there is an outsourced decision maker (whether through a substantively separate arrangement with an equity investor or an unrelated third party), determine whether (1) the decision maker’s rights represent a variable interest, (2) a single equity investor at risk (including its related parties) holds a substantive kick-out right to remove the decision maker, or (3) a single equity investor at risk (including its related parties) or a single party outside the group of at-risk equity investors has the right to participate in the most significant activities of the entity (see Section 5.3.1.1.3).
The legal entity is a VIE if the above analysis demonstrates that a variable
interest holder that does not hold equity investment at risk (or obtains its rights
through a substantively separate contract) directs the most significant activities of
the legal entity or a single party outside the group of at-risk equity investors
substantively participates in the most significant activities (see Section 5.3.1.1.3.5).
5.3.1.1.1 Identifying the Most Significant Activities (Including Predetermined Activities)
The assessment of whether the reporting entity has the power to direct the most significant activities is consistent with the assessment performed later in the consolidation analysis to identify whether the reporting entity satisfies the primary-beneficiary power condition over a VIE (see Section 7.2). The reporting entity must carefully consider the design and purpose of the legal entity. In addition, unlike the analysis generally performed under the voting interest entity model, under the VIE analysis the reporting entity cannot assume that the operating, capital, and financing decisions or the hiring and firing of management or setting of management’s compensation are the legal entity’s most significant activities.
The reporting entity must identify the level at which the entity’s most significant decisions are made. For example, certain decisions may be made by the board of directors, while others may be made by another party (e.g., a decision maker through a contract that is substantively separate from the equity interests). If decisions about the most significant activities are made by the board of directors (which would be the case for most operating entities), a decision maker would effectively be acting as a service provider on behalf of the board of directors. See Section 7.2.5 for a discussion of the determination of whether the most significant activities are performed at the board level or at the manager level.
The reporting entity should also understand the purpose and design of the legal
entity, including the risks that the legal entity was designed to create and pass
through to the variable interest holders. Once the risks of the legal entity that
affect its economic performance are identified, the reporting entity should evaluate
the activities that are expected to have the most significant impact on the economic
performance of the legal entity and the types of decisions that can be made regarding
those activities, including significant decisions made in directing and carrying out
the legal entity’s current business activities. Generally, activities related to
managing the risks the legal entity was designed to pass along to the variable
interest holders are the key activities that affect the economic performance. As part
of this analysis, it is important for the reporting entity to distinguish between the
ability (1) to make significant decisions that are expected to be made in the ordinary
course of carrying out the legal entity’s current business activities and (2) to make
decisions in exceptional circumstances or to veto or prevent certain fundamental
changes in the legal entity’s design or activities. The latter are generally
considered protective rights.
In limited situations, the ongoing activities performed throughout the life of a legal entity (e.g., administrative activities in certain resecuritization entities, such as Re-REMICs3) do not significantly affect the legal entity’s economic performance, though they may be necessary for the legal entity’s continued existence (see Section 7.2.3.2 for information about which party, if any, should consolidate a VIE with no ongoing activities). In such cases, the equity investment at risk would not possess the power to direct the most significant activities of the entity unless the holders of the equity investment at risk have (1) the unilateral ability to change the governing documents or contractual arrangements without the approval of other parties, such as lenders, and (2) the right to change the governing documents or contractual arrangements is integral to the design of the entity. If the equity holders have this unilateral ability, the right to change the governing documents or contractual arrangements is integral to the design of the entity, and these activities are the most significant activities, the equity holders would possess the power.
Example 5-23
A trust has been established to issue beneficial interests (including equity investment at risk) to investors. These interests are backed by a pool of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) that were identified and purchased at the trust’s inception. The holders of the trust’s beneficial interests are entitled to the cash flows from the underlying MBS if and when those cash flows are received by the trust. ServicerCo, the servicer of the trust, performs activities that are solely administrative (e.g., it collects cash flows from the securities and passes the cash flows to the holders of the beneficial interests); it neither actively manages the portfolio of MBS nor performs any risk-mitigation activities (e.g., activities related to credit defaults on the MBS). The trust is prohibited from disposing of or acquiring any securities, regardless of future events; and the MBS themselves do not provide their holder (i.e., the trust) with any decision-making (i.e., voting or other) rights. Neither ServicerCo nor the holders of the trust’s beneficial interests have the ability to change the governing documents of the trust.
All of the significant decisions related to the trust have been specified in the trust’s creation documents, which cannot be unilaterally altered by either ServicerCo or the holders of the trust’s beneficial interests. The ongoing activities performed throughout the life of the trust do not significantly affect the entity’s economic performance, though they may be necessary for the trust’s continued existence. Therefore, the group of holders of the trust’s equity investment at risk does not possess the ability to make decisions, and the trust is a VIE.
5.3.1.1.2 Determining Whether Decision-Making Rights Are Substantively Separate From an Equity Investment at Risk
In certain circumstances, an equity holder may own equity investment at risk and another substantively separate interest that gives that party the power to direct the most significant activities of the legal entity. If the power to direct the most significant activities is provided to the holder by embedding it in any variable interest of a legal entity other than the equity investment at risk, the legal entity is a VIE. However, if the power is through a decision-making contract that is determined not to be a variable interest, the legal entity is not a VIE under ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(1)(i).
Example 5-24
Assume that a legal entity is formed by the issuance of equity investment at risk and debt, both with voting rights proportional to the amount invested. Investor 1 contributes $20 in return for equity with a 20 percent vote. Investor 2 contributes $80 — $20 for equity with a 20 percent vote, and $60 for debt with a 60 percent vote. Decisions are based on a simple majority of all voting rights.
Although the holders of equity investment at risk have, as a group, the power to direct, the equity investment at risk does not convey the power to direct the activities of the legal entity that most significantly affect the legal entity’s economic performance. That conclusion is reached because 60 percent of the voting rights are attached to Investor 2’s debt instrument. The voting ability attached to the debt is so significant that it prevents the equity from possessing the power to direct. Therefore, the legal entity would be a VIE.
Alternatively, if Investor 2 contributes $80 — $60 for equity with a 60 percent vote, and $20 for debt with a 20 percent vote, the legal entity would not be a VIE under this criterion because the equity investment at risk conveys to the equity holders as a group the power (i.e., an 80 percent majority vote) to direct the activities of the legal entity that most significantly affect the legal entity’s economic performance.
Example 5-25
Assume that a legal entity is formed by two investors: Investors A and B. Investor A has equity investment at risk, but B does not. All of the most significant activities of the legal entity require the consent of both investors.
Although the equity investors, as a group, control the legal entity, B is not in the group of equity investors at risk. Therefore, the legal entity is a VIE because A, the only equity investor at risk, does not possess the power to direct the most significant activities.
It may be difficult to determine where power resides when an equity investor at risk separately holds decision-making rights over a legal entity through an interest other than equity. Although the discussion below is in the context of a management agreement, the concepts apply to any interests other than equity investment at risk that possess decision-making rights. The reporting entity must determine whether the decision-making rights that are derived from the separate management arrangement are substantively separate from the decision maker’s equity investment at risk.
The determination of whether a management agreement is substantively separate from an equity investment at risk should take into account all relevant facts and circumstances, including the form and substance of the pertinent arrangements. If the decision maker must maintain an equity investment at risk to retain its decision-making rights under the management agreement, the management agreement and the equity investment at risk would generally not be considered substantively separate. If, however, the decision maker is not required to maintain an equity investment at risk to retain its decision-making rights under the management agreement, the management agreement and the equity investment at risk would generally be considered substantively separate.
The legal entity’s formation documents may be silent about whether the decision
maker is required to maintain an equity investment at risk to retain its
decision-making rights under the management agreement. If so, the management agreement
should be presumed to be substantively separate from the equity investment at risk
unless other facts and circumstances provide persuasive evidence to the contrary.
Other facts and circumstances that may be relevant include consent rights. For
example, there may be sufficient evidence that the management agreement and equity
investment at risk are not substantively separate if (1) the other equity investors at
risk must provide their consent before the decision maker is allowed to transfer
(dispose of) its equity interests while retaining its decision-making rights under the
management agreement and (2) such a consent requirement is substantive.4
The evaluation of whether a management agreement is substantively separate from an equity investment at risk focuses on whether the existing decision maker is required to hold an equity investment at risk in the legal entity to retain its decision-making rights under the management agreement. A reporting entity should consider the following factors:
- Whether the reporting entity with decision-making rights under the management agreement must maintain an equity investment at risk in the legal entity — In some cases, the contractual agreements pertaining to the legal entity may permit the reporting entity with decision-making rights to transfer its management agreement to a third party (or an existing equity investor in the legal entity) and still maintain its equity investment in the legal entity. This does not necessarily mean that the group of holders of equity investment at risk lacks the power to direct the activities that most significantly affect the economic performance of the legal entity. For example, if the contractual agreements permit the decision maker to transfer its management agreement only to a third party (or existing equity investor in the legal entity) that has an equity investment at risk in the legal entity, the group of equity investors at risk would have the power to direct the activities that most significantly affect the economic performance of the legal entity.
- Whether the management agreement is considered a freestanding contract or embedded in the equity investment at risk under other applicable U.S. GAAP — While the objective of the evaluation under ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(1) is not to determine whether the management agreement is a freestanding contract under other applicable U.S. GAAP, performing this assessment may be helpful in the analysis of the form and substance of the arrangement. For example, if the decision maker can transfer the management agreement only to an equity investor at risk while still maintaining its equity investment in the legal entity, the management agreement would typically be considered a freestanding contract under other applicable U.S. GAAP.However, since it must be determined whether the decision maker has the ability to transfer the management agreement to a third party that does not own an equity investment at risk in the legal entity, a conclusion that the management agreement is a freestanding contract under other applicable U.S. GAAP does not necessarily mean that the power to direct the activities that most significantly affect the economic performance of the legal entity does not reside with the equity investors at risk as a group.
- Whether the legal entity has multiple classes of equity investment at risk — A legal entity may have more than one class of equity investment at risk. Since ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(1) focuses on the group of holders of equity investment at risk, it must be determined whether the decision maker is required to maintain an equity investment at risk (as opposed to a specific class of equity investment at risk) to retain the management agreement. For example, if the decision maker must maintain an equity investment at risk to retain its decision-making rights under the management agreement, but the class of equity investment at risk is not specified (or could change), the management agreement and equity investment at risk are still not considered substantively separate.
- Whether the legal entity’s formation documents address whether a replacement decision maker is required to maintain an equity investment at risk — The terms and agreements of the legal entity may specify that any decision maker under a management agreement must also own an equity investment at risk in the legal entity. In these situations, the management agreement and equity investment at risk are unlikely to be considered substantively separate; therefore, the group of holders of equity investment at risk would not lack the power to direct the activities that most significantly affect the economic performance of the legal entity. In other situations, the terms and agreements of the legal entity may not specifically address whether a replacement decision maker is required to own an equity investment at risk. In these situations, the evaluation should focus on whether the current decision maker is required to maintain an equity investment at risk in the legal entity. However, a transfer of the management agreement to a party that does not hold equity investment at risk would represent a reconsideration event under ASC 810-10-35-4. This treatment is consistent with that of a situation in which the equity investors at risk choose not to require a replacement decision maker to own an equity investment at risk even though the legal entity’s formation documents specifically require any decision maker to own such an equity investment. In both situations, the change represents a reconsideration event under ASC 810-10-35-4.
5.3.1.1.3 Determining Whether the Equity Holders Have Power Over a Legal Entity When a Decision Maker Is Engaged
Assessing whether the equity holders, as a group, have the power to direct the
most significant activities of a legal entity other than a limited partnership (or
similar entity) can be difficult when the power over a legal entity is acquired
through a management agreement. The flowchart below illustrates how to assess whether
the equity investors at risk have power over a legal entity when a decision maker is
engaged.
