Appendix E — Industry-Specific Guidance
Appendix E — Industry-Specific Guidance
This appendix discusses considerations related to applying the
consolidation requirements in ASC 810 for the following structures and entities:
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Securitization structures (see Section E.1).
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Collateralized investment vehicles (see Section E.2).
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Real estate structures (see Section E.3).
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LIHTC structures (see Section E.4).
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P&U entities (see Section E.5).
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NFP and health care entities (see Section E.6).
E.1 Securitization Structures
E.1.1 Overview
In a securitization transaction, the reporting
entity will typically transfer a financial asset (or a portion of
a financial asset) to another legal entity
(securitization entity). For a financial asset transfer to be accounted for as a
sale, the transferor must first consider whether it is required to consolidate
the transferee. If the financial asset is transferred to a consolidated
subsidiary, control over the transferred financial asset has not been
surrendered, and the transaction would not qualify as a sale. Second, even if
the transferee is not consolidated, the transferor must surrender control over
the asset transferred. Control is considered to be surrendered only if all three
of the following conditions are met: (1) the asset has been legally isolated,
(2) the transferee has the ability to pledge or exchange the asset, and (3) the
transferor otherwise no longer maintains effective control over the asset.
However, as stated in ASC 860-10-55-17D, "if the transferee is a
consolidated subsidiary of the transferor (its parent), the transferee shall
recognize the transferred financial assets in its separate entity financial
statements, unless the nature of the transfer is a secured borrowing with a
pledge of collateral.” Accordingly, to prepare stand-alone financial statements
of the subsidiary entity, the reporting entity would be required to evaluate
whether the transfer between the affiliates meets the conditions to qualify as a
sale, ignoring the fact that the entities are under common control.
The discussion below focuses on the consolidation considerations under ASC 810 related to a typical securitization (not on whether a transfer qualifies for sale accounting under ASC 860).
E.1.2 Variable Interests in a Securitization Entity
In its evaluation to determine whether it is required to consolidate a
securitization entity, the reporting entity must identify all the parties to the
transaction and identify which of those parties has a variable interest. While there is no requirement for the
transacting parties to compare their accounting conclusions, each participant
needs to understand the rights and obligations of each party involved with the
securitization entity to reach a conclusion about its own accounting for its
interest in the securitization entity.
E.1.2.1 Beneficial Interests Received
To purchase financial assets from the transferor, the securitization entity will issue securities (beneficial interests) to investors either through a private offering or a public offering. The transferor may retain some or all of the beneficial interests issued by the securitization entity as consideration for the financial assets transferred. As discussed in Section 4.3.2, beneficial interests or debt instruments that represent financing instruments of a legal entity are almost always variable interests, even if the instruments are the most senior in the capital structure of the legal entity. As liabilities, these instruments are designed to absorb variability in the performance of the legal entity’s assets because the beneficial interest holder is exposed to that legal entity’s ability to pay (i.e., credit risk) and may be exposed to interest rate risk, depending on the design of the legal entity.
E.1.2.2 Guarantees
A transferor may also provide credit enhancements to the securitization
structure to increase the likelihood that the other investors will receive
the cash flows to which they are entitled. Doing so improves the
marketability of the beneficial interests issued while the transferor
retains the risk of the underlying assets that it transferred to the
securitization entity. Since guarantees expose the transferor to expected losses of the transferee, these
arrangements are typically variable interests. However, whether such an
arrangement is a variable interest depends on the design of the legal entity
and the characteristics of that instrument. In addition, when analyzing a
guarantee of financial assets in a securitization entity, the transferor
must determine whether the specified asset(s) subject to the guarantee have
a fair value that is less than half of the total fair value of the
securitization entity’s assets. If the specified asset or assets are less
than half of the total fair value of the securitization entity’s assets, and
the transferor does not have any other interest in the legal entity, the
guarantee is not considered a variable interest in the entire legal entity
but rather a variable interest in specified assets within the transferee
entity (see Section
4.3.11).
E.1.2.3 Fees Paid to Decision Makers or Service Providers
Securitizations involve either a static portfolio of financial assets or a
managed portfolio of financial assets. In a static portfolio securitization,
the financial assets are held by the securitization entity until they are
repaid by the original obligor. In a managed portfolio securitization, an
asset manager will actively trade the underlying investments to maximize the
returns of the securitization entity.
A servicer or decision maker that has the
ability to make investment decisions of the securitization entity will need
to evaluate whether its decision-making arrangement represents a variable
interest in the securitization entity. If the servicer’s or decision maker’s
fee arrangement meets all three conditions in ASC 810-10-55-37, then the
arrangement would not be considered a variable interest. If, as is often the
case, the servicer also owns some of the beneficial interests issued by the
securitization entity, it is likely that the servicer’s or decision maker’s
fee arrangement represents a variable interest. In addition, if the fee
arrangement exposes the servicer or decision maker to the risk of loss in
the transferee, the fee arrangement is a variable interest. However, a
servicer or decision maker that does not hold a variable interest in the
securitization entity will never consolidate the securitization entity. See
Section 4.4
for a discussion of decision-maker and service-provider fees.
E.1.3 Determining Whether a Securitization Entity Is a VIE
Not all SPEs are VIEs, but generally all
securitization SPEs are VIEs. A securitization entity usually does not issue
equity instruments with voting rights (or other interests with similar rights)
that have the power to direct the significant activities of the entity, and
often the securitization entity’s total equity investment at risk is not
sufficient to permit the entity to finance its activities without additional
forms of credit enhancement or other subordinated
financial support. Because securitization entities are typically
insufficiently capitalized, with little or no true “equity” for accounting
purposes, and are rarely designed to have a voting equity class that possesses
the power to direct the securitization entities’ activities, they are generally
VIEs. See Chapter 5 for
further discussion of determining whether a legal entity is a VIE.
E.1.4 Determining the Primary Beneficiary of a Securitization Entity
ASC 810 requires a reporting entity to identify the primary beneficiary of a securitization entity that is a VIE on
the basis of whether the reporting entity has both (1) the power to direct the
activities that most significantly affect the VIE’s economic performance and (2)
the obligation to absorb the VIE’s losses or the right to receive benefits from
the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE. Only one reporting
entity is expected to control a securitization entity. Although several deal
participants could have variable interests in the securitization entity,
typically only one would have the power to direct the activities that most
significantly affect the securitization entity’s economic performance. See Chapter 7 for further
discussion of identifying the primary beneficiary of a VIE.
E.1.4.1 Power Analysis — Identifying the Activities That Most Significantly Affect the VIE
In securitizations, the economic performance of the legal entity is generally
most significantly affected by the performance of the underlying assets.
Accordingly, the activities that most significantly affect the economic
performance of the legal entity are typically the management by the servicer
of the delinquencies and defaults that inevitably occur or, in a managed
CLO, the activities of the collateral manager related to selecting,
monitoring, and disposing of collateral assets. Sometimes, in structures
like commercial paper (CP) conduits, the management of liabilities (e.g.,
selecting the tenor of CP) will also significantly affect the performance of
the legal entity, but generally it will not be the most significant
activity. Some of the factors that might affect the performance of the
underlying assets could be beyond the direct control of any of the parties
to the securitization (like voluntary prepayments) and therefore are not
considered in the power analysis.
E.1.4.1.1 Situations in Which Securitization Entities Will Not Have Ongoing Activities That Significantly Affect Their Economic Performance
In limited situations, the ongoing activities performed throughout the life of a
securitization entity (e.g., administrative activities in certain
resecuritization entities, such as Re-REMICs) may not be expected to
significantly affect the legal entity’s economic performance even though
they are necessary for the VIE’s continued existence. In such
situations, the primary beneficiary determination will need to focus on
the activities performed and the decisions made at the VIE’s inception
as part of the VIE’s design, because in these situations the initial
design had the most significant effect on the economic performance of
the VIE. However, it would not be appropriate to determine the primary
beneficiary solely on the basis of decisions made at the VIE’s inception
as part of the VIE’s design when there are ongoing activities that will
significantly affect the economic performance of the VIE. See Section 7.2.3.2
for further discussion of legal entities that have no ongoing
activities.
E.1.4.2 Economics Analysis — Interests That Could Potentially Be Significant to the VIE
The VIE model indicates that a reporting entity must assess the VIE’s purpose
and design when evaluating whether the reporting entity has (1) the
obligation to absorb losses of the VIE or (2) the right to receive benefits
from the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE. This
assessment includes a consideration of all risks and associated variability
that are absorbed by any of the VIE’s variable interest holders. In most
securitization structures, any party with a significant beneficial interest in the securitization entity will
meet this criteria because probability is not considered. Accordingly, the
consolidation evaluation generally focuses on which of those parties has
power over the securitization entity. See Section 7.3.3 for further discussion
of when an interest would be considered more than insignificant.
E.1.5 Illustrative Examples
Cases A through F in ASC 810-10-55 below illustrate the application of the consolidation assessment for typical securitization structures.
ASC 810-10 (Case A: Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitization)
Case A: Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitization
55-96 A VIE is created and financed with $94 of investment grade 7-year fixed-rate bonds (issued in 3
tranches) and $6 of equity. All of the bonds are held by third-party investors. The equity is held by a third party,
who is also the special servicer. The equity tranche was designed to absorb the first dollar risk of loss and to
receive any residual return from the VIE. The VIE uses the proceeds to purchase $100 of BB-rated fixed-rate
commercial mortgage loans with contractual maturities of 7 years from a transferor. The commercial mortgage
loans contain provisions that require each borrower to pay the full scheduled interest and principal if the loan
is extinguished prior to maturity. The transaction was marketed to potential bondholders as an investment in a
portfolio of commercial mortgage loans with exposure to the credit risk associated with the possible default by
the borrowers.
55-97 Each month, interest received from all of the pooled loans is paid to the investors in the fixed-rate
bonds, in order of seniority, until all accrued interest on those bonds is paid. The same distribution occurs when
principal payments are received.
55-98 If there is a shortfall in contractual payments from the borrowers or if the loan collateral is liquidated
and does not generate sufficient proceeds to meet payments on all bond classes, the equity tranche and then
the most subordinate bond class will incur losses, with further losses impacting more senior bond classes in
reverse order of priority.
55-99 The transferor retains the primary servicing responsibilities. The primary servicing activities performed
are administrative in nature and include remittance of payments on the loans, administration of escrow
accounts, and collections of insurance claims. Upon delinquency or default by the borrower, the responsibility
for administration of the loan is transferred from the transferor as the primary servicer to the special servicer.
Furthermore, the special servicer, as the equity holder, has the approval rights for budgets, leases, and property
managers of foreclosed properties.
55-100 The special servicer is involved in the creation of the VIE and required at the creation date that
certain loans, which it deemed to be of high risk, be removed from the initial pool of loans that were going to
be purchased by the VIE from the transferor. The special servicer also reviewed the VIE’s governing documents
to ensure that the special servicer would be allowed to act quickly and effectively in situations in which a loan
becomes delinquent. The special servicer concluded the VIE’s governing documents allowed the special servicer
to adequately monitor and direct the performance of the underlying loans.
55-101 For its services as primary servicer, the transferor earns a fixed fee, calculated as a percentage of the
unpaid principal balance on the underlying loans. The special servicer also earns a fixed fee, calculated as a
percentage of the unpaid principal balance on the underlying loans. The fees paid to the primary and special
servicer are both of the following:
- Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide the services
- Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
No party has the ability to remove the primary servicer or the special servicer.
The following diagram illustrates the scenario
described above in the FASB’s Case A:
ASC 810-10 (Case A, continued)
55-102 To evaluate the facts and circumstances and determine which reporting entity, if any, is the primary
beneficiary of a VIE, paragraph 810-10-25-38A requires that a reporting entity determine the purpose and
design of the VIE, including the risks that the VIE was designed to create and pass through to its variable interest
holders. In making this assessment, the variable interest holders of the VIE determined the following:
- The primary purposes for which the VIE was created were to provide liquidity to the transferor to originate additional loans and to provide investors with the ability to invest in a pool of commercial mortgage loans.
- The VIE was marketed to debt investors as a VIE that would be exposed to the credit risk associated with the possible default by the borrowers with respect to principal and interest payments, with the equity tranche designed to absorb the first dollar risk of loss. Additionally, the marketing of the transaction indicated that such risks would be mitigated by subordination of the equity tranche.
- The VIE is not exposed to prepayment risk because the commercial mortgage loans contain provisions that require the borrower to pay the full scheduled interest and principal if the loan is extinguished prior to maturity.
55-103 The special servicer and the bondholders are the variable interest holders in the VIE. The fees paid
to the transferor do not represent a variable interest on the basis of a consideration of the conditions in
paragraphs 810-10-55-37 through 55-38. The fees paid to the special servicer represent a variable interest
on the basis of a consideration of the conditions in those paragraphs, specifically paragraph 810-10-55-37(c),
because of the special servicer holding the equity tranche. If the special servicer was only receiving fees and did
not hold the equity tranche and if its related parties did not hold any variable interests in the VIE, then the fees
would not be a variable interest.
55-104 Paragraph 810-10-25-38B requires that a reporting entity identify which activities most significantly
impact the VIE’s economic performance and determine whether it has the power to direct those activities. The
economic performance of the VIE is most significantly impacted by the performance of its underlying assets.
Thus, the activities that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance are the activities that most
significantly impact the performance of the underlying assets. The special servicer has the ability to manage
the VIE’s assets that are delinquent or in default to improve the economic performance of the VIE. Additionally,
the special servicer, as the equity holder, can approve budgets, leases, and property managers on foreclosed
property. The special servicing activities are performed only upon delinquency or default of the underlying
assets. However, a reporting entity’s ability to direct the activities of a VIE when circumstances arise or events
happen constitutes power if that ability relates to the activities that most significantly impact the economic
performance of the VIE. A reporting entity does not have to exercise its power in order to have power to direct
the activities of a VIE. The special servicer’s involvement in the design of the VIE does not, in isolation, result
in the special servicer being the primary beneficiary of the VIE. However, in this situation, that involvement
indicated that the special servicer had the opportunity and the incentive to establish arrangements that
result in the special servicer being the variable interest holder with the power to direct the activities that most
significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
55-105 The bondholders of the VIE have no voting rights and no other rights that provide them with the
power to direct the activities that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
55-106 The activities that the primary servicer has the power to direct are administrative in nature and do
not most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance. In addition, the primary servicer, and its related
parties, do not hold a variable interest in the VIE. Thus, the primary servicer cannot be the primary beneficiary of
the VIE.
55-107 If a reporting entity has the power to direct the activities of a VIE that most significantly impact the
VIE’s economic performance, then under the requirements of paragraph 810-10-25-38A, that reporting entity
also is required to determine whether it has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially be
significant to the VIE or the right to receive benefits from the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE.