5.3.1.1.3.1 Does the Decision Maker Have a Variable Interest in the Legal Entity?
If it is determined that a decision maker exists, an evaluation of whether the decision maker has a variable interest in the legal entity must be performed. If there is no decision maker, the equity holders must perform step 1 in the flowchart above (and consider the general principles in Section 5.3.1.1) to determine whether the equity investors at risk have the collective power to direct the most significant activities of the legal entity through their equity investment at risk.
However, the mere existence of a decision maker in a legal entity does not mean that the holders of equity investment at risk as a group do not have the power to direct that legal entity’s most significant activities through their equity investment at risk. The equity holders may engage a decision maker to perform certain services on their behalf but retain ultimate responsibility for and power over decision making. In other words, when the decision maker is a fiduciary of the investors, it is presumed that the equity holders, as a group, have the power to direct the most significant activities of the legal entity.
If a decision maker’s fee arrangement does not constitute a variable interest,
the decision maker’s power to direct the
activities is effectively attributed to the
investors. That is, the decision maker does not
prevent the equity investors at risk, through
their equity investment at risk, from possessing
the power over the entity because the decision
maker is deemed to be acting as a fiduciary (i.e.,
making decisions on behalf of others). In many
cases, it will be easier to conclude that the
decision maker’s fee is not a variable interest
(and therefore that the power rests with the
holders of equity investment at risk) than to
perform the two-step evaluation outlined in the
flowchart above. Accordingly, a reporting entity
may be able to conclude that the legal entity
meets the criterion in ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(1)
simply because the decision maker’s fee
arrangement is not a variable interest. See
Section 4.4 for a discussion of
whether decision-maker fees represent a variable
interest.
5.3.1.1.3.2 Determine Whether the Equity Holders Have Power Through Their Equity Investment at Risk (Step 1)
If a decision maker has a variable interest in a legal entity, the reporting entity must next identify the level at which the legal entity’s most significant decisions are made. For example, certain decisions may be made by the board of directors, while others may be made by a decision maker through a contract that is substantively separate from the equity interests. If decisions about the most significant activities are made by the board of directors (which would be the case for most operating entities), the decision maker would effectively be acting as a service provider on behalf of the board of directors. See Section 7.2.5 for additional discussion of the determination of whether the most significant activities are performed at the board level or at the manager level. Paragraph BC35 of ASU 2015-02 discusses such circumstances:
This may be the case, for example, when the equity holders’ voting rights provide them with the power to elect the entity’s board of directors and the board is actively involved in making decisions about the activities that most significantly impact the entity’s economic performance. The equity holders may have power through voting rights in their equity-at-risk interests over the activities of a legal entity that most significantly impact the entity’s economic performance even if the entity has a decision maker.
If a reporting entity concludes that the most significant activities of the
legal entity are directed by the decision maker
(and not by the board of directors), the equity
holders would not have the power to direct the
most significant activities unless the equity
holders as a group have the ability to remove and
set the compensation of the decision maker. The
example in ASC 810-10-55-8A though 55-8H indicates
that “the activities that most significantly
impact the economic performance of Fund A, which
include making decisions on how to invest the
assets of that fund, are carried out by the asset
management company.” In that example, the most
significant activities of the legal entity are
directed by the decision maker and not conducted
at the board-of-director level. However, the FASB
concludes in the example that the entity’s
shareholders are able to effectively direct those
activities through their voting rights “because
shareholders have the ability to directly remove
and replace the asset management company, approve
the compensation of the asset management company,
and vote on the investment strategy of Fund A.”
Conversely, if decisions about the most significant activities are made by the board of directors, the decision maker would effectively be acting as a service provider on behalf of the board of directors. In addition, the board of directors is typically merely an extension of the legal entity’s equity holders established to act solely in a fiduciary capacity for the equity holders. However, this may not always be the case. For example, the board of directors may have been elected by the debt investors or parties other than the equity investors. If the board of directors is not considered to be acting on behalf of the holders of equity investment at risk, such holders do not have the power to direct the most significant activities of a legal entity. Rather, the party that elected the board of directors may have such rights.
5.3.1.1.3.3 Application to a Series Trust
ASC 810-10-55-8A through 55-8F provide the following example of the step 1
assessment:
ASC 810-10
55-8A An asset management company creates a series fund structure in which there are multiple mutual
funds (Fund A, Fund B, and Fund C) within one (umbrella) trust. Each mutual fund, referred to as a series fund,
represents a separate structure and legal entity. The asset management company sells shares in each series
fund to external shareholders. Each series fund is required to comply with the requirements included in the
Investment Company Act of 1940 for registered mutual funds.
55-8B The purpose, objective, and strategy of each series fund are established at formation and agreed upon
by the shareholders in accordance with the operating agreements. Returns of each series fund are allocated
only to that respective fund’s shareholders. There is no cross-collateralization among the individual series funds.
Each series fund has its own fund management team, employed by the asset management company, which has
the ability to carry out the investment strategy approved by the fund shareholders and manage the investments
of the series fund. The Board of Trustees is established at the (umbrella) trust level.
55-8C The asset management company is compensated on the basis of an established percentage of assets
under management in the respective series funds for directing the activities of each fund within its stated
objectives. The fees paid to the asset management company are both of the following:
- Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide the services
- Part of service arrangements that include only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
55-8D The asset management company has sold 65 percent of the shares in Fund A to external shareholders
and holds the remaining 35 percent of shares in Fund A.
55-8E The shareholders in each series fund have the ability through voting rights to do the following:
- Remove and replace the Board of Trustees
- Remove and replace the asset management company
- Vote on the compensation of the asset management company
- Vote on changes to the fundamental investment strategy of the fund
- Approve the sale of substantially all of the assets of the fund
- Approve a merger and/or reorganization of the fund
- Approve the liquidation or dissolution of the fund
- Approve charter and bylaw amendments
- Increase the authorized number of shares.
55-8F For this series fund
structure, the voting rights in paragraph
810-10-55-8E(a) are exercised at the (umbrella)
trust level. That is, a simple majority vote of
shareholders of all of the series funds (Fund A,
Fund B, and Fund C) is required to exercise the
voting right to remove and replace the Board of
Trustees of the (umbrella) trust. However, the
voting rights in paragraph 810-10-55-8E(b) through
(i) are series fund-level rights. That is, only a
simple majority vote of Series Fund A’s
shareholders is required to exercise the voting
rights in paragraph 810-10-55-8E(b) through (i)
for Series Fund A.
In the example in ASC 810-10-55-8A through 55-8F, it is concluded that the
equity investors (rather than the investment
manager through its decision-making contract) have
power through their voting rights because of their
ability to constrain the decision maker’s
authority. Accordingly, as long as the other
conditions in ASC 810-10-15-14 are met, the entity
would not be a VIE.
Further, the example indicates that the rights afforded to the equity investors
of a series fund structure that operates in accordance with the 1940 Act would
typically give the shareholders the ability to direct the activities that most
significantly affect the fund’s economic performance through their equity interests.
While these rights are often given to the investors of a fund structure that is
regulated under the 1940 Act, they are less likely to be present in fund structures
established in foreign jurisdictions (particularly those established in a structure
similar to a series structure) or in domestic funds that do not operate in
accordance with the requirements of the 1940 Act. See Section 3.2.1 for an additional discussion of
series funds.
Although the example illustrates the evaluation for a legal entity that is regulated under the 1940 Act, it does not apply exclusively to such entities. The FASB clarifies in paragraph BC36 of ASU 2015-02 that “the Board does not intend for the two-step analysis described above to apply only to series mutual funds.”
Reporting entities will need to exercise considerable judgment in determining whether the equity investors at risk have power through their voting rights. Understanding the rights and responsibilities of each involved party, and the design of the legal entity itself, is critical in such a situation.
5.3.1.1.3.4 Determine Whether a Single Equity Owner Has a Substantive Kick-Out Right (Step 2)
If a reporting entity determines that the decision-making rights represent a
variable interest and that the decision maker (rather than the equity investors) has
power over the significant decisions (step 1), the reporting entity would then
assess whether a single equity holder through its equity
investment at risk (including its related parties and de facto agents — see Section 8.2) has the unilateral ability to
remove the decision maker. ASC 810-10-20 provides the following VIE definition of
kick-out rights:
The ability to remove the entity with the power to direct the
activities of a VIE that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic
performance or to dissolve (liquidate) the VIE without cause.
If a single at-risk equity investor has the ability, through its equity investment at risk, to unilaterally remove the decision maker (or dissolve/liquidate the legal entity), then that single equity owner has the power to direct the activities and, accordingly, the equity group at risk would have the unilateral ability to direct the most significant activities. Said differently, in such a case, the decision maker is making decisions on behalf of the at-risk equity investors only temporarily at the discretion of the single at-risk equity investor with the kick-out rights. If such rights do not exist, the reporting entity would consider the effect of substantive participating rights held by a single equity investor (see Section 5.3.1.1.3.5).
In paragraph BC49 of ASU 2015-02, the FASB noted that liquidation rights “should be considered equivalent to kick-out rights [because they] provide the holders of such rights with the ability to dissolve the entity and, thus, effectively remove the decision maker’s authority.” See Section 5.3.1.2.5 for a discussion of when liquidation and withdrawal rights would be considered equivalent to kick-out rights.
5.3.1.1.3.5 Impact of a Single Equity Owner With Substantive Participating Rights (Step 2)
Since the FASB discusses participating rights in the same context as kick-out rights, the implication is that the two, though defined differently, should be treated similarly in the VIE analysis. We do not believe that the existence of a substantive participating right held by a single equity investor at risk should result in a conclusion that the legal entity is not a VIE. ASC 810-10-20 provides the following VIE definition of participating rights:
The ability to block or participate in the actions through which an entity exercises the power to direct the activities of a VIE that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance. Participating rights do not require the holders of such rights to have the ability to initiate actions.
Further, ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(1)(i)(01) states, in part:
If no owners hold voting
rights or similar rights (such as those of a
common shareholder in a corporation) over the
activities of a legal entity that most
significantly impact the entity’s economic
performance, kick-out rights or participating
rights (according to their VIE definitions) held
by the holders of the equity investment at risk shall not prevent interests other
than the equity investment from having this
characteristic unless a single equity holder
(including its related parties and de facto
agents) has the unilateral ability to exercise
such rights. [Emphasis added]
The phrase emphasized above specifies that if substantive kick-out or
participating rights are held by a single owner of
equity investment, then the equity holder would
not be prevented from having the power to
direct the activities that most significantly
affect the VIE’s economic performance. However, it
does not indicate that the equity holder with such
rights has that power. While an equity holder with
a kick-out right may have the power to direct the
most significant activities, a conclusion is less
likely to be reached that an equity holder with
participating rights has the power to direct the
most significant activities. That is, if a single
holder of equity investment at risk can
substantively participate in decisions about a
legal entity that are being made by the decision
maker, that decision maker does not have the power
to direct the most significant activities of the
legal entity (i.e., the ability of the one equity
investor to participate keeps the decision maker
from having the unilateral ability to act but does
not give the equity investor the unilateral
ability). Thus, since the guidance above indicates
that the decision maker does not have power
but not that the equity investors, as a group,
do have power, the next sentence in ASC
810-10-15-14(b)(1)(i)(01) would need to be
considered, which states, in part:
Alternatively, interests other
than the equity investment at risk that provide
the holders of those interests with kick-out
rights or participating rights shall not prevent
the equity holders from having this characteristic
unless a single reporting entity (including its
related parties and de facto agents) has the
unilateral ability to exercise those rights.
Accordingly, if a nonequity holder has the ability to direct the activities that most significantly affect the legal entity’s economic performance, and an equity holder has the ability to block the nonequity holder’s actions through a substantive participating right, the legal entity would still be a VIE because the equity holder would not have power over the entity. The VIE conclusion should be the same regardless of whether the equity investor at risk is initiating decisions (but could be blocked by a nonequity investor at risk) or another party is directing the most important economic activities (but could be blocked by the holder of equity investment at risk). In both instances, the legal entity would be a VIE. That is, a legal entity would be a VIE if power is distributed between (1) equity investment at risk and (2) equity investment not at risk or nonequity holders; for a legal entity to be a voting interest entity, only the holders of equity investment at risk may have power.
We therefore believe that it would be unusual for a substantive participating right held by a single at-risk equity investor alone to result in a conclusion that the equity investors as a group have the power to direct the most significant activities of a legal entity.
5.3.1.1.3.6 Franchise Agreements
A franchise agreement typically gives the franchisee equity investor(s) the
right to use the franchisor’s brand name along
with its associated operating policies and
procedures for a period in exchange for a
franchise fee. Generally, the franchisor has
certain rights under the agreement to ensure that
the integrity and quality of the brand is
maintained. A reporting entity should therefore
carefully analyze the rights granted to the
franchisor to determine whether the franchisee is
a VIE under ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(1). That is, the
reporting entity must determine whether the rights
held by the franchisor prevent the group of
franchisee equity investors from having the power
to direct the activities that most significantly
affect the economic performance of the
franchisee.
For example, a franchise agreement may specify that the franchisor has rights to participate in certain decisions related to:
- The location and appearance of the franchisee.
- Products sold by the franchisee.
- Suppliers used by the franchisee.
- Marketing by the franchisee.
- Training of employees of the franchisee.
- Days and hours of operation of the franchisee.
- Sale of the franchisee.
Decisions related to the above items may be important to the franchisee’s
economic performance; however, a franchisor’s
right to participate in the decisions does not
automatically cause the franchisee to be a VIE
under ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(1). A reporting entity
should assess whether the rights are protective in
nature (i.e., intended to preserve the integrity
and quality of the brand name) or prevent the
franchisee equity investors at risk from holding
the power to direct the activities that most
significantly affect the economic performance of
the franchisee.
Many of a franchisee’s activities are predetermined under the franchise agreement, which typically specifies that the franchisee equity investors have voluntarily agreed to operate the franchisee according to specified policies and procedures. Therefore, in assessing whether the franchisee equity investors at risk hold the power to direct the activities that most significantly affect the franchisee’s economic performance, the reporting entity must focus on whether the franchisee equity investors at risk control the activities that are not specified in the franchise agreement. Such activities include, but are not limited to, establishing and implementing capital and operating budgets; hiring, firing, and setting the compensation of franchisee employees; and establishing pricing for franchisee products and services.
If a franchisor is taking on additional risk by providing financial support to
the franchisee, the franchisor may need to be more
involved in the decisions regarding the most
significant activities of the franchisee.
Accordingly, if a franchisor gives the franchisee
financial support (e.g., through an equity
investment or a loan), or the franchisee equity
investors’ exposure to the economic performance of
the franchisee is somehow limited, the reporting
entity must carefully evaluate the franchisor’s
decision-making rights to determine whether they
are protective or give the franchisor control over
the most significant activities of the franchisee.
In such instances, the reporting entity must
consider all relevant facts and circumstances to
determine whether the franchisee is a VIE under
ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(1). In addition, if a loan or
a contract limits the equity investor’s exposure
to the economic performance of the franchisee, the
franchisee may be a VIE under ASC 810-10-15-14(a),
ASC 810-10-15-14 (b)(2), or ASC
810-10-15-14(b)(3).
5.3.1.1.3.7 Contractual Arrangements That Are Designed to Transfer the Risks and Rewards of Ownership
There may be restrictions on a reporting entity’s legal ownership of a legal
entity’s equity. In such a case, the reporting entity may enter into contractual
arrangements that transfer all the legal entity’s risks and rewards from its equity
owners to the reporting entity. The legal entity in these arrangements is a VIE
because the owners of equity have effectively surrendered to the reporting entity
both control and the right to participate in the legal entity’s economics.
Example 5-26
Entity A wishes to acquire Entity B, a corporation located in a foreign
jurisdiction where the local regulations preclude foreign ownership of
corporations in B’s industry. To effect the acquisition, A enters into a
contractual arrangement with Shareholder C (the sole shareholder of B
and unrelated to A), under which A acquires C’s rights to all dividends
paid from B in exchange for an up-front cash payment. Further, A enters
into a management services agreement with B that gives A the ability to
make all significant operating and capital decisions for B. In addition,
under the management services agreement, B must pay A 100 percent of its
after-tax income in the form of a management fee. The management
services agreement has an initial five-year term, is unilaterally
extendable by A for an unlimited amount of successive five-year terms,
and can only be terminated by A. Alternatively, the management services
agreement may give A the ability to unilaterally determine the amount of
the fee payable in any given year. Because C, the sole equity investor
of B, has surrendered control and cannot exercise power to direct the
most significant activities of B, B is a VIE under ASC
810-10-15-14(b)(1)(i).
See Section
D.3.4 for a discussion of the contract-controlled entity model under
the voting interest entity model for legal entities that are not VIEs.
5.3.1.2 The Power to Direct the Most Significant Activities of a Limited Partnership (or Similar Entity)
ASC 810-10
15-14 A
legal entity shall be subject to consolidation under the guidance in the
Variable Interest Entities Subsections if, by design, any of the following
conditions exist. (The phrase by design refers to legal entities that
meet the conditions in this paragraph because of the way they are
structured. For example, a legal entity under the control of its equity
investors that originally was not a VIE does not become one because of
operating losses. The design of the legal entity is important in the
application of these provisions.) . . .
b. As a group the holders of the equity investment at risk lack any one of the following three characteristics:
- The power, through voting rights or similar rights, to direct the activities of
a legal entity that most significantly impact the
entity’s economic performance. . . .ii. For limited partnerships, partners lack that power if neither (01) nor (02) below exists. The guidance in this subparagraph does not apply to entities in industries (see paragraphs 910-810-45-1 and 932-810-45-1) in which it is appropriate for a general partner to use the pro rata method of consolidation for its investment in a limited partnership (see paragraph 810-10-45-14).01. A simple majority or lower threshold of limited partners (including a single limited partner) with equity at risk is able to exercise substantive kick-out rights (according to their voting interest entity definition) through voting interests over the general partner(s).A. For purposes of evaluating the threshold in (01) above, a general partner’s kick-out rights held through voting interests shall not be included. Kick-out rights through voting interests held by entities under common control with the general partner or other parties acting on behalf of the general partner also shall not be included.02. Limited partners with equity at risk are able to exercise substantive participating rights (according to their voting interest entity definition) over the general partner(s).03. For purposes of (01) and (02) above, evaluation of the substantiveness of participating rights and kick-out rights shall be based on the guidance included in paragraphs 810-10-25-2 through 25-14C. . . .
If interests other than the equity investment at risk
provide the holders of that investment with these characteristics or if
interests other than the equity investment at risk prevent the equity
holders from having these characteristics, the entity is a VIE. . . .
A limited partnership would be considered a VIE regardless of whether it
otherwise qualifies as a voting interest entity unless either of the following apply:
-
A simple majority or lower threshold (including a single limited partner) of the “unrelated” limited partners (i.e., parties other than the general partner, entities under common control with the general partner, and other parties acting on behalf of the general partner) with equity at risk have substantive kick-out rights (including liquidation rights — see Section 5.3.1.2.2).
-
The limited partners with equity at risk have substantive participating rights (see Section 5.3.1.2.7).
Accordingly, a limited partnership is considered a VIE unless limited partners hold
substantive kick-out or participating rights. In addition to considering whether the
limited partners have equity at risk, it is also necessary to consider whether the
limited partner rights are possessed through the limited partner interest that is at
risk rather than through a substantively separate contract (see Section 5.3.1.1.2 for a discussion
of the determination of whether a separate contract should be considered part of the
equity interest at risk).
While the FASB’s intent in creating an alternate approach for evaluating limited partnerships was based on their differing governance structures, the result is that if a general partner does not possess an interest in the limited partnership that is potentially significant, the general partner should not consolidate the limited partnership. Specifically, this requirement ensures that the general partner would only consolidate the limited partnership if it met the economics criterion of a controlling financial interest under the VIE model (see Section 7.3).
5.3.1.2.1 A Legal Entity That Is “Similar to a Limited Partnership”
The requirement to evaluate limited partnerships under the specific guidance on
limited partnerships also applies to other legal
entities that have governance structures similar
to limited partnerships. Determining whether a
legal entity is similar to a limited partnership
is consequently an important step in the
assessment of whether a legal entity is a VIE. ASC
810-10-05-3 states, in part:
Throughout this Subtopic, any reference to a
limited partnership includes limited partnerships
and similar legal entities. A similar legal
entity is an entity (such as a limited
liability company) that has governing provisions
that are the functional equivalent of a limited
partnership.
Accordingly, certain limited liability companies in which the managing member is the functional equivalent of a general partner, and in which the nonmanaging member or members are the functional equivalent of a limited partner, would be considered equivalent to limited partnerships and evaluated under the limited-partnership requirements. A conclusion cannot be reached that a legal entity is similar to a limited partnership merely on the basis of the existence of separate capital accounts. Any analysis of similarity should include the application of judgment and focus on the function of the legal entity, including the governance and the substance of the legal entity’s board of directors.
The specific guidance on limited partnerships does not apply to either general partnerships or limited liability companies that have multiple managing members since the governing provisions of such structures are not equivalent to those of limited partnerships.
Connecting the Dots
This scope guidance is one-directional (i.e., a legal entity that is not in the
form of a limited partnership can be considered
“similar to a limited partnership” for
consolidation analysis purposes). However, we
believe that in some circumstances, the governance
of a legal-form limited partnership could be more
similar to that of a corporation. For example,
some limited partnerships may have irrevocably
changed their governance structure to that of a
board elected by the limited partners. We believe
that in such instances, it is more appropriate for
the variable interest holders to analyze the legal
entity under the corporation consolidation
guidance.
Example 5-27
Investor A (managing member) and Investor B (nonmanaging member) each own 50 percent of LLC, a limited liability company. As the managing member, A makes all the decisions related to activities that most significantly affect the economic performance of LLC. On the basis of LLC’s governing provisions, A is the functional equivalent of a general partner, and B is the functional equivalent of a limited partner. Therefore, LLC is considered equivalent to a limited partnership and should be evaluated under the limited-partnership VIE requirements.
Example 5-28
Assume the same facts as in the example above, except that LLC has a board of
directors that is composed of four individuals (two are selected by
Investor A, and two are selected by Investor B). The decisions related to
the activities that most significantly affect the economic performance of
LLC are made through a simple majority vote of the board of directors. As
the managing member, A acts at the direction of the board, and its
responsibilities are administrative. On the basis of LLC’s governing
provisions, the decision-making ability held by the board of directors is
substantive. Therefore, A is not the functional equivalent of a general
partner, and LLC is not considered equivalent to a limited partnership.
Consequently, LLC should not be evaluated under the limited-partnership
VIE requirements.
Example 5-29
Investor A has a 40 percent equity interest in LLC and is the managing member. Investor B, Investor C, and Investor D each have a 20 percent equity interest in LLC and are nonmanaging members. As the managing member, A has the authority to act on behalf of LLC or bind LLC in any manner whatsoever, including, without limitation, entering into any agreement on behalf of LLC. Investor A is given this right through a separate management agreement because A is the only investor that has expertise in the industry that LLC operates.
In exchange for its services, A receives a fixed management fee and a performance fee. LLC also has a board of directors that is composed of four representatives (one each selected by Investor A, Investor B, Investor C, and Investor D). The decisions of the Board require unanimous consent; however, they are related to decisions made outside the ordinary course of business. As the managing member, A cannot transfer or sell its interest in the LLC without the consent of the nonmanaging members, but the nonmanaging members are not similarly constrained.
On the basis of the facts and circumstances, A is the functional equivalent of a general partner, and LLC is considered equivalent to a limited partnership. The decision-making rights held by the board of directors are deemed to be not substantive and to represent protective rights. In addition, A’s fee structure and its limitations on transferring its interest are also similar to those of a general partner given its expertise in LLC’s industry. Therefore, LLC should be evaluated under the limited-partnership VIE requirements.