55-108 The special servicer, for its servicing activities, receives a fixed fee that provides it with the right to
receive benefits of the VIE. The fees paid to the special servicer are both of the following:
- Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide the services
- Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
Therefore, the fees meet the criteria in paragraph 810-10-25-38H, and they should not be considered for
purposes of evaluating the characteristic in paragraph 810-10-25-38A(b). The special servicer, as the equity
tranche holder, has the obligation to absorb losses and the right to receive benefits, either of which could
potentially be significant to the VIE. As equity tranche holder, the special servicer is the most subordinate tranche
and therefore absorbs the first dollar risk of loss and has the right to receive benefits, including the VIE’s actual
residual returns, if any.
55-109 On the basis of the specific facts and circumstances presented in this Case and the analysis performed,
the special servicer would be deemed to be the primary beneficiary of the VIE because:
- It is the variable interest holder with the power to direct the activities of the VIE that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
- As the equity tranche holder, it has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE and the right to receive benefits from the VIE, either of which could potentially be significant to the VIE.
ASC 810-10 (Case B: Asset-Backed Collateralized Debt Obligation)
Case B: Asset-Backed Collateralized Debt Obligation
55-110 A VIE is created and financed with $90 of AAA-rated fixed-rate debt securities, $6 of BB-rated fixed-rate
debt securities, and $4 of equity. All debt securities issued by the VIE are held by third-party investors. The
equity tranche is held 35 percent by the manager of the VIE and 65 percent by a third-party investor. The VIE
uses the proceeds to purchase a portfolio of asset-backed securities with varying tenors and interest rates.
55-111 The transaction was marketed to potential debt investors as an investment in a portfolio of asset-backed securities with exposure to the credit risk associated with the possible default by the issuers of the asset-backed securities in the portfolio and to the interest rate risk associated with the management of the portfolio. The equity tranche was designed to absorb the first dollar risk of loss related to credit risk and interest rate risk and to receive any residual returns from a favorable change in interest rates or credit risk that affects the proceeds received on the sale of investments in the portfolio.
55-112 The assets of the VIE are managed within the parameters established by the underlying trust
documents. The parameters provide the manager with the latitude to manage the VIE’s assets while maintaining
an average portfolio rating of single B-plus or higher. If the average rating of the portfolio declines, the VIE’s
governing documents require that the manager’s discretion in managing the portfolio be curtailed.
55-113 For its services, the
manager earns a base, fixed fee, and a performance fee
in which it receives a portion of the VIE’s profit above
a targeted return. The fees paid to the manager are both
of the following:
-
Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide the services
-
Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
The manager can be removed, without cause (as distinguished from with cause), by a simple majority decision
of the AAA-rated debt holders. As the debt of the entity is widely dispersed, no one party has the ability to
unilaterally remove the manager. If removal of the manager occurs, the manager will continue to hold a 35
percent equity interest in the VIE.
55-114 The third-party equity investor has rights that are limited to administrative matters.
The following diagram illustrates the scenario
described above in the FASB’s Case B:
ASC 810-10 (Case B, continued)
55-115 To evaluate the facts and circumstances and determine which reporting entity, if any, is the primary
beneficiary of a VIE, paragraph 810-10-25-38A requires that a reporting entity determine the purpose and
design of the VIE, including the risks that the VIE was designed to create and pass through to its variable interest
holders. In making this assessment, the variable interest holders of the VIE determined the following:
- The primary purposes for which the VIE was created were to provide investors with the ability to invest in a pool of asset-backed securities, to earn a positive spread between the interest that the VIE earns on its portfolio and the interest paid to the debt investors, and to generate management fees for the manager.
- The transaction was marketed to potential debt investors as an investment in a portfolio of asset-backed securities with exposure to the credit risk associated with the possible default by the issuers of the asset-backed securities in the portfolio and to the interest rate risk associated with the management of the portfolio. Additionally, the marketing of the transaction indicated that such risks would be mitigated by the support from the equity tranche.
- The equity tranche was designed to absorb the first dollar risk of loss related to credit risk and interest rate risk and to receive any residual returns from a favorable change in interest rates or credit risk that affects the proceeds received on the sale of asset-backed securities in the portfolio.
55-116 The third-party debt investors, the third-party equity investor, and the manager are the variable
interest holders in the VIE. The fees paid to the manager also represent a variable interest on the basis of a
consideration of the conditions in paragraphs 810-10-55-37 through 55-38, specifically paragraph 810-10-55-37(c), because of the manager holding the equity tranche. If the manager was only receiving fees and did not
hold the equity tranche and if its related parties did not hold any variable interests in the VIE, then the fees
would not be a variable interest.
55-117 Paragraph 810-10-25-38B requires that a reporting entity identify which activities most significantly
impact the VIE’s economic performance and determine whether it has the power to direct those activities. The
economic performance of the VIE is most significantly impacted by the performance of the VIE’s portfolio of
assets. Thus, the activities that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance are the activities that
most significantly impact the performance of the portfolio of assets. The manager has the ability to manage
the VIE’s assets within the parameters of the trust documents. If the average rating of the portfolio declines,
the VIE’s governing documents require that the manager’s discretion in managing the portfolio be curtailed.
Although the AAA-rated debt holders can remove the manager without cause, no one party has the unilateral
ability to exercise the kick-out rights over the manager. Therefore, such kick-out rights would not be considered
in this primary beneficiary analysis.
55-118 The debt holders of
the VIE do not have voting rights or other rights that
provide them with the power to direct activities that
most significantly impact the VIE’s economic
performance. Although the AAA-rated debt holders can
remove the manager without cause, no one party has the
unilateral ability to exercise the kick-out rights over
the manager.
55-119 The third-party equity investor has the power to direct certain activities. However, the activities that
the third-party equity investor has the power to direct are administrative and do not most significantly impact
the VIE’s economic performance.
55-120 If a reporting entity has the power to direct the activities of a VIE that most significantly impact the
VIE’s economic performance, then under the requirements of paragraph 810-10-25-38A, that reporting entity
also is required to determine whether it has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially
be significant to the VIE or the right to receive benefits from the VIE that could potentially be significant to the
VIE. The manager, as the 35 percent equity tranche holder, has the obligation to absorb losses and the right
to receive benefits. As equity tranche holder, the manager has the most subordinate tranche and therefore
absorbs 35 percent of the first dollar risk of loss and has the right to receive 35 percent of any residual benefits.
The fees paid to the manager are both of the following:
- Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide the services
- Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
Therefore, the fees meet the criteria in paragraph 810-10-25-38H, and they should not be considered for
purposes of evaluating the characteristic in paragraph 810-10-25-38A(b). Through the equity interest, the
manager has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE and the right to receive benefits from the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE.
55-121 On the basis of the specific facts and circumstances presented in this Case and the analysis
performed, the manager would be deemed to be the primary beneficiary of the VIE because:
- It is the variable interest holder with the power to direct the activities of the VIE that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance (and no single entity has the unilateral ability to exercise kick-out rights).
- Through its equity interest, it has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE and the right to receive benefits from the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE.
ASC 810-10 (Case C: Structured Investment Vehicle)
Case C: Structured Investment Vehicle
55-122 A VIE is created and financed with $94 of AAA-rated fixed-rate short-term debt with a 6-month
maturity and $6 of equity. The VIE uses the proceeds to purchase a portfolio of floating-rate debt with an
average life of four years and varying interest rates and short-term deposits with highly rated banks. The short-term
debt securities and equity are held by multiple third-party investors. Upon maturity of the short-term debt,
the VIE will either refinance the debt with existing investors or reissue the debt to new investors at existing
market rates.
55-123 The primary purpose of the VIE is to generate profits by maximizing the spread it earns on its asset
portfolio and its weighted-average cost of funding. The transaction was marketed to potential debt investors
as an investment in a portfolio of high-quality debt with exposure to the credit risk associated with the possible
default by the issuers of the debt in the portfolio. The equity tranche is designed to absorb the first dollar risk
of loss related to credit, liquidity, changes in fair value, and interest rate risk and to receive any benefit from a
favorable change in credit, changes in fair value, and interest rates.
55-124 The VIE is exposed to liquidity risk because the average tenor of the assets is greater than its liabilities.
To mitigate liquidity risk, the VIE maintains a certain portion of its assets in short-term deposits with highly rated
banks. The VIE has not entered into a liquidity facility to further mitigate liquidity risk.
55-125 The sponsor of the VIE was significantly involved with the creation of the VIE. The sponsor performs
various functions to manage the operations of the VIE, which include:
- Investment management — This management must adhere to the investment guidelines established at inception of the VIE. These guidelines include descriptions of eligible investments and requirements regarding the composition of the credit portfolio (including limits on country risk exposures, diversification limits, and ratings requirements).
- Funding management — This function provides funding management and operational support in relation to the debt issued and the equity with the objective of minimizing the cost of borrowing, managing interest rate and liquidity risks, and managing the capital adequacy of the VIE.
- Defeasance management — An event of defeasance occurs upon the failure of the rating agencies to maintain the ratings of the debt securities issued by the VIE at or above certain specified levels. In the event of defeasance, the sponsor is responsible for overseeing the orderly liquidation of the investment portfolio and the orderly discharge of the VIE’s obligations. This includes managing the market and credit risks of the portfolio.
55-126 For its services, the sponsor receives a fixed fee, calculated as an annual percentage of the aggregate
equity outstanding, and a performance-based fee, calculated as a percentage of the VIE’s profit above a
targeted return. The fees paid to the sponsor are both of the following:
- Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide the services
- Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
55-127 The debt security holders of the VIE have no voting rights. The equity holders have limited voting rights
that are typically limited to voting on amendments to the constitutional documents of the VIE.
The following diagram illustrates the scenario
described above in the FASB’s Case C:
ASC 810-10 (Case C, continued)
55-128 To evaluate the facts and circumstances and determine which reporting entity, if any, is the primary
beneficiary of a VIE, paragraph 810-10-25-38A requires that a reporting entity determine the purpose and
design of the VIE, including the risks that the VIE was designed to create and pass through to its variable interest
holders. In making this assessment, the variable interest holders of the VIE determined the following:
- The primary purposes for which the VIE was created were to provide investors with the ability to invest in a pool of high-quality debt, to maximize the spread it earns on its asset portfolio over its weighted-average cost of funding, and to generate management fees for the sponsor.
- The transaction was marketed to potential debt investors as an investment in a portfolio of high-quality debt with exposure to the credit risk associated with the possible default by the issuers of the debt in the portfolio.
- The equity tranche is negotiated to absorb the first dollar risk of loss related to credit, liquidity, fair value, and interest rate risk and to receive a portion of the benefit from a favorable change in credit, fair value, and interest rates.
- The principal risks to which the VIE is exposed include credit, interest rate, and liquidity risk.
55-129 The third-party debt investors, the third-party equity investors, and the sponsor are the variable
interest holders in the VIE. The fees paid to the sponsor represent a variable interest on the basis of a
consideration of the conditions in paragraphs 810-10-55-37 through 55-38, specifically paragraph 810-10-55-37(c), because of the sponsor having an implicit variable interest in the VIE as discussed in paragraph 810-10-55-132. If the sponsor was only receiving fees and did not have the implicit variable interest and if its related
parties did not hold any variable interests in the VIE, then the fees would not be a variable interest.
55-130 Paragraph 810-10-25-38B requires that a reporting entity identify which activities most significantly
impact the VIE’s economic performance and determine whether it has the power to direct those activities.
The economic performance of the VIE is significantly impacted by the performance of the VIE’s portfolio of
assets and by the terms of the short-term debt. Thus, the activities that significantly impact the VIE’s economic
performance are the activities that significantly impact the performance of the portfolio of assets and the terms
of the short-term debt (when the debt is refinanced or reissued). The sponsor manages the VIE’s investment,
funding, and defeasance activities. The fact that the sponsor was significantly involved with the creation of the
VIE does not, in isolation, result in the sponsor being the primary beneficiary of the VIE. However, the fact that
the sponsor was involved with the creation of the VIE indicated that the sponsor had the opportunity and the
incentive to establish arrangements that result in the sponsor being the variable interest holder with the power
to direct the activities that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
55-131 The debt security holders of the VIE have no voting rights and no other rights that provide them with
the power to direct the activities that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance. Although the
equity holders have voting rights, they are limited to voting on amendments to the constitutional documents
of the VIE, and those rights do not provide the equity holders with the power to direct the activities that most
significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
55-132 If a reporting entity has the power to direct the activities of a VIE that most significantly impact the
VIE’s economic performance, then under the requirements of paragraph 810-10-25-38A, that reporting entity
also is required to determine whether it has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially be
significant to the VIE or the right to receive benefits from the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE.
The sponsor considered whether it had an implicit financial responsibility to ensure that the VIE operates as
designed. Based on paragraphs 810-10-25-51 and 810-10-25-54, the sponsor determined that it has an implicit
financial responsibility and that such obligation requires the sponsor to absorb losses that could potentially
be significant to the VIE. This determination was influenced by the sponsor’s concern regarding the risk to its
reputation in the marketplace if the VIE did not operate as designed. The fees paid to the sponsor are both of
the following:
- Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide the services
- Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
Therefore, the fees meet the criteria in paragraph 810-10-25-38H, and they should not be considered for
purposes of evaluating the characteristic in paragraph 810-10-25-38A(b).
55-133 On the basis of the specific facts and circumstances presented in this Case and the analysis
performed, the sponsor would be deemed to be the primary beneficiary of the VIE because:
- It is the variable interest holder with the power to direct the activities of the VIE that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
- Through its implicit financial responsibility to ensure that the VIE operates as designed, it has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE.
ASC 810-10 (Case D: Commercial Paper Conduit)
Case D: Commercial Paper Conduit
55-134 A VIE is created by a reporting entity (the sponsor) and financed with $98 of AAA-rated fixed-rate
short-term debt with a 3-month maturity and $2 of subordinated notes. The VIE uses the proceeds to purchase
a portfolio of medium-term assets with average tenors of three years. The asset portfolio is obtained from
multiple sellers. The short-term debt and subordinated notes are held by multiple third-party investors. Upon
maturity of the short-term debt, the VIE will either refinance the debt with existing investors or reissue the debt
to new investors.
55-135 The sponsor of the VIE provides credit enhancement in the form of a letter of credit equal to 5 percent
of the VIE’s assets and it provides a liquidity facility to fund the cash flow shortfalls on 100 percent of the short-term
debt. Cash flow shortfalls could arise due to a mismatch between collections on the underlying assets of
the VIE and payments due to the short-term debt holders or to the inability of the VIE to refinance or reissue
the short-term debt upon maturity.
55-136 A credit default of the VIE’s assets resulting in deficient cash flows is absorbed as follows:
- First by the subordinated note holders
- Second by the sponsor’s letter of credit
- Third by the short-term debt holders.
The sponsor’s liquidity facility does not advance against defaulted assets.
55-137 The VIE is exposed to liquidity risk because the average life of the assets is greater than that of its
liabilities. The VIE enters into a liquidity facility with the sponsor to mitigate liquidity risk.
55-138 The transaction was marketed to potential debt investors as an investment in a portfolio of highly
rated medium-term assets with minimal exposure to the credit risk associated with the possible default by the
issuers of the assets in the portfolio. The subordinated notes were designed to absorb the first dollar risk of
loss related to credit. The VIE is marketed to all investors as having a low probability of credit exposure due to
the nature of the assets obtained. Furthermore, the VIE is marketed to the short-term debt holders as having
protection from liquidity risk due to the liquidity facility provided by the sponsor.
55-139 The sponsor of the VIE performs various functions to manage the operations of the VIE. Specifically,
the sponsor:
- Establishes the terms of the VIE
- Approves the sellers permitted to sell to the VIE
- Approves the assets to be purchased by the VIE
- Makes decisions regarding the funding of the VIE including determining the tenor and other features of the short-term debt issued
- Administers the VIE by monitoring the assets, arranging for debt placement, compiling monthly reports, and ensuring compliance with the VIE’s credit and investment policies.
55-140 For providing the letter of credit, liquidity facility, and management services, the sponsor receives
fixed fees that are calculated as an annual percentage of the asset value. The short-term debt holders and
subordinated note holders have no voting rights. The fees paid to the sponsor for its management services are
both of the following:
- Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide the services
- Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
The following diagram illustrates the scenario
described above in the FASB’s Case D:
ASC 810-10 (Case D, continued)
55-141 To evaluate the facts and circumstances and determine which reporting entity, if any, is the primary
beneficiary of a VIE, paragraph 810-10-25-38A requires that a reporting entity determine the purpose and
design of the VIE, including the risks that the VIE was designed to create and pass through to its variable interest
holders. In making this assessment, the variable interest holders of the VIE determined the following:
- The primary purposes for which the VIE was created were to provide investors with the ability to invest in a pool of highly rated medium-term assets, to provide the multiple sellers to the VIE with access to lower-cost funding, to earn a positive spread between the interest that the VIE earns on its asset portfolio and its weighted-average cost of funding, and to generate fees for the sponsor.
- The transaction was marketed to potential debt investors as an investment in a portfolio of highly rated medium-term assets with minimal exposure to the credit risk associated with the possible default by the issuers of the assets in the portfolio. The subordinated debt is designed to absorb the first dollar risk of loss related to credit and interest rate risk. The VIE is marketed to all investors as having a low probability of credit loss due to the nature of the assets obtained. Furthermore, the VIE is marketed to the short-term debt holders as having protection from liquidity risk due to the liquidity facility provided by the sponsor.
- The principal risks to which the VIE is exposed include credit, interest rate, and liquidity.
55-142 The short-term debt holders, the third-party subordinated note holders, and the sponsor are the
variable interest holders in the VIE. The letter of credit and liquidity facility provided by the sponsor protect
holders of other variable interests from suffering losses of the VIE. Therefore, the sponsor’s fees for the letter
of credit and liquidity facility are not eligible for the evaluation in paragraph 810-10-55-37 and are variable
interests in the VIE. The fees paid to the sponsor for its management services represent a variable interest on
the basis of a consideration of the conditions in paragraphs 810-10-55-37 through 55-38, specifically paragraph
810-10-55-37(c), because of the sponsor providing the letter of credit and liquidity facility and the fees for the
letter of credit and liquidity facility. If the sponsor was only receiving management fees, did not provide the
letter of credit and liquidity facility, and did not receive fees for the letter of credit and liquidity facility and if its
related parties did not hold any variable interests in the VIE, then the management fees would not be a variable
interest.
55-143 Paragraph 810-10-25-38B requires that a reporting entity identify which activities most significantly
impact the VIE’s economic performance and determine whether it has the power to direct those activities.
The economic performance of the VIE is significantly impacted by the performance of the VIE’s portfolio of
assets and by the terms of the short-term debt. Thus, the activities that significantly impact the VIE’s economic
performance are the activities that significantly impact the performance of the portfolio of assets and the terms
of the short-term debt (when the debt is refinanced or reissued). The sponsor manages the operations of
the VIE. Specifically, the sponsor establishes the terms of the VIE, approves the sellers permitted to sell to the
VIE, approves the assets to be purchased by the VIE, makes decisions about the funding of the VIE including
determining the tenor and other features of the short-term debt issued, and administers the VIE by monitoring
the assets, arranging for debt placement, and ensuring compliance with the VIE’s credit and investment
policies. The fact that the sponsor was significantly involved with the creation of the VIE does not, in isolation,
result in the sponsor being the primary beneficiary of the VIE. However, the fact that the sponsor was involved
with the creation of the VIE may indicate that the sponsor had the opportunity and the incentive to establish
arrangements that result in the sponsor being the variable interest holder with the power to direct the activities
that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
55-144 The short-term debt holders and subordinated note holders of the VIE have no voting rights and
no other rights that provide them with power to direct the activities that most significantly impact the VIE’s
economic performance.
55-145 If a reporting entity has the power to direct the activities of a VIE that most significantly impact the
VIE’s economic performance, then under the requirements of paragraph 810-10-25-38A, that reporting entity
also is required to determine whether it has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially be
significant to the VIE or the right to receive benefits from the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE.
The fees paid to the sponsor for its management services are both of the following:
- Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide the services
- Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
Therefore, the management fees meet the criteria in paragraph 810-10-25-38H, and they should not be
considered for purposes of evaluating the characteristic in paragraph 810-10-25-38A(b). However, the sponsor
still, through its letter of credit and liquidity facility fees, receives benefits from the VIE that could potentially
be significant to the VIE. The sponsor, through its letter of credit and liquidity facility, also has the obligation to
absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE.
55-146 On the basis of the specific facts and circumstances presented in this Case and the analysis
performed, the sponsor would be deemed to be the primary beneficiary of the VIE because:
- It is the variable interest holder with the power to direct the activities of the VIE that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
- Through its letter of credit and liquidity facility, the sponsor has the obligation to absorb losses that could potentially be significant to the VIE, and, through its fees for the letter of credit and liquidity facility, the sponsor has the right to receive benefits that could potentially be significant to the VIE.
ASC 810-10 (Case E: Guaranteed Mortgage-Backed Securitization)
Case E: Guaranteed Mortgage-Backed Securitization
55-147 A VIE is created and financed with $100 of a single class of investment-grade 30-year fixed-rate debt
securities. The VIE uses the proceeds to purchase $100 of 30-year fixed-rate residential mortgage loans from
the transferor. The VIE enters into a guarantee facility that absorbs 100 percent of the credit losses incurred
on the VIE’s assets. The assets acquired by the VIE are underwritten by the transferor in accordance with the
parameters established by the guarantor. Additionally, all activities of the VIE are prespecified by the trust
agreement and servicing guide, which are both established by the guarantor. No critical decisions are generally
required for the VIE unless default of an underlying asset is reasonably foreseeable or occurs.
55-148 The transaction was marketed to potential debt security holders as an investment in a portfolio
of residential mortgage loans with exposure to the credit risk of the guarantor and to the prepayment risk
associated with the underlying loans of the VIE. Each month, the security holders receive interest and principal
payments in proportion to their percentage ownership of the underlying loans.
55-149 If there is a shortfall in contractually required loan payments from the borrowers or if the loan is
foreclosed on and the liquidation of the underlying property does not generate sufficient proceeds to meet the
required payments on all securities, the guarantor will make payments to the debt securities holders to ensure
timely payment of principal and accrued interest on the debt securities.
55-150 The guarantor also serves as the master servicer for the VIE. As master servicer, the guarantor
services the securities issued by the VIE. Generally, if a mortgage loan is 120 days (or 4 consecutive months)
delinquent, and if other circumstances are met, the guarantor has the right to buy the loan from the VIE. The
master servicer can only be removed for a material breach in its obligations. As compensation for the guarantee
and services provided, the guarantor receives a fee that is calculated monthly as a percentage of the unpaid
principal balance on the underlying loans.
55-151 As master servicer, the guarantor also is responsible for supervising and monitoring the servicing of
the residential mortgage loans (primary servicing). The VIE’s governing documents provide that the guarantor
is responsible for the primary servicing of the loans; however, the guarantor is allowed to, and does, hire the
transferor to perform primary servicing activities that are conducted under the supervision of the guarantor.
The guarantor monitors the primary servicer’s performance and has the right to remove the primary servicer at
any time it considers such a removal to be in the best interest of the security holders.
55-152 The primary servicing activities are performed under the servicing guide established by the guarantor.
Examples of the primary servicing activities include collecting and remitting principal and interest payments,
administering escrow accounts, and managing default. When a loan becomes delinquent or it is reasonably
foreseeable of becoming delinquent, the primary servicer can propose a default mitigation strategy in which
the guarantor can approve, reject, or require another course of action if it considers such action is in the best
interest of the security holders. As compensation for servicing the underlying loans, the transferor receives a
fee that is calculated monthly as a percentage of the unpaid principal balance on the underlying loans.
The following diagram illustrates the scenario
described above in the FASB’s Case E:
ASC 810-10 (Case E, continued)
55-153 To evaluate the facts and circumstances and determine which reporting entity, if any, is the primary
beneficiary of a VIE, paragraph 810-10-25-38A requires that a reporting entity determine the purpose and
design of the VIE, including the risks that the VIE was designed to create and pass through to its variable interest
holders. In making this assessment, the variable interest holders of the VIE determined the following:
- The primary purposes for which the VIE was created were to provide investors with the ability to invest in a pool of residential mortgage loans with a third-party guarantee for 100 percent of the principal and interest payments due on the mortgage loans in the VIE, to provide the transferor to the VIE with access to liquidity for its originated loans and an ongoing servicing fee, and to generate fees for the guarantor.
- The transaction was marketed to potential debt security holders as an investment in a portfolio of residential mortgage loans with exposure to the credit risk of the guarantor and prepayment risk associated with the underlying assets of the VIE.
- The principal risks to which the VIE is exposed include credit risk of the underlying assets, prepayment risk, and the risk of fluctuations in the value of the underlying real estate. The credit risk of the underlying assets and the risk of fluctuations in the value of the underlying real estate are fully absorbed by the guarantor.
55-154 The debt securities holders and the guarantor are the variable interest holders in the VIE. The fees
paid to the transferor do not represent a variable interest on the basis of a consideration of the conditions in
paragraphs 810-10-55-37 through 55-38. The guarantee arrangement protects holders of other variable interests from suffering losses in the VIE because the guarantor is required to fully absorb the credit risk of the underlying assets of the VIE and the risk of fluctuations in the value of the underlying real estate. Therefore, the guarantor’s fees are not eligible for the evaluation in paragraph 810-10-55-37.
55-155 Paragraph 810-10-25-38B requires that a reporting entity identify which activities most significantly
impact the VIE’s economic performance and determine whether it has the power to direct those activities. The
economic performance of the VIE is most significantly impacted by the performance of its underlying assets.
Thus, the activities that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance are the activities that most
significantly impact the performance of the underlying assets. The guarantor, who is also the master servicer,
has the ability (through establishment of the servicing terms, to appoint and remove the primary servicer, to
direct default mitigation, and to purchase defaulted assets) to manage the VIE’s assets that become delinquent
(or may become delinquent in the reasonably foreseeable future) to improve the economic performance of the
VIE.
55-156 Prepayment risk is also a risk that the VIE was designed to create and pass through. However, no
variable interest holder has the power to direct activities related to such risk.
55-157 Because the guarantor is able to appoint and replace the primary servicer and direct default
mitigation, the primary servicer does not have the power to direct the activities that most significantly impact
the VIE’s economic performance. In addition, the primary servicer and its related parties do not hold a variable
interest in the VIE. Thus, the primary servicer cannot be the primary beneficiary of the VIE. Furthermore, the
security holders have no voting rights and, thus, no power to direct the activities that most significantly impact
the VIE’s economic performance.
55-158 If a reporting entity has the power to direct the activities of a VIE that most significantly impact the
VIE’s economic performance, then under the requirements of paragraph 810-10-25-38A, that reporting entity
also is required to determine whether it has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially be
significant to the VIE or the right to receive benefits from the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE.
The guarantor, through its fee arrangement, receives benefits, which may or may not potentially be significant
under this analysis; however, the guarantor has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially
be significant through its guarantee obligation. Therefore, the fees are not eligible for the evaluation in paragraph 810-10-25-38H, and they should be considered for purposes of evaluating the characteristic in paragraph 810-10-25-38A(b).
55-159 On the basis of the specific facts and circumstances presented in this Case and the analysis
performed, the guarantor would be deemed to be the primary beneficiary of the VIE because:
- It is the variable interest holder with the power to direct the activities of the VIE that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
- Through its guarantee, it has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE.
ASC 810-10 (Case F: Residential Mortgage-Backed Securitization)
Case F: Residential Mortgage-Backed Securitization
55-160 A VIE is created and financed with $100 of 30-year fixed-rate debt securities. The securities are issued
in 2 tranches (a $90 senior tranche and a $10 residual tranche). The senior tranche securities are investment
grade and are widely dispersed among third-party investors. The residual tranche securities are held by the
transferor. The VIE uses the proceeds to purchase $100 of 30-year fixed-rate residential mortgage loans from
a transferor. A default on the underlying loans is absorbed first by the residual tranche held by the transferor.
All activities of the VIE are prespecified by a pooling and servicing agreement for the transaction. No critical
decisions are generally required for the VIE unless default of an underlying asset is reasonably foreseeable or
occurs.
55-161 The transaction was marketed to potential senior debt security holders as an investment in a portfolio
of residential mortgage loans with exposure to the credit risk of the underlying loan borrowers and to the
prepayment risk associated with the underlying loans of the VIE. Each month the security holders receive
interest and principal payments in proportion to their percentage of ownership of the underlying loans. The
residual tranche was designed to provide a credit enhancement to the transaction and to absorb the first dollar
risk of loss related to credit.
55-162 The primary servicing responsibilities are retained by the transferor. No party has the ability to remove
the transferor as servicer.
55-163 The servicing activities are performed in accordance with the pooling and servicing agreement.
Examples of the servicing activities include collecting and remitting principal and interest payments,
administering escrow accounts, monitoring overdue payments, and overall default management. Default
management includes evaluating the borrower’s financial condition to determine which loss mitigation strategy
(specified in the pooling and servicing agreement) will maximize recoveries on a particular loan. The acceptable
default management strategies are limited to the actions specified in the pooling and servicing agreement and
include all of the following:
- Modifying the terms of loans when default is reasonably foreseeable
- Temporary forbearance on collections of principal and interest (such amounts would be added to the unpaid balance on the loan)
- Short sales in which the servicer allows the underlying borrower to sell the mortgaged property even if the anticipated sale price will not permit full recovery of the contractual loan amounts.
55-164 As compensation for servicing the underlying loans, the transferor receives a fee, calculated monthly
as a percentage of the unpaid principal balance on the underlying loans. Although the servicing activities,
particularly managing default, are required to be performed in accordance with the pooling and servicing
agreement, the transferor, as servicer, has discretion in determining which strategies within the pooling and
servicing agreement to utilize to attempt to maximize the VIE’s economic performance. The fees paid to the
transferor are both of the following:
- Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide those services
- Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
The following diagram illustrates the scenario
described above in the FASB’s Case F:
ASC 810-10 (Case F, continued)
55-165 To evaluate the facts and circumstances and determine which reporting entity, if any, is the primary
beneficiary of a VIE, paragraph 810-10-25-38A requires that a reporting entity determine the purpose and
design of the VIE, including the risks that the VIE was designed to create and pass through to its variable interest
holders. In making this assessment, the variable interest holders of the VIE determined the following:
- The primary purposes for which the VIE was created were to provide investors with the ability to invest in a pool of residential mortgage loans and to provide the transferor to the VIE with access to liquidity for its originated loans and an ongoing servicing fee and potential residual returns.