5.3.1.2.2 Evaluating Kick-Out Rights
The evaluation of whether the limited partners with equity at risk can kick out
the general partner focuses on whether a simple majority (or lower threshold) of the
limited partner interests (excluding those held by the general partner, entities under
common control with the general partner, and entities acting on behalf of the general
partner) can remove the general partner. Accordingly, the kick-out rights would not be
considered in the analysis unless (1) a simple majority (or lower threshold, including
a single limited partner) of the limited partners can exercise the kick-out rights (or
liquidation rights that are equivalent to kick-out rights, as discussed in Section 5.3.1.2.5); (2) the
rights can be exercised by limited partner interests excluding those held by the
general partner, entities under common control with the general partner, and entities
acting on behalf of the general partner (see Section 5.3.1.2.3); and (3) the rights are
substantive (see Section
5.3.1.2.4).
Example 5-30
A limited partnership is formed to acquire a real estate property. The partnership has a general partner that holds a 20 percent limited partner interest in the partnership, and eight unrelated limited partners equally hold the remaining equity interests. Profit and losses of the partnership (after payment of general partner fees, which represent a variable interest in the entity) are distributed in accordance with the partners’ ownership interests. There are no other arrangements between the partnership and the general partners/limited partners.
The general partner is the property manager and has full discretion to buy and sell properties, manage the properties, and obtain financing. In addition, the general partner can be removed without cause by a simple majority of all of the limited partners (including the limited partner interests held by the general partner). The removal rights are held by all the partners in proportion to their partnership interests.
In this example, the limited partner interests held by the general partner are permitted to vote on the removal of the general partner. The general partner, through its limited partner interests, will therefore vote 20 percent of the overall interests voting on the removal. The unrelated limited partner interests only hold 80 percent of the interests voting on removal. Since the unrelated limited partners are unable to remove the general partner unless more than a simple majority of the limited partner interests vote on the removal (i.e., the general partner’s presumed no vote on removal will require 75 percent of the unrelated limited partner interests — six of the eight unrelated limited partners — to remove the general partner), the kick-out rights would not be substantive, and the limited partnership would be considered a VIE.
Note that some partnership agreements are structured so that the general partners and their “related” parties are unable to exercise the rights associated with any limited partner interests they hold. In these situations, a simple majority of the “unrelated” limited partners with equity at risk may have the ability to exercise substantive kick-out rights over the general partner, regardless of whether the general partner holds any other interests.
In the determination of whether there are simple majority kick-out rights,
certain factors will be known. For example, the contractual terms will provide the
mechanism for removing the general partner, and the total number of limited partner
interests will be apparent. However, variables such as who the qualifying limited
partners are, what makes a kick-out right substantive, and what a substantive
participating right is, will need to be determined.
EITF 04-5 introduced the concept of analyzing whether a simple majority of
limited partners can remove the general partner. The purpose of the analysis was to
identify the smallest possible combination of limited partnership interests that is at least a simple majority. If, on the basis of the governance provisions of the limited partnership and ownership interests held by the limited partners, the number of eligible partner interests required to remove the general partner is less than this amount, then the simple-majority requirement is met. ASC 810-10-55-4N contains examples (originally from EITF 04-5) of the application of this requirement.
The examples below, which are adapted from ASC 810-10-55-4N, are intended to
demonstrate its application in certain more complex structures. Note that the examples
focus on the amount of limited partnership interests needed to remove the general
partner, not a simple count of the number of limited partners (i.e., it would be
expected that a limited partner with more ownership interests would get a weighted
vote — see Examples 5-35 and 5-36, in which the limited partners have unequal
partnership interests).
Example 5-31
A limited partnership agreement includes a requirement that a simple majority of
the limited partner voting interests is needed to remove the general
partner. Assume that the limited partnership has three limited partners,
none of which have any relationship to the general partner, and that each
holds an equal amount of the limited partner voting interests (33.33
percent). Under the simple-majority requirement in the partnership
agreement, a vote of no more than two of the three limited partners would
be needed to remove the general partners. Accordingly, a provision that
entitles any individual limited partner to remove the general partner, or
a provision under which a vote of two of the limited partners is needed to
remove the general partner, would meet the substantive kick-out right
requirements. However, if a vote of all three limited partners is needed
to remove the general partner, the right would not meet the requirements
for a substantive kick-out right because the necessary vote is greater
than a simple majority of the limited partner voting interests.
Example 5-32
Assume the same facts as in the example above, except that there are two limited
partners that each hold an equal interest. In this case, a vote of both
limited partners would be required for a simple majority of the limited
partner voting interests, so a provision entitling any individual limited
partner to remove the general partner, or a provision under which a vote
of both limited partners is needed to remove the general partner, would
meet the requirements for a substantive kick-out right.
Example 5-33
Assume the same facts as in Example 5-31, except that there are 100 limited partners,
and each holds an equal interest. In this case, a vote of 51 limited
partners would be required for a simple majority of the limited partner
voting interests, so a provision under which a vote of less than 52
limited partners is needed to remove the general partner would meet the
requirements for a substantive kick-out right. However, if a vote of 52 or
more limited partners is needed to remove the general partner, that
provision would not meet the requirements for a substantive kick-out right
because the necessary vote is greater than a simple majority of the
limited partner voting interests.
Example 5-34
A limited partnership agreement includes a requirement that a vote of 66.6
percent of the limited partner voting interests is
needed to remove the general partner. There are
three independent limited partners that each hold
an equal percentage (33.33 percent) of the limited
partner voting interest. A vote of two of the
three limited partners represents 66.7 percent of
the limited partner voting interests, which also
represents the smallest possible combination of
voting interests that is at least a simple
majority of the limited partner voting interests.
As long as there are no barriers to the exercise
of the kick-out rights, those rights in this
scenario meet the simple majority requirement and
therefore represent substantive kick-out rights
that overcome the presumption of control by the
general partner. That is, although there is a 66.6
percent requirement in the governance of the
limited partnership agreement, because there are
only three limited partners with equity interest,
the substance of the arrangement is a simple
majority (i.e., there is no substantive difference
between a stated 50.1 percent or 66.6 percent
requirement, because in both instances, two of the
three limited partners are needed).
Example 5-35
A limited partnership agreement includes a requirement that a vote of 66.6
percent of the limited partner voting interests is
needed to remove the general partners. There are
three independent limited partners that hold 45
percent (LP1), 25 percent (LP2), and 30 percent
(LP3) of the limited partner voting interests,
respectively. To determine whether kick-out rights
are substantive in such a scenario, the reporting
entity should identify the smallest possible
combination of limited partner interests that
constitutes a simple majority. To remove the
general partners, a vote of LP1 in combination
with either LP2 or LP3 would be a simple majority
of the limited partners and would satisfy the 66.6
percent contractual requirement. By contrast, a
vote to exercise the kick-out rights by LP2 and
LP3 also would represent a simple majority vote of
the limited partners. However, their voting
interests (55 percent) would not meet the required
threshold of 66.6 percent for removal of the
general partners. Accordingly, these kick-out
rights would be assessed as nonsubstantive because
LP2 and LP3, which represent at least a simple
majority of the limited partner voting interests,
cannot remove the general partners.
The above conclusion applies
even though a vote of LP1 in combination with either LP2 or LP3 would be a
simple majority of the limited partners and would satisfy the 66.6 percent
contractual requirement. This is because the analysis is premised on
whether the smallest possible combination of limited partner
interests that constitutes a simple majority that would be able to remove
the general partners, not on whether any possible combination of
limited partner interests that is a simple majority would be able to
remove the general partners.
Example 5-36
A provision in a limited partnership agreement states that the general
partner may be removed if the following two conditions are met: (1) four
out of the six limited partners vote to remove the general partner and (2)
the limited partnership interest of the four limited partners that vote
for removal must exceed 50 percent of the limited partnership’s voting
interest. The six independent limited partners hold 22 percent (LP1), 22
percent (LP2), 22 percent (LP3), 13 percent (LP4), 10.5 percent (LP5), and
10.5 percent (LP6) of the limited partnership interest, respectively. To
determine whether kick-out rights are substantive in such a scenario, the
reporting entity should identify the smallest possible combination of
limited partner voting interests that constitute a simple majority.
In this example, LP1, LP2, and LP3 are the smallest combination of limited
partners whose combined limited partnership voting interest is in excess
of a simple majority of the limited partnership voting interest. Because
the limited partnership agreement requires at least four limited partners
to remove the general partner, LP1, LP2, and LP3 would not be able to
remove the general partner if they acted in concert and their kick-out
rights would be viewed as nonsubstantive.
The above conclusion applies even though a simple
majority of any combination of the number of limited partners
results in the ability to remove the general partner. LP3, LP4, LP5, and
LP6 have, on a combined basis, the lowest voting ownership interest
represented by at least a majority of the number of limited partners. If
those limited partners voted together, the general partner would be
removed. However, that combination of a simple majority of the number of
limited partners is not the smallest combination of limited partners whose
limited partnership voting interest is in excess of a simple
majority of the limited partnership voting interest.
5.3.1.2.3 Whether Limited Partners Are “Acting on Behalf of the General Partner”
In the evaluation of whether a
simple majority of the limited partners can remove
the general partner, interests held by the general
partner, entities under common control with the
general partner, and parties acting on behalf of
the general partner should not be considered in
the identification of the number of limited
partner interests needed to remove the general
partner. If the general partner owns limited
partnership interests, it is not reasonable to
expect the general partner to tender a vote to
remove itself. Accordingly, if in theory the
general partner owns 45 percent of the limited
partnership units, and a 51 percent vote is
required to remove the general partner, it can be
assumed that the 45 percent of limited partner
interests owned by the general partner will vote
no. Therefore, the relevant percentage required to
remove the general partner is much higher than 51
percent: all but 4 percent of the total limited
partner units must vote yes.
Thus, interests should be
identified that are attributable to the general
partner, or that, because of relationships, would
otherwise vote along with the general partner.
Identifying interests owned by the general partner
is relatively straightforward. In addition, BC69
of ASU 2015-02 notes that:
Current GAAP uses the term common control
in multiple contexts, and the term is not defined
in the Master Glossary. Therefore, for purposes of
evaluating the criteria in paragraphs
810-10-25-42, 810-10-25-44A, and 810-10-55-37D,
the Board’s intent was for the term to include
subsidiaries controlled (directly or indirectly)
by a common parent, or a subsidiary and its
parent.
This explanation does not
specifically refer to the assessment of whether a
limited partnership is a VIE. Nonetheless, it is
reasonable to conclude that the application of the
common control definition should be consistent
throughout the consolidation analysis.
However, considerable judgment
is required in the determination of whether a
limited partner is acting on behalf of the general
partner. Although now superseded, ASC
810-20-25-8(a) indicated that all “relevant facts
and circumstances shall be considered in assessing
whether other parties, including, but not limited
to, those defined as related parties in Topic 850,
may be acting on behalf of the general partners in
exercising their voting rights as limited
partners.”
The following are examples of
relevant facts and circumstances to be considered
in the evaluation of whether a limited partner is
acting on behalf of the general partner:
-
The design of the partnership, including:
-
The risks that the partnership was designed to pass on to its variable interest holders.
-
The reason the limited partner holds its interest in the partnership.
-
-
The nature of the relationship(s) between the general partner and the limited partner, including:
-
The degree of influence the general partner has over the limited partner.
-
Any investment the limited partner has in the general partner. For example, if the limited partner has a material investment in a general partner, and removal of the general partner would adversely affect its investment, the limited partner might be acting on behalf of the general partner.
-
Any dependencies the limited partner has on the general partner.
-
Other operating or financial arrangements between the parties.
-
-
The existence of any call options between the general partner and limited partner, including:
-
The terms of the option, the exercise price, and exercise period. For example, if the limited partner’s interest can be purchased at fair value or less, the limited partner may be acting on behalf of the general partner.
-
The existence of any barriers to exercising the option. For example, the general partner controls technology that is critical to the limited partnership, or the general partner is the principal source of funding for the limited partnership.
-
-
Whether the limited partner’s exercise of its right to vote to remove the general partner would trigger significant financial penalties or other operating barriers.
-
Any incentives or disincentives that may affect the likelihood that the limited partner would act in accordance with the general partner.