- The transaction was marketed to potential senior debt security holders as an investment in a portfolio of residential mortgage loans with credit enhancement provided by the residual tranche and prepayment risk associated with the underlying assets of the VIE. The marketing of the transaction indicated that credit risk would be mitigated by the subordination of the residual tranche.
- The principal risks to which the VIE is exposed include credit of the underlying assets, prepayment risk, and the risk of fluctuations in the value of the underlying real estate.
55-166 The debt security holders and the transferor are the variable interest holders in the VIE. The fee paid
to the transferor (in its role as servicer) represents a variable interest on the basis of a consideration of the
conditions in paragraphs 810-10-55-37 through 55-38, specifically paragraph 810-10-55-37(c), because of the
transferor holding the residual tranche. If the transferor was only receiving fees and did not hold the residual
tranche and if its related parties did not hold any variable interests in the VIE, then the fees would not be a
variable interest.
55-167 Paragraph 810-10-25-38B requires that a reporting entity identify which activities most significantly
impact the VIE’s economic performance and determine whether it has the power to direct those activities. The
economic performance of the VIE is most significantly impacted by the performance of its underlying assets.
Thus, the activities that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance are the activities that most
significantly impact the performance of the underlying assets. The transferor, as servicer, has the ability to
manage the VIE’s assets that become delinquent (or are reasonably foreseeable of becoming delinquent) to
improve the economic performance of the VIE. Additionally, no party can remove the transferor in its role
as servicer. The default management activities are performed only after default of the underlying assets or
when default is reasonably foreseeable. However, a reporting entity’s ability to direct the activities of a VIE
when circumstances arise or events happen constitutes power if that ability relates to the activities that most
significantly impact the economic performance of the VIE. A reporting entity does not have to exercise its power
in order to have power to direct the activities of a VIE.
55-168 Prepayment risk is also a risk that the VIE was designed to create and pass through. However, no
variable interest holder has the power to direct matters related to such risk.
55-169 The senior security holders have no voting rights and, thus, no power to direct the activities that most
significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
55-170 If a reporting entity has the power to direct the activities of a VIE that most significantly impact the
VIE’s economic performance, then under the requirements of paragraph 810-10-25-38A, that reporting entity
also is required to determine whether it has the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially
be significant to the VIE or the right to receive benefits from the VIE that could potentially be significant to the
VIE. The transferor, through its residual tranche ownership, has the obligation to absorb losses and the right to
receive benefits, either of which could potentially be significant to the VIE. The fees paid to the transferor are
both of the following:
- Compensation for services provided and commensurate with the level of effort required to provide those services
- Part of a service arrangement that includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
Therefore, the fees meet the criteria in paragraph 810-10-25-38H and should not be considered for purposes
of evaluating the characteristic in paragraph 810-10-25-38A(b).
55-171 On the basis of the specific facts and circumstances presented in this Case and the analysis
performed, the transferor would be deemed to be the primary beneficiary of the VIE because:
- It is the variable interest holder with the power to direct the activities of the VIE that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance.
- Through its residual tranche ownership, it has the obligation to absorb losses and the right to receive benefits, either of which could potentially be significant to the VIE.
E.2 Collateralized Investment Vehicles
E.2.1 Consolidation Analysis
Collateralized investment vehicles (CIVs) are unique securitizations in that
there is typically no transfer of assets from the sponsor to the securitization entity.
Instead, the CIV purchases financial assets (e.g., senior syndicated loans) from the open
market by using proceeds from a warehouse line (warehousing phase). Once the legal entity
has accumulated loans of a quantity sufficient to permit securitization, it will issue
beneficial interests and use the proceeds from the sale of its securities to pay off the
warehouse line and purchase any remaining financial assets needed (securitization phase).
Common examples of CIVs include CLOs and CDOs. A CIV is an example of a CFE, as defined in
ASC 810.
A CIV employs a collateral manager (typically a bank or an investment manager
that sponsors the CIV) that performs various functions for the CIV
during its different stages. For example, during the initial
warehousing phase, the collateral manager is responsible for acquiring
the assets for the CIV and ensuring that the asset composition
complies with the transaction documents. During the securitization
phase, the collateral manager is responsible for determining the
appropriate action to take in response to a default or other event as
well as how to reinvest the principal proceeds received from the
underlying loans.
Because a substantive contingent event may need to be resolved (e.g., market
receptivity to the securitization or consent granted by all parties
involved) before the CIV’s transition from the warehousing phase to
the securitization phase, a separate consolidation analysis may need
to be performed for each distinct phase. That is, because its
securitization may be considered a fundamental redesign of the CIV,
there may be different activities that most significantly affect the
potential VIE’s economic performance during each phase.
E.2.2 Determining Whether a CIV Is a VIE
A reporting entity is required to apply either the VIE model or the voting interest entity model in
performing its consolidation assessment. To determine which model to use, the collateral
manager must decide whether any of the following conditions apply:
-
The CIV has insufficient equity at risk to finance its activities.
-
The at-risk equity holders (as a group) lack any of the three characteristics of a controlling financial interest.
-
Members of the at-risk equity group have nonsubstantive voting rights.
If any of these conditions apply, the CIV should be evaluated under the VIE model.
Although a CIV may issue equity interests that provide credit support to the
legal entity’s senior investors, the tranched capital structure of the
CIV, as well as the multiple series of debt instruments typically
issued by a CIV, will usually serve as qualitative evidence that the
legal entity has insufficient equity at risk.
Even if a CIV has sufficient equity investment at risk, the equity interests do
not typically have voting rights that give those investors power to
direct the activities of the legal entity. Rather, the decision-making
ability is typically granted to the collateral manager, and the
ability to remove the collateral manager is often shared with holders
of debt interests issued by the CIV. Unless a single equity holder
with equity at risk has the unilateral ability to remove the
collateral manager, or the collateral manager is acting as an agent on
behalf of the at-risk equity group, through its equity investment at
risk (i.e., the decision-making rights are not considered a variable
interest), the CIV would be a VIE. See Chapter 5 for further
discussion of whether a legal entity is a VIE.
E.2.3 Determining the Primary Beneficiary of a CIV
The chart below illustrates the steps a collateral manager would take in
determining whether it is required to consolidate a CIV. The sections
that follow the chart discuss the steps in detail.
E.2.3.1 Step 1: Does the Collateral Manager Have a Variable Interest in the CIV?
ASC 810-10
55-37
Fees paid to a legal entity’s decision maker(s) or service provider(s) are
not variable interests if all of the following conditions are met:
-
The fees are compensation for services provided and are commensurate with the level of effort required to provide those services.
-
Subparagraph superseded by Accounting Standards Update No. 2015-02.
-
The decision maker or service provider does not hold other interests in the VIE that individually, or in the aggregate, would absorb more than an insignificant amount of the VIE’s expected losses or receive more than an insignificant amount of the VIE’s expected residual returns.
-
The service arrangement includes only terms, conditions, or amounts that are customarily present in arrangements for similar services negotiated at arm’s length.
-
Subparagraph superseded by Accounting Standards Update No. 2015-02.
-
Subparagraph superseded by Accounting Standards Update No. 2015-02.
As ASC 810-10-55-37 indicates, the evaluation of whether fees paid to a
collateral manager are a variable interest focuses on whether (1) the fees “are
commensurate with the level of effort” (ASC 810-10-55-37(a)), (2) the collateral manager
has any other direct or indirect interests (including indirect interests through its
related parties) that absorb more than an insignificant amount of the CIV’s variability
(ASC 810-10-55-37(c)), and (3) the arrangement’s terms are customary (ASC
810-10-55-37(d)).
When a collateral manager evaluates its economic exposure to a VIE under ASC
810-10-55-37(c), it should consider its direct interests in the CIV together with its
indirect interests held through its related parties (or de facto agents) on a
proportionate basis. For example, if a collateral manager owns a 20 percent interest in
a related party that itself owns 40 percent of the residual tranche of the CIV being
evaluated, the collateral manager’s interest would be considered equivalent to an 8
percent direct interest in the residual tranche of the CIV. (In the assessment of
whether the reporting entity meets the economics criterion in the primary-beneficiary
determination, the guidance on entities under common control is consistent with the
proportionate-basis guidance that applies to related parties. See Section 7.3.5.1 for additional
information.) In situations in which the collateral manager does not hold an interest in
the related party, the collateral manager would exclude the related party’s interest
unless the interest was provided to the related party to circumvent the consolidation
guidance (see Section 4.4.2.3.2).
As a general guideline, the evaluation of whether the collateral manager’s other
variable interests absorb more than an insignificant amount of the CIV’s variability is
based on whether the variability absorbed by the collateral manager through its other
variable interests in the CIV exceeds, either individually or in the aggregate, 10
percent of the CIV’s expected
variability. However, because of the subjective nature of the calculation
of expected losses and expected
residual returns, 10 percent is not a bright line or safe harbor.
The evaluation of a collateral manager’s economic exposure through its other
interests should take into account the CIV’s purpose and design. In addition, all risks
and associated variability that are absorbed by any of the CIV’s variable interest
holders should be considered. The type of interest held by a collateral manager will
affect its economic exposure to the CIV and, accordingly, the collateral manager’s
conclusion about whether its decision-making arrangement is a variable interest. For
example, a first-loss interest is more likely to expose the collateral manager to a
significant amount of expected losses or the potential to receive significant expected
residual returns than a senior interest. See Appendix
C for more information about the quantitative concepts underlying these
terms.
We expect that substantially all fees charged by collateral managers for
services are commensurate with the level of effort required to provide those services
and that their fee arrangements contain only customary terms and conditions. Therefore,
as long as a collateral manager does not have other interests in the CIV (including
indirect interests through its related parties) that would absorb more than an
insignificant amount of the CIV’s variability, the collateral manager will not have a
variable interest in the CIV and will not consolidate the CIV.
See Section 4.4 for further discussion of whether decision-maker or service-provider fees represent a variable interest.
E.2.3.2 Step 2: Does the Collateral Manager Have the Power to Direct the Activities That Most Significantly Affect the CIV?
When the collateral manager has other interests in the CIV (including interests
through its related parties and certain interests held by its
related parties under common control) that would absorb more
than an insignificant amount of the CIV’s variability, the
collateral manager would have a variable interest in the CIV and
must determine whether it has power over the CIV’s most
significant activities.
The economic performance of a CIV is generally most significantly affected by
the underlying assets’ performance. Some of the factors that can
affect the underlying assets’ performance may be beyond the
direct control of any of the parties to the CIV (like voluntary
prepayments) and, therefore, do not enter into the power
analysis. The activities that most significantly affect the
underlying assets’ performance in a CIV are typically related to
the collateral manager’s selection, monitoring, and disposal of
collateral assets.
In the analysis of which party has the power to direct those activities,
questions that should be answered include the following:
-
Does the collateral manager hold the power unilaterally?
-
Alternatively, do other parties also have relevant rights and responsibilities? For example:
-
Is there another party or other parties that direct other important activities of the CIV? If so, which activities are the most important?
-
Is there another party that has to consent to every important decision?
-
Is there another party that can direct the collateral manager to take certain actions?
-
Is there another party that can replace the collateral manager without cause?
-
Is there another party or other parties that direct the same activities as the collateral manager but for a different portion of the CIV’s assets?
-
-
Is the collateral manager’s right to exercise power currently available or contingent on the occurrence of some other event(s)?
E.2.3.2.1 Circumstances in Which a Collateral Manager Might Not Have Power
The collateral manager might not have power in the following situations:
- The collateral manager can be replaced without cause by a single unrelated party (see Section E.2.3.2.2).
- All important decisions require the consent of one or more unrelated parties (see Section E.2.3.2.3).
- The collateral manager manages less than a majority of the assets in the VIE (see Section E.2.3.2.4).
See Section 7.2 for further discussion of evaluating the power criterion.
E.2.3.2.2 Kick-Out Rights
Although not common for CIVs, substantive kick-out
rights (i.e., those that can be exercised at will and not upon a
contingent event) held by a single party (including its related parties and de facto
agents) that are unrelated to the collateral manager prevent the collateral manager
from having power because the collateral manager could be removed. Such rights would
generally be considered substantive if there are no significant financial or
operational barriers to their exercise.
E.2.3.2.3 Shared Power and Participating Rights
The right of an unrelated party to veto all the important decisions made by the
collateral manager would, if substantive, prevent the collateral manager from
satisfying the power condition since power would be shared. The requirement to obtain
consent is considered a participating right when
the consent is required for the activities that most significantly affect the legal
entity’s economic performance. However, when the consent is related only to activities
that are unimportant or only to certain of the significant activities, power would not
be considered shared. In addition, a reporting entity would need to closely analyze
the legal entity’s governance provisions to understand whether the consent
requirements are substantive (e.g., the consequences if consent is not given).
However, if power is considered shared (e.g., the collateral manager is required
to obtain approval from the residual holder for all significant decisions), the
collateral manager will need to determine whether the other party (residual holder) is
a related party (or de facto agent). If power is considered shared within a
related-party group, and the group as a whole has the characteristics of a controlling
financial interest, the collateral manager must perform the related-party tiebreaker
test to determine which party in the group must consolidate the CIV. ASC 810-10-25-44
notes that an entity must use judgment in determining “which party within the related
party group is most closely associated with the VIE” and should consider all relevant
facts and circumstances. The guidance provides the following four indicators, which
are the same as those under prior GAAP, for consideration in this assessment:
-
“The existence of a principal-agency relationship between parties within the related party group.”
-
“The relationship and significance of the activities of the [legal entity] to the various parties within the related party group.”
-
“A party’s exposure to the variability associated with the anticipated economic performance of the [legal entity].”
-
“The design of the [legal entity].”
Example E-1
A collateralized loan entity is formed to acquire commercial loans, drawing down on a line of credit as it identifies new loans. Once the CLO has accumulated sufficient loans to permit securitization, the entity will issue beneficial interests and use the proceeds from the sale of its securities to pay off the warehouse line and purchase any remaining assets needed. The CLO is sponsored by the investment manager.
During the warehousing stage, the investment manager invests $1 million for 20 percent equity ownership in the entity, and other investors provide $4 million for the remaining equity interests in addition to $95 million provided by the bank in the form of a line of credit. The investment manager cannot (1) make any decisions (e.g., loan purchases or issuances of beneficial interests) without approval from the bank or (2) transfer its equity interest in the CLO (the bank is not similarly constrained). Further, the entity is unable to transition from the warehousing phase to the securitization phase without the agreement of all the equity investors and the bank.
The investment manager has determined that the arrangement should be evaluated as a multiphase entity because of the significant uncertainty about the CLO’s ability to transition from the warehousing phase to the securitization phase. In addition, the investment manager has determined that the CLO is a VIE during the warehousing phase since the bank (a nonequity holder) has the ability to participate in the entity’s most significant decisions during this phase. This determination will need to be reevaluated when the CLO proceeds to the securitization phase and issues beneficial interests in the securitization entity (redesign of the CLO).
Under the VIE model, the restrictions imposed on the investment manager’s ability to transfer or encumber its equity interest create a de facto agency relationship between the investment manager and the bank. Therefore, although the decisions that most significantly affect the entity during the warehousing phase require the consent of both parties, because the investment manager shares power with the bank, the investment manager cannot conclude that there is no primary beneficiary of the CLO. Rather, because the related-party group (including de facto agents) meets both criteria in ASC 810-10-25-38A, the investment manager would apply the related-party tiebreaker test in ASC 810-10-25-44 to determine whether it should consolidate the CLO. Note that a different consolidation conclusion may be reached after the CLO’s transition from the warehousing to securitization phase.
E.2.3.2.4 Multiple Parties With Power
The concept of multiple parties with power can manifest itself in two ways:
- Multiple parties performing different activities — It is possible that in certain CIVs, one service provider is engaged to manage investments and another is engaged to manage funding. In such situations, the reporting entity must use judgment and analyze all the facts and circumstances to determine the activity that most significantly affects the economic performance of the legal entity.
- Multiple parties performing the same activities — If the joint consent of multiple unrelated parties is required for decisions regarding directing the relevant activities of a legal entity, power is shared, and no party would consolidate. However, when multiple parties individually perform the same activities over separate pools of similar assets, and consent is not required, the party that has unilateral decision making over a majority of the assets would have power over the CIV.
E.2.3.3 Step 3: Does the Collateral Manager Have a Potentially Significant Interest?
If a collateral manager determines that its decision-making arrangement is a
variable interest as a result of any direct or indirect
interests through its related parties,
its interests will usually represent an obligation to absorb
losses of the VIE or a right to receive benefits from the VIE
that could potentially be significant to the VIE. That is, if a
collateral manager’s fee is a variable interest because the
collateral manager has other direct interests (or indirect
interests through its related party) in
the CIV that represent a more than insignificant economic
interest in the CIV, it would meet the “economics” criterion
(ASC 810-10-25-38A(b)) in the primary-beneficiary analysis.
However, if the collateral manager’s fee is a variable interest solely because
(1) the fee arrangement is not customary or at market but the
collateral manager does not have any direct interests (including
the fee) or indirect interests through its related parties that
meet the economics criterion or (2) the collateral manager’s
related party under common control holds an interest in the CIV
in an effort to circumvent the consolidation guidance, the
collateral manager may not meet this requirement. The collateral
manager would only include interests held by its related parties
under common control in the primary-beneficiary analysis if it
has a direct interest in those related parties. Accordingly, if
the collateral manager’s fee arrangement is a variable interest
solely for one of these two reasons, and the collateral manager
does not have an interest in those related parties, the
collateral manager individually would not have both of the
characteristics of a controlling financial interest. However,
the collateral manager would still need to assess whether it
should consolidate the CIV under the related-party tiebreaker
test (step 4).
E.2.3.4 Step 4: Is the Collateral Manager Required to Perform the Related-Party Tiebreaker Test to Determine Whether It Has a Controlling Financial Interest?
E.2.3.4.1 Related Parties Under Common Control
A collateral manager and its related parties must individually determine which
party should consolidate a CIV. Each member of a
related-party group with a variable interest in the CIV
may determine that it individually does not possess both
characteristics of a controlling financial interest but
that the related-party group as a whole possesses both
characteristics. A reporting entity would perform the
related-party tiebreaker test in this situation only if
both characteristics of a controlling financial interest
reside within a related-party group that is under common
control.
We expect that the related-party tiebreaker guidance will apply in extremely
limited circumstances to a collateral manager and its related parties under common
control. A determination that the collateral manager meets the power criterion through
a fee arrangement is most likely to have been made if the collateral manager has a
direct or indirect economic interest in the CIV that absorbs more than an
insignificant amount of the CIV’s variability (see Section 4.4.2). In addition, when performing the
economics-criterion assessment, the collateral manager is required to consider its
indirect economic interests in a VIE held through related parties under common control
on a proportionate basis (see Section 7.3.5.1). Therefore, the related-party tiebreaker guidance would
apply to the collateral manager and its related parties under common control only if
either (1) the collateral manager fees were not commensurate or at market but the
collateral manager did not have any direct interests (including the fee) or indirect
interests through its related parties that met the economics criterion or (2) it was
determined that the collateral manager’s decision-making arrangement was a variable
interest because a CIV was designed in an effort to circumvent consolidation in the
stand-alone financial statements of the collateral manager or related party under
common control (see Section
4.4.2.3.2).
Note that in instances in which the collateral manager does not have a variable
interest through the fee arrangement in a VIE but the related parties under common
control collectively would, if aggregated, have met the power and economics criteria
collectively, the parent of the related parties under common control would consolidate
the VIE. That is, although the CIV may not be consolidated by either of the
subsidiaries in their stand-alone financial statements, the parent must assess the VIE
on the basis of its aggregate direct and indirect interests. See Section 7.4.2.3 for further
discussion of diversity in practice as a result of a determination that a decision
maker with contractual power does not have a variable interest but a related party
under common control meets the economics criterion.
E.2.3.4.2 Related Parties Not Under Common Control
If neither the collateral manager nor a related party under common control is
required to consolidate a CIV, but the related-party group
(including de facto agents) possesses the characteristics
of a controlling financial interest, and substantially all
of the CIV’s activities are conducted on behalf of a
single entity in the related-party group, that single
entity would be the primary beneficiary of the CIV.
Interests held by the reporting entity’s de facto agents (typically as a result of a one-way transfer restriction) would not be included in the consolidation analysis on an indirect basis unless the reporting entity has economic exposure to the VIE through its de facto agents. Accordingly, these restrictions are less likely to result in consolidation.
E.2.4 Reconsideration of Who Controls
The VIE guidance in ASC 810 requires a reporting entity to continually
reconsider its conclusion regarding which interest holder is the CIV’s primary
beneficiary. The collateral manager’s conclusion could change as a result of any of the
following:
-
A change in the legal entity’s design (e.g., a change in its governance structure, management, activities, purpose, or in the primary risks it was designed to create and pass through to variable interest holders).
-
The addition of terms to the variable interests, or the modification or retirement of terms.
-
A change in the holders of a legal entity’s variable interests (e.g., a reporting entity acquires or disposes of variable interests in a VIE), causing the reporting entity to have (or no longer have), in conjunction with its other involvement with the legal entity, a variable interest in the CIV.
-
A significant change in the anticipated economic performance of a legal entity (e.g., as a result of losses significantly in excess of those originally expected) or other events (including the legal entity’s commencement of new activities) that cause a change in the reporting entity’s responsibilities such that it now has the power to direct the activities that most significantly affect the legal entity’s economic performance.
-
Two or more variable interest holders become (or are no longer) related parties.
-
A contingent event that transfers, from one reporting entity to another reporting entity, the power to direct the activities of the legal entity that most significantly affect the legal entity’s economic performance.
Because continual reconsideration is required, the collateral manager will need to
determine when, during the reporting period, the change in primary beneficiary occurred.
If the collateral manager determines that it is no longer the primary beneficiary of a
CIV, it would need to deconsolidate the CIV as of the date the circumstances changed and
recognize a gain or loss. See Section
7.1.5 for a discussion of reassessing the primary beneficiary.
E.2.5 Accounting for Interests in Unconsolidated CIVs
If a collateral manager is not required to consolidate a CIV, it must
determine the appropriate accounting for any interests it holds in the CIV. Most interests
in CIVs will meet the definition of a “debt security” and are therefore accounted for in
accordance with ASC 320. If the investment is a debt security, the collateral manager must
first decide whether to elect the “fair value option” and subsequently record its
interests at fair value, with fair value changes reported in earnings. The collateral
manager can make the election on an item-by-item basis (e.g., for the residual but not the
senior interests held in a CIV); however, the election must be made when each investment
is first recognized, and it is irrevocable once made.
If the collateral manager decides not to elect the fair value option, it
must elect to classify debt securities as trading, available for sale (AFS), or held to
maturity (HTM). While this initial classification generally cannot be changed if the
holder retains the security, transfers from the AFS category to the HTM category are
permitted in limited circumstances. To classify a security as HTM, the holder must have
the positive intent and the ability to hold the security until its maturity. However, if
the interest can be prepaid or otherwise settled so that the collateral manager would not
recover substantially all of its recorded investment, the instrument cannot be classified
as HTM. Given the restrictions on HTM classification, collateral managers typically
classify their interests in a CIV as either AFS or trading.
E.2.6 Accounting for Consolidated CIVs
When collateral managers initially consolidate a CIV, they are required
to measure the CIV’s assets and liabilities at fair value. While some collateral managers
subsequently account under ASC 320 for the financial assets of a consolidated CFE as
trading, AFS, or HTM, many elect the fair value option and subsequently account for both
the financial assets and financial liabilities at fair value. CIVs are CFEs; therefore, a
reporting entity that measures both the financial assets and financial liabilities of a
consolidated CIV at fair value may use a measurement alternative to determine the fair
value of its financial assets and financial liabilities.
See Sections
10.1.3 and 10.2.2 for further discussion of the use of a measurement alternative for
the initial and subsequent measurement of CFEs.
E.2.7 Risk Retention Rules
On October 22, 2014, the SEC and five other federal agencies2 adopted a final rule that requires sponsors of securitizations, under certain
conditions, to retain a portion of the credit risk associated with the assets
collateralizing an asset-backed security (ABS).3
Under the final rule, sponsors of securitizations are:
-
Required to retain no less than 5 percent of the credit risk of assets in an ABS offering (unless they qualify for certain exemptions).
-
Prohibited from financing (other than on a full recourse basis), hedging, or transferring the credit risk they are required to retain for most of the life of the retained security.
Under the risk retention requirements, a sponsor is prohibited from
hedging or transferring any interest it is required to retain under the rule to any person
other than a majority-owned affiliate. Of particular interest to constituents is whether a
collateral manager could comply with the risk retention rule by transferring the retained
interest to a consolidated affiliate (i.e., the sponsor either owns a majority [51
percent] stake or a controlling financial interest of a VIE) whose third-party investors
own the other interests in the consolidated affiliate. If so, the sponsor’s exposure could
be effectively decreased (below 5 percent) when a portion of the risk is absorbed by the
third-party investors of the consolidated affiliate. Companies should not only consider
the accounting implications of establishing these types of structures but also consult
with their legal and regulatory advisers to ensure that they will not be viewed as hedging
the credit risk they are required to retain.
The final rule permits sponsors of securitizations to select the form of
risk retention obligation, which could be:
-
An eligible vertical interest (a proportionate 5 percent interest in every tranche of a securitization).
-
An eligible horizontal residual interest (an interest in the first loss tranche of a securitization with a market value equal to at least 5 percent of the market value of all the securities issued).
-
A combination of both or an “L-shaped” interest (the combined interest is no less than 5 percent of the market value of all securities issued).
The type of interest retained by the sponsor (i.e., vertical, horizontal, or L-shaped)
will affect the sponsor’s economic exposure to the securitization structure and,
accordingly, the sponsor’s consolidation conclusion. If a sponsor holds the subordinate
horizontal tranche of a securitization structure, it would be more likely to consolidate
the structure than if it holds a vertical interest (or a combination of interests).
At the 2015 AICPA Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments, an
SEC staff member, Professional Accounting Fellow Chris Rickli, provided the following
example:
In 2014, several federal agencies adopted final rules to implement
the Dodd-Frank credit risk retention requirements for asset-backed securities.
[Footnote omitted] Over the past several months, OCA has received accounting
consultations related to the application of Topic 810 [footnote omitted] to a
registrant’s involvement with a so-called collateralized manager vehicle, or CMV. CMVs
are designed to sponsor various types of securitization transactions.
In one particular fact pattern, the CMV itself was required to hold
an ownership interest in the underlying securitization to which it acted as a sponsor.
The registrant made an initial equity contribution to the CMV, and obtained one of
three seats on the CMV’s board of directors. The remaining equity capital was funded
by third party investors, several of which were individually significant.
The registrant also entered into a services agreement to provide
certain support functions to the CMV, including middle and back office operations,
investment research, and other administrative activities.
An aspect of the registrant’s consolidation analysis related to
whether the CMV was a voting interest entity under Topic 810. The analysis focused
heavily on the ownership of the CMV and the role of the CMV’s board of directors. The
equity holders of the CMV, as represented by the board of directors, had power over
the most significant activities of the CMV, including the development of the
investment strategy, the hiring and firing of service providers, and the appointment
of individuals to the CMV’s investment committee. Based on these factors, we did not
object to the conclusion that the CMV was a voting interest entity under Topic 810.
We understand that many variations of this type
of entity exist in the marketplace. Therefore, it is possible that several of the
most significant factors to the analysis may vary greatly from CMV to CMV, and
therefore may result in different accounting conclusions. As a result, it would not
be appropriate to analogize our conclusions to other fact patterns that involve a
CMV.
I would also like to note that our conclusions did not extend beyond
the registrant’s GAAP accounting analysis. A critical part of the registrant’s legal
analysis would likely include whether the CMV would qualify as a legal sponsor. This
is a legal question and was not addressed as part of the accounting consultation. To
the extent there is uncertainty related to legal questions, entities should consult
with their primary regulator. [Emphasis added]
Example E-2
An investment manager sponsors a CLO and retains a 5 percent
vertical interest (i.e., an interest in each class of ABS interests issued as
part of the CLO). The investment manager designed the vertical tranche to be
compliant with the risk retention rules. For its role as collateral manager,
the investment manager receives remuneration that is customary and
commensurate with services performed, including a senior management fee that
is paid senior to the notes, a subordinate management fee that is paid senior
to the CLO’s preferred shares, and an incentive fee.
Further, the investment manager is the reporting entity that
has the contractual right to make decisions related to the activities that
most significantly affect the CLO’s economic performance. The vertical
interest owned by the investment manager does not absorb more than an
insignificant amount of the CLO’s variability (since it owns only 5 percent of
all tranches).
The fees received by the investment manager are customary
and commensurate with remuneration for services performed (i.e., negotiated at
arm’s length). In addition, because the investment manager’s vertical interest
would never absorb more than 5 percent of the CLO’s economic performance, once
the investment manager appropriately excludes the fees from its variable
interest assessment, it would never possess the right to receive benefits or
the obligation to absorb losses that are more than insignificant to the CLO
(under ASC 810-10-55-37(c)). Therefore, the investment manager’s
decision-making agreement would not represent a variable interest. Although
the investment manager’s 5 percent vertical interest is a variable interest in
the CLO, because the decision-making arrangement is not a variable interest,
the investment manager would not be required to consolidate the CLO.
In this example, it is assumed that the other investors are
not related parties or de facto agents of the investment manager; if they
were, the consolidation conclusion could be affected.