-
Any regulatory, contractual, or other requirements that may affect the limited partner’s ability to vote to remove the general partner. For example, a related-party limited partner’s charter or organizational documents may require an independent person (or committee of independent persons) to exercise any right to vote to retain or remove the general partner.
5.3.1.2.4 “Substantive” Kick-Out Rights
For a kick-out right to be
substantive, the right must be exercisable
“without cause” (as opposed to a right that is
triggered upon a contingent event, such as default
by the general partner). Although a limited
partnership’s organizational documents may give
the limited partners the ability to remove the
general partner, that stated right may not always
have substance. ASC 810-10-25-14A defines
substantive kick-out rights that are specific to
limited partnerships as follows:
For limited partnerships, the
determination of whether kick-out rights are
substantive shall be based on a consideration of
all relevant facts and circumstances. For kick-out
rights to be considered substantive, the limited
partners holding the kick-out rights must have the
ability to exercise those rights if they choose to
do so; that is, there are no significant barriers
to the exercise of the rights. Barriers include,
but are not limited to, the following:
-
Kick-out rights subject to conditions that make it unlikely they will be exercisable, for example, conditions that narrowly limit the timing of the exercise
-
Financial penalties or operational barriers associated with dissolving (liquidating) the limited partnership or replacing the general partners that would act as a significant disincentive for dissolution (liquidation) or removal
-
The absence of an adequate number of qualified replacement general partners or the lack of adequate compensation to attract a qualified replacement
-
The absence of an explicit, reasonable mechanism in the limited partnership’s governing documents or in the applicable laws or regulations, by which the limited partners holding the rights can call for and conduct a vote to exercise those rights
-
The inability of the limited partners holding the rights to obtain the information necessary to exercise them.
Although this guidance is
specific to limited partnerships, reporting
entities may analogize to it when evaluating
kick-out rights related to entities other than
limited partnerships.
Note that when a reporting entity holds a call option, it should evaluate its forward
starting rights and potential kickout rights. See Section
7.2.9.1 for a detailed discussion of forward starting rights in a
primary-beneficiary assessment.
5.3.1.2.5 Evaluation of Liquidation and Withdrawal Rights as Kick-Out Rights
ASC 810-10-20 provides the
following voting interest entity definition of
kick-out rights:
The rights
underlying the limited partner’s or partners’
ability to dissolve (liquidate) the limited
partnership or otherwise remove the general
partners without cause.
As discussed in Section
7.2.10.3, paragraph BC49 of ASU 2015-02
notes the FASB’s view that liquidation rights
“should be considered equivalent to kick-out
rights [because they] provide the holders of such
rights with the ability to dissolve the entity
and, thus, effectively remove the decision maker’s
authority.” Accordingly, any liquidation right
should be considered a kick-out right as long as
the right (1) is substantive6 and (2) gives a simple majority (or lower
threshold)7 of limited partners with equity investment
at risk the ability to liquidate a limited
partnership without cause. As described in
Sections 7.2.10 and D.1.6, if the substantive kick-out
right is held by a single limited partner, it may
result in that limited partner’s consolidation of
the limited partnership (under both the VIE and
voting interest entity models).
Liquidation rights must be
distinguished from withdrawal rights since ASC
810-10-25-14B indicates that a limited partner’s
unilateral right to withdraw from an entity that
does not require dissolution or liquidation of the
entire entity “would not be deemed a kick-out
right.” Therefore, a reporting entity should
carefully analyze withdrawal rights to determine
whether, on the basis of the specific facts and
circumstances, they represent liquidation rights.
In a manner similar to liquidation rights, when
the exercise of a withdrawal right does require
the dissolution or liquidation of the entire
limited partnership, the right should be
considered a kick-out right only if it (1) is
substantive, (2) gives a simple majority (or lower
threshold) of limited partners the ability to
withdraw without cause, and (3) results in the
liquidation of the limited partnership.8
Note also that special
consideration is necessary when a liquidation
right (or a withdrawal right that represents a
liquidation right) is exercisable in the future as
opposed to currently exercisable. Generally, the
right would be ignored until exercisable unless
there are no significant decisions to be made
before the right becomes exercisable. See
Section 7.2.9.1 for a more detailed
discussion of future potential voting rights.
5.3.1.2.6 Evaluation of Buy-Sell Clauses as a Liquidation Right
A buy-sell term in a
contractual agreement can take various forms. However, in an arrangement in which two
investors each own 50 percent of an entity, a buy-sell clause generally gives the
investors the ability to offer to buy out the entire equity interest of another
investor (the “offeree”) upon giving notice to the offeree. The investor making the
offer (the “offeror”) typically names a price for the offeree’s interest at its
discretion. After receiving the offer from the offeror, the offeree typically is
contractually required to either (1) sell its entire interest in the entity to the
offeror at the named price or (2) buy the offeror’s interest at the named price.
Buy-sell agreements are not typically considered liquidation rights. See Section 7.2.9.1 for a discussion of forward starting
rights in a primary-beneficiary assessment.
Example 5-37
Investor A (the managing
member) and Investor B (the nonmanaging member)
each own 50 percent of LLC, a limited liability
company. As the managing member, A makes all of
the most significant decisions regarding LLC. Both
investors have the right to initiate a buy-sell
clause that, once initiated, will result in
ownership by one of the investors in 100 percent
of LLC and may result in the liquidation of LLC.
We do not believe that this scenario is akin to a
liquidation right that would be deemed a kick-out
right. Although B can initiate the buy-sell, it
can only offer to buy A’s interest. However, A has
the first right to buy B’s interest instead. Said
differently, a buy-sell clause does not operate
like a unilateral liquidation right, because A has
the option to retain control over LLC’s
assets.
5.3.1.2.7 Substantive Participating Rights
A limited partnership would
also not be considered a VIE if the limited
partners with equity at
risk have substantive participating rights
(provided the other criteria to not qualify as a
VIE are met). Note that the definition of
participating rights in the evaluation of whether
a limited partnership is a VIE is the same
definition as that applied in the voting interest
entity model (see Section D.2 for
a detailed discussion of the determination of
whether noncontrolling rights are substantive
participating rights or protective). Accordingly,
the analysis focuses on whether the limited
partners can participate in the significant
financial and operating decisions of the limited
partnership (i.e., the voting interest entity
definition that focuses on decisions made in the
ordinary course of business, such as selecting and
terminating management and setting its
compensation or making operating and capital
decisions) rather than in the most significant
activities of the entity (i.e., the VIE model
definition).
ASC 810-10-25-13 provides
guidance on evaluating whether participating
rights are substantive. Factors that must be
considered include the percentage ownership
interest of the parties with the participating
rights, the relationship between the parties with
the rights and others involved with the
partnership, and the activities in which the
parties can participate.
5.3.1.2.8 Reassessing Whether Kick-Out or Participating Rights Exist
In the evaluation of kick-out
or participating rights, it is sometimes necessary
to reconsider those rights. A scenario may exist
in which, upon formation, a limited partnership is
a VIE because the general partner, along with
entities under common control or parties acting on
its behalf, has sufficient interests to prevent a
simple majority of the limited partners from
exercising kick-out rights. After the limited
partnership’s formation, its governing documents
are amended to permit a simple majority of the
limited partners, excluding the general partner
(and entities under common control or parties
acting on its behalf), to exercise the kick-out
rights that accrue to those interest holders
irrespective of the holdings of the general
partner.
ASC 810-10-35-4(e) indicates
when the initial determination of VIE status
should be reconsidered, noting that such
reconsideration should take place if “[c]hanges in
facts and circumstances occur such that the
holders of the equity investment at risk, as a
group, lose the power from voting rights or
similar rights of those investments to direct the
activities of the entity that most significantly
impact the entity’s economic performance.”
In the scenario above, the
holders of the equity investment at risk effectively gain power as a result of the
general partner’s disposal of its kick-out rights as opposed to losing the power to
direct activities (as would be the case if the general partner obtained additional
kick-out rights). However, the right to exercise power over the significant activities
of an entity is fundamental to the determination of whether an entity is a VIE and, if
so, whether the holder of a variable interest in the VIE is the primary beneficiary.
Accordingly, either a gain or a loss of power to direct the activities of a limited
partnership that most significantly affect its economic performance should be deemed a
reconsideration event in the context of evaluating whether a substantive kick-out or
participating right exists. Accordingly, if such a reconsideration event occurs, the
partners would need to reconsider all the requirements of ASC 810-10-15-14 in
determining whether the limited partnership is a VIE.
5.3.1.2.9 Partnerships in the Extractive and Construction Industries
As stated in ASC
810-10-15-14(b)(1)(ii), partnerships in the
extractive and construction industries that are
accounted for under the pro rata method of
consolidation would not be considered VIEs solely
because the limited partners do not have
substantive simple majority kick-out or
participating rights.
5.3.2 The Obligation to Absorb the Expected Losses of the Legal Entity
ASC 810-10
15-14 A legal entity shall be subject to consolidation under the guidance in the Variable Interest Entities
Subsections if, by design, any of the following conditions exist. (The phrase by design refers to legal entities that
meet the conditions in this paragraph because of the way they are structured. For example, a legal entity under
the control of its equity investors that originally was not a VIE does not become one
because of operating losses. The design of the legal entity is important in the application of these provisions.) . . .
b. As a group the holders of the equity investment at risk lack any one of the following three characteristics: . . .
2. The obligation to absorb the expected losses of the legal entity. The investor or investors
do not have that obligation if they are directly
or indirectly protected from the expected losses
or are guaranteed a return by the legal entity
itself or by other parties involved with the legal
entity. See paragraphs 810-10-25-55 through 25-56
and Example 1 (see paragraph 810-10-55-42) for a
discussion of expected losses. . . .
If interests other than the equity investment at risk
provide the holders of that investment with these characteristics or if
interests other than the equity investment at risk prevent the equity holders
from having these characteristics, the entity is a VIE. . . .
A legal entity is a VIE if the holders of equity investment at risk do not have the obligation to absorb the expected losses. Equity interests are expected to be the most residual interests in a legal entity. If the equity interests do not absorb the expected losses of the legal entity, the party protecting the equity interests from losses may be the party that has a controlling financial interest. Further, such structuring suggests that the legal entity is different from a typical legal entity and that, therefore, application of the voting interest entity model may not yield meaningful results.
The relevance of the guidance in ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(2) was clearer when it was part of FIN 46(R), and consolidation of a VIE depended primarily upon which party was
exposed to a majority of the expected losses. The linkage is now less apparent between the
root cause of a determination that a legal entity is a VIE (e.g., a guarantor protecting
equity investors from certain expected losses) and the party that ultimately consolidates
(see Chapter 7). Nonetheless,
the FASB retained this guidance, presumably because it still believes that any legal
entity that has variable interests that protect the equity investors from expected losses
requires additional scrutiny as a VIE.
Determining whether the equity investors lack the obligation to absorb expected
losses requires the application of judgment.
Logically, equity investors do not have the
obligation to absorb the expected losses of a
legal entity if another interest protects them
from absorbing those losses, either in part or in
full. Equity investments typically absorb
first-dollar loss in a legal entity; to the extent
that an agreement or instrument protects the
equity investors from absorbing that first-dollar
loss, the condition in ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(2) is
met (and the legal entity would be a VIE). A
quantitative analysis of expected losses is
generally not required. In the performance of a
qualitative analysis, judgment should be applied
that takes into account the totality of the legal
entity’s capital structure and the associated
rights.
To qualitatively assess whether the equity at risk has the obligation to absorb a legal entity’s expected losses, a reporting entity should consider the contractual arrangements that it and other interest holders have with each other and with the potential VIE that may protect one or more holders of equity investment at risk from the expected losses or guarantee them a return (e.g., a guarantee of the residual value of the majority of the fair value of the potential VIE’s assets, or a contractual arrangement that guarantees a 5 percent return).
In addition, a reporting entity should consider the contractual allocation of cash flows in determining whether the equity investment at risk absorbs the first risk of loss of a potential VIE to the extent of its equity invested. If a qualitative analysis indicates that no interests (1) are subordinate to the equity investment at risk, (2) protect the equity investors at risk, or (3) guarantee the equity investors a return, the analysis is generally sufficient for the assessment of whether the equity investment at risk has the obligation to absorb the expected losses of the legal entity.