Connecting the Dots
In February 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. SEC (882 F.3d
220, D.C. Cir. 2018) held that the final risk retention rule does not apply to
“open-market CLO” managers. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s
ruling and instructed it to “grant summary judgment to the [Loan Syndications and
Trading Association] on whether application of the rule to CLO managers is valid under
[Section] 941, to vacate summary judgment on the issue of how to calculate the 5
percent risk retention, and to vacate the rule insofar as it applies to open-market
CLO managers.” The period in which to appeal the circuit court’s decision has lapsed.
Preparers are encouraged to consult with their legal advisers regarding the
application of the credit risk retention rules to their particular facts and
circumstances.
While Example E-2 focuses on a
CLO manager, we believe that it continues to be relevant since it can be applied
generally to the consolidation analysis for securitization structures irrespective of
whether the risk retention requirements apply.
Footnotes
1
A collateral manager must also assess whether it would be required
to perform the related-party tiebreaker test (see step 4 for additional details).
2
The other federal agencies are the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency in the Department of the Treasury, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Housing Finance
Agency, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
3
The final rule was issued in response to a mandate of Section 941 of
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which added new credit
risk retention requirements to Section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
E.3 Real Estate Structures
E.3.1 UPREIT Structures
In a typical umbrella partnership real estate
investment trust (UPREIT) structure, all of the REIT’s assets (properties) are
indirectly owned through operating limited partnerships. The REIT as the sole
general partner of the partnership makes all the decisions for the operating
partnership. The REIT will also hold units (limited partnership interests) in
the operating partnership, and the former real estate owners that contributed
the property to the partnership in exchange for their interests will hold the
remaining units. The units held by these external investors are usually
convertible into REIT shares at the option of the unit holder after a specified
period. However, they usually do not give the unit holders voting, kick-out, or
participating rights in the operating partnership. A typical UPREIT is
structured as follows:
Under ASC 810-10-15-14(b)(1), a limited partnership would be considered a VIE
unless a simple majority of the limited partners or lower threshold (including a
single limited partner) of limited partners have substantive kick-out rights
(including liquidation rights) or participating rights.4 Rights held by the general partner, entities under common control with the
general partner, and other parties acting on behalf of the general partner would
be excluded from the evaluation of whether limited partners have substantive
kick-out rights. See Section
5.3.1.2.3 for a discussion of which parties are considered to be
acting on behalf of the general partner.
In a typical UPREIT structure, the operating limited partnership would be considered a VIE because the unit holders do not have substantive kick-out or participating rights. Accordingly, a REIT with a variable interest in the operating partnership would be considered the primary beneficiary of the partnership (and would therefore be required to consolidate the partnership) if it has (1) the power to direct the activities of the operating partnership that most significantly affect the partnership’s economic performance and (2) the obligation to absorb losses of, or the right to receive benefits from, the partnership that could potentially be significant to the partnership.
Because the REIT would typically have the power to direct the activities of the operating partnership, and no one has the ability to remove the REIT as the general partner, if the REIT also has an interest that could potentially be significant (i.e., under the economics criterion), which is typically the case in an UPREIT structure, the REIT would consolidate the operating partnership.
If the operating partnership is considered a VIE, the REIT may have to comply
with the presentation requirements and provide the extensive disclosures
currently required for any VIE. However, the REIT may be able to apply the
disclosure exemption criterion in ASC 810-10-50-5B (which exempts a reporting
entity from providing certain of the VIE disclosures) if the REIT's partnership
interest is considered a "majority voting interest." See Section 11.2.1.1 for more
information. Accordingly, the REIT would be exempt from providing the
disclosures in ASC 810-10-50-5A only if the criteria in
ASC 810-10-50-5B are met. See Section 11.2 for a discussion of the disclosure
requirements.
E.3.2 Land Option Agreements
The homebuilding industry frequently uses land option (or lot option) contracts to procure land for the
future construction of homes. In a typical arrangement, a third-party seller owns a parcel of land, which
could be finished lots or zoned raw or partially developed land. A homebuilder enters into an agreement
with the seller to potentially acquire the land, usually at a fixed price. The seller can be an individual landowner (e.g.,
a farmer) or an investor group or financial institution acting as a land banker.
To legally separate the land under option from its other assets, the seller forms a land option entity (a
potential VIE) and contributes to it the land to be optioned. As consideration for the right to acquire
the land, the homebuilder pays to the seller a deposit or provides the seller with an irrevocable letter
of credit. The deposit typically varies from 5 percent to 20 percent of the option exercise price of the
land under option and is generally nonrefundable. In some circumstances, the homebuilder may make
an additional investment in the land by incurring preacquisition costs such as legal costs, roads, or
amenities.
The land option agreement allows the homebuilder to purchase all the lots at once or to conduct a
“rolling” takedown in which it purchases them according to a predetermined timetable. If, as a result
of market factors, the homebuilder decides not to exercise its option, it forfeits its deposit and any
preacquisition costs incurred.
The homebuilder’s involvement and economic interest in the potential VIE can vary substantially
depending on the arrangement.
E.3.2.1 Determining Whether a Land Option Entity Is a VIE
To be considered a VIE, a land option entity must meet any of the criteria in ASC 810-10-15-14. A land
option entity that holds only one parcel of land (and no other assets) is typically a VIE because holders of
the equity interests of the land option entity do not have the right to receive expected residual returns
as a result of the homebuilder’s holding a fixed-price call option on the sole asset of the entity.
Alternatively, the land option entity may hold multiple parcels of land that could be subject to multiple
land option agreements with multiple parties. The homebuilder may have a land option agreement on
one or more of the parcels. When determining whether a land option entity that holds multiple parcels
of land is a VIE, the homebuilder should consider the following:
- How it was financed and whether it has sufficient equity investment at risk (see Section 5.2).
- Which party has the power to direct the activities that most significantly affect its economic performance (see Section 5.3).
- Whether the homebuilder has made a nonrefundable deposit and whether the interest is in specified assets or silos (see Section 4.3.11 and Chapter 6, respectively).
The homebuilder should analyze each consideration as follows:
- Sufficiency of equity investment at risk — The homebuilder should consider how the potential VIE was financed (i.e., through equity, nonrecourse debt, debt that is recourse to the land and equity, or a combination of these sources).
- Power to direct the activities of the potential VIE that most significantly affect its economic performance — If, as a group, the equity investors lack the power to direct the activities of the land option entity that most significantly affect its economic performance, the land option entity would be deemed a VIE. To perform this analysis, the reporting entity must determine whether the potential VIE’s equity holder (generally the seller) has the power to direct the activities that most significantly affect the land option entity’s economic performance (see Section E.3.2.2).
- Obligation to absorb losses/right to receive returns of the potential VIE — When the land option entity holds many parcels of land, the homebuilder may only have an interest in certain of these parcels (i.e., an interest in specified assets). In accordance with ASC 810-10-25-55, if the homebuilder has an interest in specified assets of the potential VIE and (1) the fair value of the specified assets is more than half the total fair value of the potential VIE’s assets or (2) if the homebuilder has another variable interest in the potential VIE as a whole, the land option is a variable interest in the potential VIE. Otherwise, the homebuilder — through the land option — may have an interest in specified assets. If so, when determining whether the land option entity is a VIE, the homebuilder does not need to analyze the land option entity further unless it holds an interest in a silo.
E.3.2.2 Which Party Should Consolidate a Land Option Entity (or Silo) That Is a VIE
ASC 810-10-25-38A states that a reporting entity has a controlling financial interest in a VIE if it has both
(1) the power to direct the activities that most significantly affect the VIE’s economic performance and
(2) an obligation to absorb losses or receive benefits of the VIE that could potentially be significant to
the VIE. In this assessment, the homebuilder should consider the design and purpose of the VIE as well
as the risks the VIE was designed to create and pass along to the variable interest holders (see Section
7.2 for general information about determining which party has power over a VIE). If the homebuilder
concludes that its purchase option represents a variable interest, the interest will generally represent a
right to receive benefits that could potentially be significant to the VIE; the probability that the homebuilder
will receive significant benefits is generally not a consideration in this analysis (see Section 7.3.2).
To determine whether the homebuilder has the power to direct the activities that most significantly affect
the economic performance of the VIE, the homebuilder should consider the risks the VIE was designed to
create and pass through to the variable interest holders. For a land option entity, such risks may include
(1) fluctuation in the value of the underlying land, (2) the homebuilder’s credit, (3) noncompletion of land
development activities, (4) failure to obtain zoning and environmental approvals, and (5) operations risk
related to any other activities of the land option entity. Once the homebuilder identifies relevant risks,
it should evaluate which of the risks are expected to have the most significant impact on the economic
performance of the entity.
After the homebuilder has identified the risks that are expected to have the most significant impact on
the economic performance of the land option entity, the homebuilder should consider which decisions
are the most important regarding the activities that are used to manage those risks. The decisions and
related activities that may affect the economic performance of a land option entity are discussed below.
Assumptions about which activities will most significantly affect the economic performance of the VIE
may change as the primary-beneficiary determination is continually reassessed. The homebuilder should
consider any new assumptions associated with such primary-beneficiary reconsiderations.
The following activities may affect economic performance:
- Land development work — The assessment of which party directs the most significant land development activities may include which party sets and approves the budget, makes decisions related to scope and timing for the work to be performed, and absorbs cost overruns. It may also include whether the other parties hold any approval rights that are substantive.
- Zoning and environmental responsibilities — The homebuilder should consider which party directs the activities related to obtaining zoning rights and environmental approvals for the land. If the homebuilder assumes the risk of and responsibility for performing these activities, the homebuilder should consider whether it is required to exercise the option or pay any penalties if these activities are not completed.
- Debt/financing transactions — The homebuilder should consider what debt-related transactions the VIE can conduct, if any (i.e., pay off existing debt, incur additional unsecured debt, incur additional secured debt for the nonoptioned land in the VIE); whether it expects that any of these transactions will occur; and which party directs these activities.
- Acquisition of additional land — The homebuilder should consider whether the VIE’s organizational documents allow it to purchase additional properties, whether the design of the VIE allows it to purchase additional properties, and whether (1) such decisions are fully within the control of the seller or (2) the homebuilder has approval rights over these decisions.
- Disposition of remaining land — If additional land is available in the VIE (either when the homebuilder enters into the option contract or subsequently because more land is acquired), the homebuilder should consider whether the land use, development, and ultimate disposition is at the discretion of the seller or whether the homebuilder may influence these decisions.
- Other rights under the agreement — The homebuilder may have the ability to defer or cancel
scheduled takedowns under the option contract, push back or cancel a development phase,
change the deposit or development fee provisions, or exercise other provisions under the
existing contract terms. The homebuilder should consider the ability to exercise such rights in
the analysis of which party has the power to direct the most significant activities.Alternatively, the parties under the arrangement could amend the contract terms. The homebuilder should consider whether an amendment of the contract terms represents a reconsideration event (see Chapter 9). In addition, in performing its continual assessment of the primary beneficiary, the homebuilder should determine whether the amendment changes the primary-beneficiary conclusion.
- Expiration of the land option — The homebuilder should consider provisions that specify (1) certain activities to occur after a land option expires and (2) which party directs these activities (e.g., development activities).
- Other operating activities of the entity — If the entity is using the land for revenue generating activities, the homebuilder may need to consider decisions related to those activities.
Although the primary-beneficiary analysis focuses on a party’s power to direct
the activities of the VIE that most significantly affect its economic
performance, the homebuilder should carefully consider situations in which
it has significant investment and involvement in a land option entity. ASC
810-10 requires the reporting entity to analyze the substance of the overall
arrangement as well as exercise additional skepticism when the relative
economic interests of the parties to the arrangement are inconsistent with
their stated power. In performing the primary-beneficiary analysis, the
homebuilder may find it useful to consider the significance of its
investment in the VIE (including nonrefundable deposits and any
preacquisition costs) relative to the option exercise price of the land
under option as well as the nature of the seller (i.e., financial
institution, land banker, or individual property owner). The homebuilder
should also consider the impact of forward starting rights (see Section 7.2.9.1) in the primary-beneficiary
assessment. In addition, when determining whether it is the primary
beneficiary, the homebuilder should consider its indirect interests in the
VIE held by its related parties.
To identify the primary beneficiary, the homebuilder must determine the ongoing
activities of a VIE that are expected to significantly affect its economic
performance. Although ASC 810-10-25-38F states that a reporting entity’s
involvement in the design of a VIE “may indicate that the reporting entity
had the opportunity and the incentive to establish arrangements that result
in the reporting entity being the variable interest holder with . . . the
power to direct the activities that most significantly impact the economic
performance of the VIE,” determining the primary beneficiary solely on the
basis of decisions made at the VIE’s inception — as part of the VIE’s design
— would not be appropriate when there are ongoing activities that will
significantly affect the VIE’s economic performance.
Footnotes
4
See Sections 5.3.1.2.4, 5.3.1.2.5, and 5.3.1.2.7 for
further discussions of how to evaluate substantive kick-out rights,
liquidation rights, and participating rights, respectively.
E.4 LIHTC Structures
E.4.1 Background
In a LIHTC partnership structure, the general partner typically has an
insignificant equity interest in the partnership but receives a fee for its
decision-making responsibilities, including building and renovating the housing
project, issuing partnership interests, and maintaining and operating the
housing project. The limited partners invest in these projects to earn the tax
benefits, and they hold essentially all of the equity interest.
E.4.2 Determining Whether a LIHTC Partnership Structure Is a VIE
A reporting entity is required to apply either the VIE model or the voting
interest entity model in performing its consolidation assessment. A limited
partnership would be considered a VIE regardless of whether it otherwise
qualifies as a voting interest entity unless either of the following apply:
-
A simple majority or lower threshold (including a single limited partner) of the limited partners (excluding interests held by the general partner, entities under common control with the general partner, and other parties acting on behalf of the general partner) with equity at risk have substantive kick-out rights (including liquidation rights — see Section 5.3.1.2.2).
-
The limited partners with equity at risk have substantive participating rights (see Section 5.3.1.2.7).
Although a reporting entity should exercise judgment and consider all facts and
circumstances, the partnership agreement in a LIHTC structure typically does not
allow the limited partners to participate in the policy-making processes of the
partnership or remove the general partner without cause. Factors to consider in
the determination of whether the limited partner investors participate in the
policy-making processes of a LIHTC partnership include the following:
-
Whether the investor has the ability to make decisions about the day-to-day operations of the LIHTC partnership (e.g., accepting tenants, setting rent).
-
Whether the investor has the unilateral ability to veto the operating and capital budgets or otherwise prevent the general partner from making decisions about the day-to-day operations of the LIHTC partnership without cause.
Accordingly, while protective
rights may exist (e.g., the ability to remove the general partner
with cause or to veto the sale of a property owned by the LIHTC partnership for
significantly less than its fair value), a LIHTC partnership is typically
considered a VIE as a result of the lack of substantive kick-out or
participating rights.