A variety of agreements and instruments protect the equity investors and therefore can be indicative of a VIE. The following are potential examples of these agreements and interests:
- Total return swaps (financial instruments that transfer an investor’s exposure to a legal entity, in full, for a return in something else).
- Guaranteed returns (terms in an agreement that promise an investor in the legal entity a certain return on its investment in a legal entity).
- Certain supply arrangements (contracts under which a purchaser acquires output and pays for the cost of a legal entity’s production).
- Residual value guarantees (agreements under which a lessee pledges to a lessor that a subject asset will have a certain value after the passage of a certain amount of time).
- Certain guarantees of the legal entity’s indebtedness, to the extent that the financial instrument would prevent losses from being absorbed by the equity investors.
- Certain puts with a fixed exercise price, to the extent that the financial instrument transfers the first-dollar risk of loss to a counterparty.
- Agreements with certain counterparties to reimburse the losses of an equity investor.
In each of the above examples, exposure to first-dollar loss is transferred away
from the group of equity investors. Interests that a legal entity acquires in the ordinary
course of its business — like certain insurance policies, certain indemnification
agreements, and equivalent agreements — do not share that design and accordingly would not
result in the identification of a legal entity as a VIE (see Example 5-42). Likewise, arrangements among equity
holders to share losses in a proportion other than that suggested by relative equity
ownership does not result in the identification of a legal entity as a VIE.
There is no direct linkage between a conclusion about the sufficiency of equity investment at risk (as discussed in Section 5.2) and a conclusion about the obligation to absorb expected losses among the equity investors at risk as a group. Although the variable interest holders of a legal entity may determine that the total equity investment at risk exceeds expected losses, the analysis focuses on whether the holders of the equity investment at risk are actually the sole group exposed to those expected losses before other parties involved with the legal entity. If the holders of the equity investment at risk are protected (e.g., because another party has provided a limited guarantee on assets that comprise more than half the total fair value of the legal entity’s assets) or are guaranteed a return, the legal entity is a VIE. Note that the guidance in Section 4.3.11 on interests in specified assets must be considered. If the protection from losses relates to an interest in a specified asset (rather than in the legal entity as a whole), it would not cause the legal entity to be a VIE under this criterion.
Example 5-38
Assume that Enterprises A and B form a joint venture (Entity C) that does not qualify for any of the scope exceptions to the VIE model. The joint venture consists mostly of three assets (all real estate assets), each with a fair value representing 33 percent of C’s total assets. The real estate assets have been guaranteed by different third parties, each unrelated to A and B. Each guarantor is required to absorb decreases in the value of the real estate asset specific to the guarantor’s respective guarantee up to a stipulated amount. The guarantor’s loss absorption occurs before any absorption by the equity holders.
In this example, the guarantees do not prevent the equity holders (A and B), as
a group, from absorbing the expected losses of the
legal entity, because each of the guarantors is
considered to hold a variable interest in a
specific asset under ASC 810-10-25-55 and 25-56
rather than a variable interest in the legal
entity as a whole. ASC 810-10-25-56 states, in
part, “Expected losses related to variable
interests in specified assets are not considered part of the expected losses of
the legal entity for purposes of . . .
identifying the primary beneficiary unless the
specified assets constitute a majority of the
assets of the legal entity” (emphasis added).
Therefore, since the guarantees are not considered
variable interests in C (the legal entity), C is
not a VIE under this condition.
Note that the third-party guarantors need to consider the “silo” guidance discussed in Chapter 6.
Example 5-39
Assume the same facts as in the example above except that the guarantor
guaranteed two or three of the real estate assets. The guarantor must
aggregate its interests in determining whether it has a variable interest in
the legal entity. The variable interest in specific assets represents a
majority of the fair value of the entity’s total assets; therefore, the
expected losses of the assets, excluding the guarantee, would be considered part of the expected losses of the legal entity.
Because the equity holders as a group would be protected from such expected
losses by the guarantee variable interest, they would lack the obligation to
absorb the expected losses of the legal entity.
Note that if this example were changed so that the equity holders absorbed the first risk of loss up to the amount of their equity investments before the performance under the guarantee, the equity interests would not lack the obligation to absorb the expected losses of the legal entity in accordance with ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(2).
Example 5-40
Assume the same facts as in Example 5-38 except that the guarantors of the real estate
assets are related parties. As in Example 5-39, the guarantees must be
aggregated, which represents a majority of the fair value of the legal
entity’s total assets; thus, the guarantors would hold variable interests in
the legal entity (rather than specified assets), and the equity interests lack
the obligation to absorb the expected losses of the legal entity.
Example 5-41
Assume the same facts as in Example 5-38 except that one of the joint venture’s real estate
assets constitutes the majority of the fair value of Entity C’s total assets.
As in Examples
5-39 and 5-40, the guarantee is related to a majority of C’s total
assets; thus, the guarantor would hold a variable interest in the legal entity
(rather than specified assets), and the equity interests lack the obligation
to absorb C’s expected losses.
Example 5-42
Legal Entity A owns and operates several manufacturing plants. It purchases
property and casualty insurance to cover against various potential natural
disasters (e.g., fire) and business interruption.
In this example, A’s purchase of insurance to protect
against certain potential losses would not, by itself, result in a conclusion
that A is a VIE.
ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(2) is applied to identify entities that, by design, have
variable interests that protect the equity investors from expected losses that
the legal entity was designed to create and distribute to its equity interest
holders. Though the purchase of insurance does protect A’s equity interest
holders from certain risks of loss, these are not losses that A was designed
to create and distribute to them.
Note that in evaluating ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(2), a reporting entity must use
judgment to determine which risk(s) the legal entity was designed to create
and distribute to its equity interest holders.
5.3.2.1 Put Option on an Equity Interest
The right of equity holders (individually or as a group) in a legal entity to
put their equity interest to another party not otherwise involved with the legal entity
at a fixed price would generally not prevent the equity investors at risk from having
the obligation to absorb the expected losses of the legal entity. Although the
fixed-price put (whether physically or cash settled) protects the individual equity holder(s) from the expected losses of the legal entity, the put
is with a party not otherwise involved with the legal entity. That is, the holder or
holders of equity investment at risk purchase the put from an unrelated third party outside the legal entity. Therefore, the put option does not
cause the legal entity to be a VIE under ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(2) because the counterparty
to the put, if the put is exercised, will become a holder of equity investment at risk
and will be exposed to the expected losses and residual returns of the entity. However,
a reporting entity should always consider the substance of the put option as well as the
design of the legal entity in determining whether a legal entity is a VIE under ASC
810-10-15-14(b)(2). If a fixed-price put on the equity interest is economically
identical to a put on substantially all of the assets held by the legal entity, it would
be appropriate to conclude that (1) the put option protects the equity holders from the
expected losses and (2) the legal entity may be a VIE. This would be the case when the
put option is held on 100 percent of the equity and the legal entity was designed to
hold specified assets. In this scenario, there is no substantive difference between an
option to sell all specified assets (as described in Section 5.3.2.2) and a put on 100 percent of the
legal entity’s equity.
Note that a put option on an equity investment to the legal entity or another party involved with the legal entity would disqualify the equity from being at risk. See Section 5.2.2.4.1 for further information.
5.3.2.2 Put Option on Assets
The right of a legal entity to put, at a fixed price, a majority of its assets (based on fair values) to another party implies that the holders of equity investment at risk, as a group, lack the obligation to absorb the expected losses of the legal entity. The holders of the equity investment at risk lack the obligation to absorb the expected losses of the legal entity because the purchased put protects the equity holders from the expected losses related to the decrease in value of the assets.
Conversely, the counterparty to a put option on less than a majority of a legal entity’s assets (based on fair values) would hold an interest in specified assets as opposed to a variable interest in the legal entity (as long as the counterparty does not have another variable interest in the entity — see Section 4.3.11). Therefore, the equity investment at risk would continue to have the obligation to absorb the expected losses of the legal entity.
5.3.2.3 Other Variable Interests Held by Equity Investors
The existence of other variable interests between the equity investors or other parties and the legal entity that absorb expected losses may cause the legal entity to be a VIE. If the terms of the arrangement cause the first dollar of expected losses to be absorbed by another interest before the equity investment at risk, the arrangement protects the holders of equity at risk from some portion of the expected losses. This same conclusion applies whether the legal entity enters into an arrangement with the equity investor or with another related or unrelated party.
Example 5-43
Investors B and C each have a 45 percent equity interest in a joint venture, all of which qualifies as equity at risk. Investor D has a 10 percent equity interest in the joint venture that does not qualify as equity at risk. Profits and losses are allocated between the investors according to their ownership interests after payments are made to all other interests in the joint venture.
In this scenario, while D’s equity interest is not considered equity at risk, it still absorbs expected losses and receives residual returns at the same level as the equity at risk. That is, D is not protecting the other equity investors from absorbing the first-dollar risk of loss. Therefore, the equity at risk does not lack the obligation to absorb the expected losses of the legal entity.
Example 5-44
Investors B and C each have a 50 percent equity interest in a joint venture (JV), all of which qualifies as equity at risk. Investor C has also entered into a contract to supply raw materials to JV at prices below those that could be obtained through sales with unrelated third parties (supply contract). The supply contract is considered a variable interest because the equity holders are protected from the losses associated with that contract. That is, the supply contract is reallocating expected losses associated with the below-market pricing from the equity interests directly to C.
In examining how the supply contract absorbs losses before the equity investment
at risk, assume that there are no other variable interest holders. The
expected losses of JV are $110 and are allocated as follows:
-
Below-market supply contract — Investor C = $10.
-
50 percent equity — Investor B = $50.
-
50 percent equity — Investor C = $50.
Example 5-45
An investor owns 100 percent of the equity issued by a legal entity, all of which is considered equity at risk. An unrelated enterprise enters into a contract to purchase finished product from the legal entity at a price equal to the actual costs of production (including costs of raw materials, labor, etc.) plus a 2 percent fixed margin. The purchase agreement is designed so that the purchaser absorbs all variability associated with the production of the finished product. There are no other variable interest holders in the entity.
In this example, because the purchaser absorbs all of the variability related to
the manufacturing of the products under the purchase agreement, the investor
is protected from some portion of expected losses. Therefore, the equity at
risk lacks the obligation to absorb the expected losses of the legal
entity.
5.3.3 The Right to Receive the Expected Residual Returns of the Legal Entity
ASC 810-10
15-14 A legal entity shall be subject to consolidation under the guidance in the Variable Interest Entities
Subsections if, by design, any of the following conditions exist. (The phrase by design refers to legal entities that
meet the conditions in this paragraph because of the way they are structured. For example, a legal entity under
the control of its equity investors that originally was not a VIE does not become one
because of operating losses. The design of the legal entity is important in the application of these provisions.) . . .
b. As a group the holders of the equity investment at risk lack any one of the following three characteristics: . . .
3. The right to receive the expected residual returns of the legal entity. The investors do not have
that right if their return is capped by the legal entity’s governing documents or arrangements with
other variable interest holders or the legal entity. For this purpose, the return to equity investors
is not considered to be capped by the existence of outstanding stock options, convertible debt, or
similar interests because if the options in those instruments are exercised, the holders will become
additional equity investors.
If interests other than the equity investment at risk
provide the holders of that investment with these characteristics or if
interests other than the equity investment at risk prevent the equity holders
from having these characteristics, the entity is a VIE. . . .
A legal entity is a VIE if the holders of equity investment at risk are “capped” on receipt of the expected residual returns. This is because the owners of equity investment at risk would typically not give away the right to those residual profits and, consequently, the rights allocated to the equity investment at risk in such an entity should be discounted (i.e., application of the voting interest entity model may not yield meaningful results). Rights to residual returns can accrue to parties other than the holders of equity investment at risk in a number of ways, including (but not limited to):
- Explicitly stated contractual terms in organizing documents.