Although a LIHTC partnership will typically be considered a VIE because of its lack of participating or kick-out rights, the partnership may also fail to satisfy the other VIE criteria. However, if such rights exist, and the partnership meets all of the conditions to qualify as a voting interest entity, a single limited partner with the ability to remove the general partner would be required to consolidate the partnership under the voting interest entity guidance.
E.4.3 Which Party Should Consolidate a LIHTC Structure That Is a VIE?
The assessment of whether a reporting entity is required to consolidate a
limited partnership that is a VIE focuses on whether the reporting entity has
both of the following characteristics of a controlling financial interest:
-
Power — The power to direct the activities that most significantly affect the VIE’s economic performance (see Section 7.2).
-
Economics — The obligation to absorb losses or the right to receive benefits of the VIE that could potentially be significant to the VIE (see Section 7.3).
Often, despite not having made a significant equity investment, the general
partner will meet both of these conditions and would consolidate the LIHTC
partnership. For example, in situations in which the general partner is
providing guarantees for construction or operations, the general partner may
have, on its own, the characteristics of a controlling financial interest and
would therefore be the primary beneficiary.
However, when the general partner does not meet both conditions (e.g., when a
guarantee is not provided), typically no party individually would have both of
the characteristics of a controlling financial interest. Specifically, the
general partner may conclude that it meets the power criterion but not the
economics criterion, and each limited partner may conclude that it does not meet
the power criterion. However, facts and circumstances (including whether any
partners have other interests in the partnership or each other) must be
considered. For example, if the partnership is a VIE, and a single limited
partner has the right to remove the general partner, the limited partner may
have, on its own, the characteristics of a controlling financial interest and
would be required to consolidate the partnership.
E.4.4 How Do Interests Held by Related Parties Affect the Analysis?
In certain instances, the limited partner or partners may be related parties or
de facto agents or de facto principals of the general partner. For example, if
the general partner is restricted from disposing of its interest without the
approval of the limited partner and no similar restriction exists that limits
the ability of the limited partner to dispose of its own interest, the general
partner would be considered a de facto agent of the limited partner. A reporting
entity would perform the related-party tiebreaker test in the following
instances:
-
Power is shared within a related-party group and the related-party group meets both characteristics of a controlling financial interest. See Section 7.2.7.1 for further discussion of determining whether power is shared.
-
A single decision maker has met the power criterion but not the economics criterion, and the aggregation of entities under common control with the single decision maker have met the economics criterion. See Section 7.4.2.3 for further discussion of a single decision maker and related parties under common control.
In addition, in accordance with ASC 810-10-25-44B, a reporting entity in a single
decision maker’s related-party group5 should generally consolidate a VIE if (1) the reporting entity is a party
that is related to a single decision maker that does not, individually, have
both characteristics of a controlling financial interest, (2) no other party in
the single decision maker’s related-party group individually has both
characteristics of a controlling financial interest in the VIE, (3) the single
decision maker and its related parties under common control do not have both
characteristics of a controlling financial interest, and (4) substantially all
of the activities of the VIE either involve or are conducted on behalf of the
reporting entity. However, as stated in ASC 810-10-25-44B, this requirement does
not apply if the legal entity is a partnership in a LIHTC structure that meets
criteria in ASC 323-740-15-3 and ASC 323-740-25-1. Accordingly, before an entity
adopts ASU 2023-02, this exception for LITHC structures applies only if (1) the
legal entity is a limited liability entity established for affordable housing
projects and a flow-through entity for tax purposes (i.e., the criteria per ASC
323-740-15-3) and (2) the following conditions in ASC 323-740-25-1 are met:
a. It is probable that the tax credits allocable to the
investor will be available.
aa. The investor does not have the ability to exercise
significant influence over the operating and financial policies
of the limited liability entity.
aaa. Substantially all of the projected benefits are from tax
credits and other tax benefits (for example, tax benefits
generated from the operating losses of the investment).
b. The investor’s projected yield based solely on the cash
flows from the tax credits and other tax benefits is
positive.
c. The investor is a limited liability investor in the limited
liability entity for both legal and tax purposes, and the
investor’s liability is limited to its capital investment.
The exception is intended to prevent situations in which a single limited
partner investor that holds more than 90 percent of the limited partner
interests in a LIHTC partnership may have otherwise had to consolidate the
partnership if the general partner is a related party or de facto agent of the
investor.
As discussed in Section 7.4.2.5, ASU
2023-02 extends the applicability of the “substantially all” characteristic in
ASC 323-740-25-1(aaa) and the use of the proportional amortization method to all
tax equity investments, regardless of the program from which they receive income
tax credits, provided that (1) the legal entity is a limited liability entity
established for income tax credits and is a flow-through entity for tax purposes
(i.e., the criteria in ASC 323-740-15-3) and (2) the conditions in ASC
323-740-25-1, as amended by ASU 2023-02, are met (see the pending guidance
below).
ASC 323-740
Pending Content (Transition
Guidance: ASC 323-740-65-2)
Proportional Amortization Method
25-1 A reporting entity that
invests in projects that generate income tax
credits and other income tax benefits from a tax
credit program through limited liability entities
(that is, the investor) may elect to account for
those investments using the proportional
amortization method (described in paragraphs
323-740-35-2 and 323-740-45-2) if elected in
accordance with paragraph 323-740-25-4, provided
all of the following conditions are met:
a. It is probable that the income tax credits
allocable to the investor will be available.
aa. The investor does not have the ability to
exercise significant influence over the operating
and financial policies of the underlying
project.
aaa. Substantially all of the projected
benefits are from income tax credits and other
income tax benefits (for example, tax benefits
generated from the operating losses of the
investment). Projected benefits include, but are
not limited to, income tax credits, other income
tax benefits, and other non-income-tax-related
benefits, including refundable tax credits (that
is, those tax credits not dependent upon an
investor’s income tax liability). Tax credits
accounted for outside of the scope of Topic 740
(for example, refundable tax credits) shall be
included in total projected benefits, but not in
income tax credits and other income tax benefits
when evaluating this condition. This condition
shall be determined on a discounted basis using a
discount rate that is consistent with the cash
flow assumptions utilized by the investor for the
purpose of making a decision to invest in the
project.
b. The investor’s projected yield based
solely on the cash flows from the income tax
credits and other income tax benefits is
positive.
c. The investor is a limited liability
investor in the limited liability entity for both
legal and tax purposes, and the investor’s
liability is limited to its capital
investment.
Footnotes
5
See footnote 3.
E.5 P&U Entities
E.5.1 Overview
Reporting entities in the P&U industry apply the same consolidation
requirements as reporting entities in other industries. However, the
consolidation analysis may be particularly challenging in the P&U context.
This section supplements the main chapters of this publication by discussing
topics that apply to P&U reporting entities in their evaluation of whether
they are required to consolidate a legal entity.
E.5.2 Identification of Variable Interests
Only a holder of a variable interest can consolidate a VIE. Accordingly, as long as the legal entity being evaluated does not qualify for a scope exception, the reporting entity must determine whether its interest in a legal entity is a variable interest. Examples of potential variable interests include equity interests, debt interests, PPAs, derivative instruments, management agreements, and other operating or contractual arrangements. The determination of whether an interest is a variable interest is often complicated and should focus on the purpose and design of the legal entity being evaluated and the risks to which the legal entity was designed to be exposed. For more information about identifying variable interests, see Chapter 4.
E.5.2.1 PPAs and Tolling Arrangements
Performing the variable-interest assessment for PPAs and tolling arrangements
can be particularly challenging. A reporting entity must first determine
whether the arrangement is considered an operating lease under ASC 8426 or a derivative under ASC 815 and, accordingly, whether the
arrangement (1) qualifies for the scope exception in ASC 810-10-55-39 for an
operating lease (see Section E.5.2.1.2) or (2) is a derivative that creates
(rather than absorbs) variability (see Section E.5.2.3).
If the arrangement does not meet the definition of an operating lease (or there are other elements embedded in the operating lease) or the arrangement is not a derivative that creates (rather than absorbs) variability, the determination of whether a PPA or tolling agreement is a variable interest should focus on the purpose and design of the legal entity being evaluated and the risks to which the legal entity was designed to be exposed, such as raw-material price risk, operations risk, credit risk, and electricity price risk. The evaluation should take into account the nature of the pricing in the PPA or tolling arrangement (fixed, market, cost-reimbursement, etc.) as well as any features related to the underlying plant (puts, calls, residual value guarantees).
Further, the nature of the generating facility could affect the evaluation. That is, a fixed-price forward contract to purchase electricity from a fossil-fuel facility that has not yet been generated will typically be viewed as a contract to purchase an asset (electricity) that the legal entity does not currently own because of the legal entity’s exposure to raw material price risk and O&M risk in producing the electricity. In accordance with ASC 810-10-55-27, a contract to buy an asset that is not currently owned by a legal entity at a fixed price will usually increase the legal entity’s variability (rather than absorb it). In contrast, a fixed-priced forward contract to buy electricity from a renewable energy facility that has limited exposure to raw material price risk or O&M risk would typically be evaluated in a manner similar to an interest in a legal entity that currently owns the asset, because the entity has limited exposure to raw material price risk or O&M risk. Under ASC 810-10-55-28, a fixed-price contract for the legal entity to sell and for the counterparty to buy an asset owned by a legal entity is more likely to absorb variability of the legal entity.
The reporting entity should also consider any other contracts it holds, as well as those held by its related-party group, when evaluating whether a PPA or tolling arrangement is a variable interest.
Views have differed historically on the approach a reporting entity should use to assess variability, which has somewhat hindered comparability between reporting entities. Specifically, reporting entities will apply either a cash flow approach (the legal entity’s variability arises from fluctuations in its cash flows) or a fair value approach (the source of a legal entity’s variability arises from fluctuations in the fair value of the legal entity’s net assets).
The example below illustrates how particular PPAs, tolling agreements, or
similar arrangements should be evaluated in a reporting entity’s
determination of whether such contracts are variable interests.
Example E-3
- A legal entity (PowerCo) is created to hold a generating facility and is funded by two unrelated equity holders and one unrelated debt holder.
- PowerCo uses the proceeds from the equity contributions and debt to purchase the generating facility.
- As a condition of lending, the debt holder requires PowerCo to enter into a 20-year forward contract to sell 100 percent of its output to a third party.
- PowerCo holds the title to the facility, which has a useful life of 40 years.
The table below outlines how to assess whether a PPA, tolling agreement, or
similar arrangement between the Utility and PowerCo in the example above is
a variable interest. These contracts are analyzed from the purchaser’s
perspective (first column). The second column describes other arrangements
entered into between the legal entity (PowerCo) and either a third party or
the purchaser. Assume that the guidance on derivatives in ASC 810-10-25-35
and 25-36 does not apply and that the contract is not an operating lease.
Ultimately, whether a contract is a variable interest will depend on
individual facts and circumstances, including the risk profile of the
production facility (i.e., renewable energy versus fossil-fuel plants).
Table
E-1 Assessing Whether PPAs, Tolling Agreements, or Similar Arrangements
Are Variable Interests
Type of Contract (Purchaser) | Existing Contracts for Fuel and Other Materials | Is the Purchaser’s Contract a Variable Interest? |
---|---|---|
Fixed-price forward contract to purchase electricity | Market-price forward contract to purchase fuel from a third-party provider | No. The legal entity is designed to be subject to operating risk, credit risk of the purchaser, and fuel price risk. The role of the fixed-price forward contract is not to transfer any portion of those risks from the equity and debt investors to the purchaser since the price paid under the forward contract does not change as a result of changes in operating costs, fuel prices, or default by the purchaser. Those risks are designed to be borne by the equity and debt investors. |
Fixed-price forward contract to purchase electricity | Fixed-price forward contract to purchase fuel from a third-party provider | No. The legal entity is designed to be subject to operating risk, credit risk of the purchaser, and fuel price risk. The role of the fixed-price forward contract to purchase electricity is not to transfer any portion of those risks to the purchaser since the price paid under the forward contract does not change as a result of changes in operating costs, fuel prices, or default by the purchaser. Those risks are designed to be borne by the equity and debt investors and the counterparty to the fixed-price raw material supply contract. |
Fixed-price forward contract to purchase electricity | Fixed-price forward contract to purchase fuel from the purchaser | Yes. The legal entity is designed to be subject to operating risk, credit risk of the purchaser, and the fuel price risk. The role of the fixed-price forward contracts held by the purchaser, when these contracts are evaluated together, transfers the fuel price risk from the equity and debt investors to the purchaser. This arrangement is equivalent to the purchaser entering into a variable-price forward contract that is designed to reimburse the legal entity for changes in fuel prices. |
Fixed-price forward contract to purchase electricity | Renewable energy PPA — no fuel costs | Some reporting entities have concluded that fixed-price PPAs for renewable energy contracts do not represent variable interests under the cash flow approach. That is, the fixed-price PPA does not absorb the variability in production costs such as O&M costs or the credit risk of the purchaser. Rather, such variability is absorbed by the equity and debt investors. However, others have concluded that these contracts do represent a variable interest under the fair value approach. This conclusion is based on the fact that renewable energy resources have significantly lower variable production costs than traditional fossil-fuel generating units (i.e., they have a lower variable O&M cost profile and no fuel costs). Accordingly, by analogy to the guidance in ASC 810-10-55-28, the fixed-price-per-unit contract would absorb variability related to the underlying assets of the entity (e.g., the windmill or solar panels) if there are changes in commodity prices.* |
Tolling arrangement in which the purchaser provides fuel to the legal entity at no cost or transfer of title and purchases
100 percent of the output at a specified charge per unit (conversion cost) | Agreement to provide fuel included in the tolling arrangement | Yes. The legal entity is designed to be subject to operating risk, credit risk of the purchaser, and fuel price risk.** The role of the tolling arrangement transfers the fuel price risk from the equity and debt investors to the purchaser. Changes in the fuel prices will be borne by the purchaser. This arrangement is equivalent to the purchaser’s entering into a variable-price forward contract that is designed to reimburse the legal entity for changes in fuel prices. |
Variable-price forward contract to purchase electricity — reimburses legal entity for costs of fuel and O&M | Market-price forward contract to purchase fuel from a third-party provider | Yes. The legal entity is designed to be subject to operating risk, credit risk of the purchaser, and fuel price risk. The role of the variable-price forward contract is to transfer the fuel price risk and some portion of operating risk from the equity and debt investors to the purchaser. Changes in the fuel prices and O&M costs will be borne by the purchaser. |
Variable-price forward contract to purchase electricity — reimburses legal entity for costs of fuel and O&M | Market-price forward contract to purchase fuel from the purchaser | Yes. The legal entity is designed to be subject to operating risk, credit risk of the purchaser, and fuel price risk. The role of the variable-price forward contract is to transfer the fuel price risk and some portion of operating risk from the equity and debt investors to the purchaser. Changes in the fuel prices and O&M costs will be borne by the purchaser. |
Variable-price forward contract to purchase electricity — reimburses the legal entity for costs of fuel and O&M. A component of the variable-price forward contract is considered an operating lease | Market-price forward contract to purchase fuel from a third-party provider | Yes. The legal entity is designed to be subject to operating risk, credit risk of the purchaser, and fuel price risk. Although a component of the variable-price forward contract is considered an operating lease, the role of the remaining, nonlease components of the arrangement is to transfer fuel price risk and some portion of operating risk from the equity and debt investors to the purchaser. Changes in the fuel prices and O&M costs will be borne by the purchaser. |
* PPAs for renewable energy that are ostensibly fixed-price-per-unit contracts often have features designed to absorb cash flow variability. For example, construction overrun contingencies or tax contingencies that can change the fixed price per unit of the facility’s output would absorb variability in the cash flows of the legal entity. It is important for a reporting entity to ensure that the PPA truly is a fixed-price-per-unit contract before concluding that the arrangement does not absorb cash flow variability. In addition, regardless of whether the PPA for renewable energy represents a variable interest, given the noncontrollable risks (i.e., risks for which there are no related activities) in a typical renewable structure, the off-taker often will conclude that it does not have power over the most significant activities since the power over the controllable risks (such as O&M) frequently rests with the owner-operator. This conclusion will depend on the particular terms of each arrangement. See Section E.5.4.