- Agreements between the owners of equity investment at risk and other counterparties.
- Agreements between the legal entity and the owners of equity investment at risk.
The threshold in ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(3) is unlike that established for the
obligation to absorb expected losses described in
Section 5.3.2, under which the legal
entity is a VIE if the equity holders are
protected from any expected losses. Under ASC
810-10-15-14(b)(3), the legal entity is a VIE only
if the residual returns are capped, a distinction
that allows for residual returns to be shared with
parties that do not hold equity investment at
risk. A cap is an upward limit, a ceiling above
which all residual returns are received by a
variable interest holder that does not represent
equity investment at risk. In practice, because of
this distinction, it is rare for a legal entity to
qualify as a VIE under this guidance, whereas a
legal entity is frequently a VIE because its
equity investors at risk are protected from
expected losses.
Note that stock options, convertible debt, or similar interests do not cap
residual returns because if the options in those instruments are exercised, the holders
will become additional equity investors. Similarly, a return to an at-risk equity investor
is generally not capped by an outstanding fixed-price call option on the investor’s equity
because the holder of the option would become an equity investor if the option were
exercised (see Section 5.3.3.2 for an
exception to this rule). The distinction in these instruments is the alignment of return
and equity ownership. However, it is not correct that only holders of equity investment at
risk can share in the residual returns of a legal entity (e.g., profit sharing is
permissible as long as it does not cap the return to the equity holders). Likewise, it is
not necessary for an equity investment at risk to have the same rights to residual returns
as another equity investment; disproportionate profit sharing is permissible as long as it
does not result in an impact to the group of holders of equity investment at risk in a
manner akin to a cap. Reporting entities should apply judgment in considering the effects
of financial instruments and profit-sharing arrangements.
For a legal entity to qualify as a voting interest entity, the rights to its expected residual returns must not be capped. A reporting entity must use significant judgment and evaluate all relevant facts and circumstances to determine whether returns are capped. Investors should not be considered to have the right to receive the expected residual returns of the legal entity if their participation in the return of a legal entity is trivial beyond a specified amount.
The following are examples of situations in which residual returns generally
would be considered capped:
-
The investment manager receives a performance-based fee equal to all investment returns above 15 percent in any annual period.
-
The legal entity is designed to serve as a profit-sharing vehicle for employees of a sponsoring reporting entity at which all returns on assets of more than 6 percent are allocated to the employees.
The following are examples of situations in which holders of the equity investment at risk generally would not be considered capped:
- The investment manager receives a performance-based fee equal to 10 percent of all investment returns up to 15 percent and thereafter shares in investment returns 30/70 with the equity investors.
- The legal entity is designed to serve as a profit-sharing vehicle for employees of a sponsoring reporting entity at which 50 percent of the returns on assets of more than 6 percent are allocated to the employees.
Example 5-46
Investors B and C each have a 45 percent equity interest in a joint venture, all of which qualifies as equity at risk. Investor D has a 10 percent equity interest in the joint venture that does not qualify as equity at risk. Profits and losses are allocated according to ownership interests after payments are made to all other interests in the joint venture. Investor D is also entitled to an additional 5 percent of profits (not losses) above a specified threshold.
In this scenario, while D is entitled to additional profits above a specified
threshold, D’s equity interest shares losses and
residual returns at the same level as the equity
interest (pari passu) of B and C. Although D’s
interest has a beneficial feature that the equity
investors at risk (B and C) do not have, B’s and
C’s returns are not capped. Therefore, the equity
at risk does not lack the characteristic in ASC
810-10-15-14(b)(3).
5.3.3.1 Determining the Effect of a Call Option on an Entity’s Assets on the Ability of the Equity Group to Receive Residual Returns
A fixed-price call option written by the legal entity on specified assets of the legal entity that represent more than 50 percent of the total fair value of a legal entity’s assets would be considered a cap on the holders of equity investment at risk right to receive the expected residual returns of the legal entity. However, if the aggregate amount of call options with a counterparty and its related parties is on assets constituting 50 percent or less of the total fair value of a legal entity’s assets, it would not represent a cap on the residual returns of the holders of equity investment at risk.
Example 5-47
Entity A leases equipment to several unrelated lessees under operating leases.
Some of the lessees hold fixed-price purchase options on the leased
equipment that are exercisable at the expiration of the lease terms. The
initial fair value of equipment under one of the leases is more than 50 percent of the fair value of A’s total
assets. Therefore, that lessee’s purchase option under that lease would be a
variable interest in the legal entity. Because the purchase option would cap
the holder of the equity investment at risk’s right to receive residual
returns pursuant to ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(3) (i.e., the equity investors at
risk of A do not participate in the appreciation in value of the related
equipment), A would be a VIE.
5.3.3.2 Determining the Effect of a Call Option on an Entity’s Equity on the Ability of the Equity Group to Receive Residual Returns
As discussed in Section
5.3.3, a return to an at-risk equity
investor is generally not capped by an outstanding
fixed-price call option on the investor’s equity
because the holder of the option would become an
equity investor if the option were exercised.
However, in determining whether a legal entity is
a VIE, a reporting entity should consider the
substance of the call option on equity as well as
the design of the legal entity. In instances in
which the fixed-price call option on the equity is
economically identical to a call on the specified
assets held by the legal entity, it would be
appropriate to conclude that the residual returns
to the equity group are capped and that,
therefore, the legal entity is a VIE. This would
be the case when the call option is held on 100
percent of the equity and the VIE was designed to
hold specified assets. In that circumstance, there
is no substantive difference between an option to
acquire the specified assets (as described in
Section 5.3.3.1) and a call on 100 percent
of the legal entity’s equity.
Footnotes
3
Re-REMICs are resecuritizations of real estate mortgage investment conduit securities.
4
In these specific circumstances, a consent requirement is not
substantive unless the other investors of at-risk equity are able to withhold
their consent without limitation. Accordingly, consent that cannot be unreasonably
withheld is generally not substantive. However, such a conclusion regarding the
determination of whether a consent that cannot be unreasonably withheld is
substantive should not be applied to other situations, including the evaluation of
whether a noncontrolling interest holder has substantive participating rights, as
discussed in Section
D.2.3. A consent requirement may also not be substantive if the other
equity investors are related parties or de facto agents of the decision maker.
5
Although participating rights must also be considered, as discussed in Section 5.3.1.1.3.5, we do not believe that such rights have the same impact on the VIE determination as kick-out rights in this context.
6
Paragraph BC49 of ASU 2015-02
states that “[b]arriers to exercise may be
different when considering kick-out rights as
compared with barriers for liquidation rights and
should be evaluated appropriately when assessing
whether the rights are substantive.”
7
Excluding liquidation rights
held by the general partner, entities under common
control with the general partner, or other parties
acting on behalf of the general partner as
described in Section
5.3.1.2.3.
8
As stated in ASC
810-10-25-14B, “[t]he requirement to dissolve or
liquidate the entire limited partnership upon the
withdrawal of a limited partner or partners shall
not be required to be contractual for a withdrawal
right to be considered as a potential kick-out
right.” Therefore, a reporting entity must
consider whether withdrawal will practically
result in the required dissolution of the
partnership (e.g., the partnership has only one
limited partner and the general partner has a
nominal interest). All facts and circumstances
must be considered in determining whether the
withdrawal requires dissolution or liquidation.
5.4 Nonsubstantive Voting Rights
ASC 810-10
15-14 A legal entity shall be
subject to consolidation under the guidance in the Variable
Interest Entities Subsections if, by design, any of the
following conditions exist. (The phrase by design
refers to legal entities that meet the conditions in this
paragraph because of the way they are structured. For
example, a legal entity under the control of its equity
investors that originally was not a VIE does not become one
because of operating losses. The design of the legal entity
is important in the application of these provisions.) . .
.
c. The equity investors as a group also are considered to lack the characteristic in (b)(1) if both of the following conditions are present:
- The voting rights of some investors are not proportional to their obligations to absorb the expected losses of the legal entity, their rights to receive the expected residual returns of the legal entity, or both.
- Substantially all of the legal entity’s activities (for example, providing financing or buying assets) either involve or are conducted on behalf of an investor that has disproportionately few voting rights. This provision is necessary to prevent a primary beneficiary from avoiding consolidation of a VIE by organizing the legal entity with nonsubstantive voting interests. Activities that involve or are conducted on behalf of the related parties of an investor with disproportionately few voting rights shall be treated as if they involve or are conducted on behalf of that investor. The term related parties in this paragraph refers to all parties identified in paragraph 810-10-25-43, except for de facto agents under paragraph 810-10-25-43(d).
For purposes of applying this requirement, reporting
entities shall consider each party’s obligations to absorb expected losses and
rights to receive expected residual returns related to all of that party’s
interests in the legal entity and not only to its equity investment at risk.
Although intended to clarify ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(1) (see Section 5.3.1), ASC 810-10-15-14(c) is
generally considered a separate condition in the assessment of a VIE. ASC 810-10-15-14(c)(2)
explains that the provision “is necessary to prevent a primary beneficiary from avoiding
consolidation of a VIE by organizing the legal entity with nonsubstantive voting interests.”
Thus, ASC 810-10-15-14(c) is often referred to as the “anti-abuse provision” since it aims
to prevent legal entities from being structured in a manner in which (1) a reporting entity
has disproportionately few voting rights and (2) substantially all of the legal entity’s
activities either involve or are conducted on behalf of the reporting entity (and its
related parties except for related parties under ASC 810-10-25-43(d)) and disproportionately
few voting rights are exempt from the VIE model. Such legal entities would be evaluated
under the VIE model.
Although intended to address abuse, ASC 810-10-15-14(c) also applies to
reporting entities other than those that circumvent the VIE rules. Many legal entities
established with valid business purposes may qualify as VIEs under this guidance.
Furthermore, a reporting entity that has been determined to have met the “substantially all”
criterion does not automatically consolidate the VIE.
When considering this guidance, a reporting entity must perform the following
steps:
-
Step 1 — Determine whether one investor has disproportionately few voting rights relative to that investor’s economic exposure to a legal entity.
-
Step 2 — Assess whether substantially all of the activities of a legal entity either involve or are conducted on behalf of the investor identified in step 1, including that investor’s related parties and some de facto agents.
If a legal entity satisfies all the criteria in both steps 1 and 2,
its voting rights are considered nonsubstantive and it is therefore a VIE. A reporting
entity would then evaluate the legal entity for consolidation under the VIE model.
5.4.1 Disproportionately Few Voting Rights (Step 1)
ASC 810-10-15-14(c) reflects the FASB’s belief that having disproportionately
few voting rights creates a potential for abuse, since an investor would be unlikely to
accept economic exposure in excess of its voting rights. In the assessment of what
constitutes “disproportionately few,” the voting rights an investor holds and the exposure
to economics retained by an investor are each expressed as a percentage of the respective
total. If the percentage of relative voting rights is smaller than the percentage of
relative economic exposure, the criterion is met.
Legal entities are often structured with multiple classes of stock, and those
classes may carry voting rights that are conditional or that carry different weight.
Limited partnerships and limited liability corporations often identify one party — the
general partner or managing member — as the decision maker, endowed with all power related
to decisions in the ordinary course of business, irrespective of the equity owned by that
party. In other circumstances, the exact percentage of total voting rights that an
investor holds may not be of specific importance. For example, in a situation in which two
investors hold 60 percent and 40 percent of the voting rights, respectively, and a 66.6
percent threshold is required for a decision, each party should be considered to have 50
percent of the voting rights of the legal entity regardless of the actual voting rights
held.
Judgment will also be required in the determination of an investor’s economic exposure. Economic exposure in this context incorporates the definition of a variable interest (see Section 2.14 and Chapter 4) by reference to the obligation to absorb expected losses or the right to receive expected residual returns. It is clear, therefore, that the anti-abuse provision is not intended to encompass only the exposure to economics conveyed by the same interests that convey the right to vote. Investors will often have exposure to economics through variable interests in addition to equity interests in a legal entity. Examples include debt financing, decision-maker fees, and guarantees. Finally, an investor’s economic exposure should include implicit variable interests and “activities around the entity,” as described in Section 4.3.10.1.
Though these assessments will require the use of judgment, we generally believe
that the threshold for satisfying this criterion will be low. Given the purpose of the
guidance, it will often be obvious when voting rights and economic exposure are
disproportionate. An investor with a majority of economic exposure and less than a
majority of voting rights clearly has disproportionately few voting rights.
If an investor has disproportionately few voting rights, step 2 should be
performed (see Section
5.4.2).
The anti-abuse provision focuses on all investors in the legal entity, not only
a specific reporting entity. Consequently, if a reporting entity has disproportionately
many voting rights, another investor will by default have disproportionately few voting
rights, and the condition will be met. A conclusion that the reporting entity alone does
not have disproportionately few voting rights is insufficient. Note that under step 1,
related parties and de facto agents are ignored (although implicit variable interests and
activities around the legal entity through a related party may be relevant, and thus an
understanding of the totality of a reporting entity’s variable interests is required).
Instead, the focus is on variable interests held specifically by an investor.
5.4.1.1 Impact of Variable Interests in Addition to Equity
When determining whether a reporting entity’s voting rights are proportional to its obligations to absorb the expected losses of the legal entity or to its rights to receive the expected residual returns of the legal entity, a reporting entity must consider all of its variable interests issued by the legal entity, including those held by reporting entities that do not also hold equity investment at risk.
The FASB staff has indicated that the anti-abuse provision requires a reporting
entity to consider each possible scenario in determining whether its voting rights are
proportionate to its obligations to absorb the expected losses or rights to receive the
expected residual returns of the legal entity. Therefore, a reporting entity that holds
a voting equity investment at risk and any other variable interest not proportionately
held by other equity interest holders (e.g., debt, service contract that is a variable
interest, guarantee) will always meet ASC 810-10-15-14(c)(1).
Example 5-48
Enterprises X and Y each contribute $1 million (aggregate equity of $2 million)
in exchange for a 50 percent equity interest in an entity. This entitles
each enterprise to equal voting rights. Enterprise Y, but not X, also
provides subordinated debt. ASC 810-10-15-14(c)(1) is met because Y’s total
variable interests, as a percentage of the total of all variable interests
of holders of equity investment at risk, are greater than its voting rights
(50 percent). This is true even if Y’s specific amount of expected losses
and expected residual returns is less than the $2 million equity investment
at risk. In other words, although subordinated debt is not expected to
absorb any of the expected losses, Y could experience losses or returns that
are disproportionate to its 50 percent voting interest.
Example 5-49
Company J and Company E each contribute $500,000 (aggregate equity of $1
million) in exchange for a 50 percent equity interest in a chemical
manufacturing entity. This entitles each company to equal voting rights in
the entity. Company J, but not E, also receives fees for managing the
chemical manufacturing entity. The fees paid to E meet the conditions to be
“commensurate” under ASC 810-10-55-37(a) and “at market” under ASC
810-10-55-37(d); however, as a result of E’s equity interests in the
chemical manufacturing entity that absorb more than an insignificant amount
of the potential VIE’s variability, the condition in ASC 810-10-55-37(c) is
not met and the fees therefore represent a variable interest. In this case,
ASC 810-10-15-14(c)(1) is met because E’s total variable interests, as a
percentage of the total of all variable interests of holders of equity
investment at risk, are greater than its voting rights (50 percent).
Although the fees paid to E are not expected to absorb any of the expected
losses, E could experience returns that are disproportionate to its 50
percent voting interest.
Example 5-50
Company B and Company D are equity investors in Conglomerate T and hold 90
percent and 10 percent voting interests, respectively. Company B has a
majority of the voting rights in T (through its 90 percent voting interest)
and has a majority of the exposure to T’s profits and losses (through its 60
percent participation). In this case, ASC 810-10-15-14(c)(1) is not met even
though B’s voting rights (90 percent) and exposure to T’s economics (60
percent) are not equal. Company B has control of T; therefore, B’s voting
rights and economic interests are proportional at either the 90 percent or
60 percent threshold.
5.4.2 Substantially All of the Activities Involve or Are Conducted on Behalf of the Investor With Disproportionately Few Voting Rights (Step 2)
A legal entity that has an investor with disproportionately few voting rights is
not a VIE unless substantially all of its activities either involve or are conducted on
behalf of that investor (including that investor’s related parties and all but one type of
its de facto agents9). This provision is intended to prevent a reporting entity from circumventing the
requirements for consolidating a VIE by forming the VIE primarily for its own use with
voting rights that do not equate to the allocation of the underlying economic gains and
losses of holders of interests in the formed VIE.
Many components of this provision will already be known: the investor with disproportionately few voting rights will have been identified in step 1; that investor’s related parties and de facto agents will be identified; and the legal entity’s activities can be determined on the basis of its purpose and design. However, a reporting entity will need to exercise significant judgment in determining whether the “substantially all” requirement has been met.
Speaking at the 2003 AICPA Conference on Current SEC Developments, an SEC staff member, Eric Schuppenhauer, discussed this provision:
The second part of this provision is where more judgment is involved. In the event that a registrant concludes that it has disproportionately few voting rights compared to its economics, there must be an assessment of whether substantially all of the activities of the entity either involve or are conducted on behalf of the registrant. There is no “bright-line” set of criteria for making this assessment. All facts and circumstances, qualitative and quantitative, should be considered in performing the assessment.
Under ASC 810-10-15-14(c)(2), the term “activities” refers to the business
activities of the potential VIE under evaluation. It does not necessarily encompass the
economic interests (i.e., the obligation of the interest holders to absorb expected losses
or the right of the interest holders to receive expected residual returns). A reporting
entity must also understand the business reason why an investor chooses to accept voting
rights that are not proportionate to its investment.
“Substantially all” is a high threshold. Generally, if 90 percent or more of the
legal entity’s activities either involve or are conducted on behalf of a reporting entity
and its related parties, they are presumed to be “substantially all” of the legal entity’s
activities. However, less than 90 percent is not a safe harbor. The evaluation should not
necessarily be based on the reporting entity’s economic interest(s) in a legal entity.
However, significant economic interests in a legal entity may be an indicator that
substantially all of the legal entity’s activities either involve or are conducted on
behalf of the reporting entity and its related parties.
A reporting entity will generally need to perform a qualitative analysis to
determine whether substantially all of the activities of a legal entity either involve or
are conducted on behalf of an investor, its related parties, and some de facto agents.10 This “substantially all” terminology is used in a manner parallel to its use in the
business scope exception discussed in Section 3.4.4.7 and should be applied in a consistent manner. The following
factors, among others, may be useful in the evaluation of whether substantially all of a
legal entity’s activities either involve or are conducted on behalf of a reporting
entity:
-
Business relationship of the legal entity and the reporting entity — Does the reporting entity contractually acquire substantially all of the output of the legal entity? Does the legal entity have the substantive ability to provide its output to other entities, or is the legal entity solely tied to the reporting entity?
-
Type of business conducted by the legal entity — Does the legal entity serve a function beyond providing inputs to the reporting entity (i.e., is the legal entity just an extension of the reporting entity)? Does the legal entity rely on inputs provided exclusively by the reporting entity to conduct its operations?
-
Economic dependence of the legal entity upon the reporting entity — Does the reporting entity absorb substantially all of the losses of the legal entity? Does the reporting entity have the responsibility to fund losses of the legal entity?
-
Operational dependence of the legal entity on the reporting entity — Does the reporting entity provide the employees that operate the legal entity’s business?
-
Origins of the legal entity — Did the reporting entity form the legal entity to perform a specific function that the reporting entity had historically performed on its own?
-
Ongoing linkage of the entities — Do the reporting entity and legal entity have the ability to put or call the assets of the legal entity in the future under favorable terms?
No single factor is necessarily determinative. The facts and circumstances associated with a legal entity
should be considered in total in the assessment of whether ASC 810-10-15-14(c)(2) has been met.
Example 5-51
Two investors, Enterprise A and Enterprise B, form a joint venture (JV) solely to manufacture steel. Enterprises A and B contribute cash of $80 million and $20 million, respectively, to fund JV, and each investor has 50 percent of the voting rights. In addition, 90 percent of JV’s manufactured steel is sold to A, and 10 percent is sold to third parties.
In this scenario, JV satisfies ASC 810-10-15-14(c)(1) because A’s share in
losses of JV is disproportionate to its voting rights (80 percent share of
losses compared with 50 percent voting rights). JV also satisfies ASC
810-10-15-14(c)(2) because substantially all of JV’s activities (90 percent of
the output) are conducted on behalf of A, the investor with disproportionately
few voting rights. Therefore, since the equity investors as a group lack the
characteristic in ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(1) (i.e., both conditions in ASC
810-10-15-14(c) have been met), JV is a VIE.
Conversely, if JV were to sell 50 percent or more of its manufactured steel to
unrelated third parties, JV would not be a VIE. If sales to A are greater than
50 percent but less than 90 percent, judgment should be used in the
determination of whether JV meets both criteria in ASC 810-10-15-14(c) when no
other activity besides sales is relevant to the evaluation.
Example 5-52
An investment hedge fund (Entity Z) is established by a 99 percent limited
partner (Enterprise A) and a 1 percent general partner (Enterprise B).
Enterprise B manages the hedge fund and makes all decisions. Enterprise A
cannot remove B except for cause. Therefore, the voting rights are not
proportional to the share of expected losses and expected residual returns of
Z. Substantially all of Z’s activities would be considered to be on behalf of
A because Z is established to invest its money and provide a return to A.
Therefore, because Z meets both conditions of ASC 810-10-15-14(c), it would be
deemed a VIE.
Conversely, if limited partner interests were held by a larger number of unrelated limited partners, Z would not be considered a VIE under ASC 810-10-15-14(c). Note, however, that Z would be deemed a VIE under ASC 810-10-15-14(b) in both scenarios because the limited partner and partners do not have substantive rights to kick out the general partner.
Example 5-53
Entity X is formed by Enterprise A and Enterprise B with equity contributions of $80 million and $20 million, respectively. Each investor has a 50 percent voting interest. Entity X’s activities consist solely of purchasing merchandise from A and selling and distributing it to third-party customers.
Entity X satisfies ASC 810-10-15-14(c)(1) because the voting rights of the
investors are not proportional to their obligation to absorb X’s expected
losses. Therefore, X’s investors must consider ASC 810-10-15-14(c)(2).
While the “outputs” of X are not transactions with A or B, the business of X represents another distribution or sales channel for A’s merchandise. Entity X appears to be an extension of A’s business because it is so closely aligned in appearance and purpose. Entity X has been designed so that substantially all of its activities either involve or are conducted on behalf of A (the investor that has disproportionately few voting rights). Therefore, ASC 810-10-15-14(c)(2) is met, and X is a VIE.
Example 5-54
Enterprise A and Enterprise B form Entity Y with equity contributions of $80 million and $20 million, respectively. Each investor has a 50 percent voting interest. Entity Y has contracted to purchase all of its raw materials from A. Entity Y is one of several customers of A. Entity Y uses these raw materials to manufacture products to sell to third-party customers identified by Y.
Entity Y meets ASC 810-10-15-14(c)(1) because the voting rights of the investors
are not proportional to their obligation to absorb the expected losses of the
legal entity. Therefore, the investors of Y must consider ASC
810-10-15-14(c)(2).
Entity Y sells its products directly to third parties. That is, the “outputs” of
Y are not transactions conducted directly with A or B. Even though all of the
raw materials of Y are provided by A, Y does not appear to be an extension of
A’s business and would not be considered to be designed so that substantially
all of its activities either involve or are conducted on behalf of the
investor that has disproportionately few voting rights. (This is different
from the situation in the previous example.) Therefore, ASC 810-10-15-14(c)(2)
is not met, and Y is not a VIE.
Footnotes
9
This condition specifically excludes de facto agents resulting from
a unilateral transfer restriction under ASC 810-10-25-43(d). See Section 8.2 for a discussion of
de facto agents.
10
See footnote 9.