** Although the legal entity does not take title to the fuel in a tolling arrangement, the legal entity must produce electricity, which requires fuel. By supplying the legal entity with fuel at no cost, the reporting entity is implicitly absorbing fuel price risk associated with producing the electricity. This concept is consistent with the SEC’s speech on “activities around the entity” — see Section 4.3.10.1. |
E.5.2.1.1 Determining Whether a PPA Is a Lease Agreement
It is not uncommon for PPAs and tolling arrangements to qualify as leases for
accounting purposes. ASC 842 indicates that a lease is a contract — or
part of a contract — in which a supplier conveys to a customer “the
right to control the use of identified property, plant, or equipment . .
. for a period of time in exchange for consideration.” The evaluation of
whether a contract is (or contains) a lease under ASC 842 focuses on
whether (1) there is an identified asset and (2) the customer has the
right to both obtain substantially all of the economic benefits of its
use and direct its use. Further, the right to control the use of a
specified asset is conveyed if the customer will obtain all but an
insignificant amount of the output or other utility of the asset
during the term of the arrangement.
Currently there is diversity in practice related to how to evaluate whether a
PPA is a lease under ASC 842 as a result of differing views about how to
interpret the term “output.” For example, questions have been raised
regarding whether an “output” should include both physical and
intangible outputs (e.g., renewable energy credits [RECs], which
represent rights for environmental benefits). A PPA may also contain a
lease (i.e., there may be an embedded lease) under ASC 842. See
Sections
3.2 and 3.4 of Deloitte’s Roadmap Leases for further
discussion.
E.5.2.1.2 Operating Lease Scope Exception
ASC 810-10-55-39 indicates that most arrangements that qualify as operating leases (i.e., the lease does not transfer substantially all of the risks and rewards of ownership) do not absorb variability in the fair value of the VIE’s net assets. Accordingly, a lessee under a PPA or tolling arrangement that is considered an operating lease may not be considered to hold a variable interest in a VIE lessor entity.
However, it is important to remember that the exception for operating leases only applies to the lease element of an arrangement. Therefore, PPAs that qualify as operating leases may still contain variable interests to the extent that other elements (e.g., fixed-price put or call options, dismantlement/decommissioning obligations) exist in the lease. Other common features embedded in an operating lease include management or service arrangements, the obligation to absorb the variable costs of production, and raw material supply arrangements (e.g., a fuel-tolling arrangement). Reporting entities must understand the terms of the lease arrangement and identify all embedded features.
E.5.2.1.3 Finance Leases
Finance leases (including PPAs and tolling arrangements) are not eligible for
the operating lease scope exception, and often the features that trigger
finance lease accounting (e.g., bargain purchase options, residual value
guarantees) will absorb variability. Further, just because an
arrangement is a finance lease does not minimize the relevance of, or
negate the need for, the consolidation analysis. Accordingly, a lessee
reporting entity that enters into a finance lease would still need to
assess whether it is required to consolidate the lessor. If the
reporting entity is required to consolidate the lessor, any other assets
or obligations of the lessor would be included in the reporting entity’s
consolidated financial statements. See Section 4.3.9.2 for additional
discussion.
E.5.2.1.4 Avoided Cost Pricing
It is not uncommon for a utility to purchase power from qualifying facilities
under avoided-cost pricing structures in accordance with the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act and the Energy Policy Act. Since avoided
cost is generally a measure of the utility’s marginal cost to produce
the same amount of energy through construction of a new plant and does
not permit direct reimbursement for any of the generator’s actual costs
of production, avoided-cost pricing will generally not absorb risk of
the generator; however, there may be exceptions. Relevant considerations
include the fuel source and operating profile of the utility’s marginal
unit compared with the fuel source and operating profile of the
generator and the reset period for the price schedule. In circumstances
in which (1) the fuel source and operating profile of the utility’s
marginal unit closely mirror that of the generator and (2) the reset
period on the pricing is frequent (e.g., monthly), it may be appropriate
to conclude that the PPA is absorbing variability in the legal entity.
The use of a correlation analysis may be helpful to the reporting entity
in making this determination.
E.5.2.1.5 Curtailment Rights
There have been questions about the effects of voluntary or economic curtailment clauses on the assessment of whether a PPA is a variable interest. Specifically, entities have asked whether the off-taker would absorb variability in the legal entity if the penalty pricing for economic curtailment was the same as the pricing that would have been due had the unit generated power. This type of penalty pricing would not, in and of itself, make a PPA a variable interest, because the off-taker is not absorbing incremental cash flow variability in curtailment scenarios.
E.5.2.2 Renewable Energy Credits
If a reporting entity concludes that RECs are an output of a specified asset and
that the overall arrangement (including the benefits from the RECs) should
be accounted for as a lease, the lessee would not be required to separately
evaluate whether the right to receive the RECs is a separate variable
interest (see Section
E.5.2.1.1). See Section 3.4.1.1 of Deloitte’s Roadmap
Leases for further discussion.
However, if the reporting entity concludes that the RECs are not an output of
the specified asset in its evaluation of whether the arrangement is a lease,
or if the sale of the RECs is not part of a lease arrangement, the reporting
entity should assess the obligation to purchase the RECs separately to
determine whether the right is a variable interest.
E.5.2.3 Derivative Instruments
During the development of the by-design approach, the FASB debated whether certain derivative instruments, such as interest rate swaps and foreign currency swaps, should be considered variable interests in a legal entity by the counterparty to the derivative. From an economic standpoint, these types of derivatives could be viewed as both creating and absorbing variability in a legal entity. For example, in an interest rate swap in which the legal entity pays a fixed rate and receives a variable rate, the counterparty is absorbing fair value variability and creating cash flow variability for the legal entity. Although it would be atypical for such an instrument to give the counterparty power over the legal entity, the principles in ASC 810-10-25-35 and 25-36 provide a framework for the counterparties to conclude that many of these instruments are not variable interests in the legal entity, which permits the counterparties to avoid further analysis of whether the legal entity is a VIE as well as the disclosures required by variable interest holders in a VIE.
Under ASC 810-10-25-35 and 25-36, even if a derivative instrument absorbs variability, it may be considered a creator of variability (i.e., not a variable interest) as long as it does not absorb all or essentially all of the variability from a majority of the legal entity’s assets and it possesses the following two characteristics:
- “Its underlying is an observable market rate, price, index of prices or rates, or other market observable variable (including the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a specified market observable event).” (See Section 4.3.3.2 for a discussion of the meaning of the term “observable market.”)
- “The derivative counterparty is senior in priority relative to other interest holders in the legal entity.”
Example E-4
A reporting entity forms a legal entity to construct and hold a single plant that will produce electricity. The plant has an estimated useful life of 40 years and is financed with equity (10 percent) and nonrecourse debt (90 percent). During the formation of the legal entity, the reporting entity enters into a forward contract to buy 100 megawatts of the electricity produced by the plant, which is approximately 60 percent of the plant’s yearly electricity production, for 25 years. The forward contract is at a variable price, reimbursing the legal entity for raw materials and O&M costs. The reporting entity has no other involvement with the legal entity. The legal entity can choose to purchase the raw materials needed to produce the electricity on the spot market either when it needs them or before. Assume that the forward contract possesses the following characteristics necessary for the application of ASC 810-10-25-35 and 25-36:
- The forward contract meets the definition of a derivative in ASC 815.
- The forward contract’s underlying (electricity) has an observable market price.
- The reporting entity is senior in priority to the legal entity’s other interest holders. (In this instance, the reporting entity’s interest is senior in priority to the nonrecourse debt; often, this is not the case.)
E.5.2.4 Rate-Regulated Entities — Ratepayers Are Not Variable Interest Holders
Regulated utility companies many times enter into a PPA to purchase all the
power of a power-generating plant at an amount equal to a fixed capacity
payment plus the variable costs of fuel, operations, and maintenance. The
regulated utility company generally expects that all of its costs incurred
under the PPA will be recovered from ratepayers under the rate regulation
statutes in its operating jurisdiction. Further, in many instances, the
power-generating plant is the sole asset of a VIE.
Although the regulated utility is permitted to pass the costs of the PPA to its
ratepayers as they are billed for services in the future, no identifiable
ratepayers have the obligation to absorb the VIE’s economics at the present
time. That is, an individual ratepayer does not have an obligation to absorb
the variability in the PPA until the ratepayer consumes electricity in the
future. Further, the ratepayer is not obligated to absorb any of the VIE’s
variability if electricity is not purchased in the future (e.g., if the
ratepayer uses alternative energy sources or moves to another state).
Because the individual ratepayers do not have an obligation, contractual or
otherwise, to absorb the variability of the regulated utility’s arrangement
with the VIE, the indirect involvement of the ratepayers does not meet the
definition of a variable interest. As a result, the variability passed
through the PPA between the regulated utility and the VIE is considered to
be absorbed completely by the regulated utility under the VIE model, and no
portion of that variability should be attributed to the ratepayers.
E.5.3 Determining Whether the Legal Entity Is a VIE
To the extent that a PPA, tolling agreement, or similar off-take arrangement is deemed to be a variable interest, or when a reporting entity has other variable interests in the legal entity (e.g., equity interests, loans, guarantees), the reporting entity is required to consider whether the legal entity is a VIE and, accordingly, whether to apply the VIE model or the voting interest entity model in performing its consolidation assessment. To determine which model to use, the reporting entity must determine whether any of the following conditions apply:
- The legal entity has insufficient equity at risk to finance its activities.
- The equity holders (as a group) lack any of the three characteristics of a controlling financial interest.
- Members of the equity group have nonsubstantive voting rights.
If any of these conditions apply, the equity is not considered substantive, and
the legal entity should be evaluated under the VIE model. Legal entities in the
P&U industry often are considered VIEs because (1) the equity holders are
protected from losses or their return is capped (e.g., a put or call arrangement
for assets of the entity or an arrangement that protects the equity holders from
commodity price risk (fuel and electricity) and O&M risk), (2) the equity
holders share power with or cede power to other parties (e.g., debt investors or
another party through a PPA), or (3) the equity holders have disproportionate
voting rights to their profit-sharing arrangements. See Chapter 5 for further discussion of whether a
legal entity is a VIE.
E.5.3.1 The Business Scope Exception
The “business scope exception” exempts reporting entities from evaluating
whether a legal entity that qualifies as a business under ASC 805 is a VIE
unless one or more of the four conditions discussed in Section 3.4.4 apply.
While legal entities in the P&U industry may meet the definition of a
business under ASC 805,7 the reporting entity often fails to meet one or more of the four
conditions that preclude the use of the exception. For example, a
single-plant entity that has issued debt collateralized by the asset would
generally not qualify for the business scope exception because it would meet
the condition in ASC 810-10-15-17(d)(4).
E.5.3.2 Limited Partnerships
Developers in the renewable energy sector often use limited partnerships or similar structures for tax purposes. For example, a developer of a renewable energy facility that does not generate sufficient taxable income to offset the tax incentives or investment tax credits generated from its operations may monetize these tax credits by identifying investors that are able to use the tax incentives and credits. These renewable “flip” structures are typically set up as tax pass-through entities to give the investors (i.e., tax-equity investors) the ability to use the tax benefits of the partnership. When evaluating these types of structures under ASC 810, reporting entities should assess whether they are limited partnerships (or similar structures) and, if so, whether the holders of equity at risk (typically, the limited partners) have substantive kick-out or participating rights. If such rights do not exist, the partnership would be considered a VIE. See Section 5.3.1.2 for further discussion of whether a limited partnership (or similar entity) is a VIE.
E.5.3.3 Tax Equity
The prevalence of tax equity in renewable flip structures has led to questions about whether tax equity qualifies as equity at risk. The answer can affect the VIE determination related to equity sufficiency and the requirement that equity holders (as a group) have the three characteristics of a controlling financial interest. Tax equity will generally qualify as “at risk” unless the return of the tax investor is somehow guaranteed by the partnership. Disproportionate equity distributions until a flip date, in isolation, would not constitute a guarantee of the tax investor’s return.
E.5.4 Determining Whether the Reporting Entity Is the Primary Beneficiary of a VIE
The evaluation of whether to consolidate a VIE focuses on whether the reporting entity has (1) the power to direct the activities that most significantly affect the economic performance of the VIE (power criterion) and (2) a potentially significant interest in the VIE (economics criterion). However, the determination is often based on which variable interest holder satisfies the power criterion since generally more than one variable interest holder meets the economics criterion. Determining which variable interest holder, if any, meets the power criterion can be challenging. Although a quantitative expected loss calculation is not required, an understanding of the economic performance of the entity is useful in the assessment of the purpose and design of the VIE and the risks the VIE was designed to create and pass along to its variable interest holders (see discussion below).
E.5.4.1 Risks of the Entity
When identifying the activities that most significantly affect the legal entity, the reporting entity should focus on the purpose and design of the VIE and the risks the VIE was designed to create and pass along to its variable interest holders. The evaluation should focus on how each risk affects the VIE’s economic performance, not just those risks that have a direct impact on the net income of the VIE.
This concept is best illustrated by an example involving a traditional PPA with fixed-capacity pricing (e.g., a fixed monthly capacity charge) and variable pricing designed to pass through the variable cost of production to the off-taker. In this arrangement, the capacity payment is designed to (1) reimburse the seller’s capital investment in the plant, (2) cover fixed production costs, and (3) provide a return to the equity holders. The variable price, on the other hand, is often a pure pass-through mechanism designed to pass fuel and variable O&M costs along to the off-taker without a profit adder. Accordingly, the decision to dispatch electricity from the plant does not have a direct bearing on the profitability of the VIE — the capacity payment, which is dependent only on the availability of the plant, determines the net income of the VIE. A narrow focus on only those risks that affect net income could lead a reporting entity to conclude that the ability to dispatch would not be considered in the analysis of which party has the power to direct the activities that most significantly affect the VIE’s economic performance because the dispatch decision does not affect earnings of the VIE.
We believe that such a conclusion would be inappropriate because it ignores the fact that the dispatch decision governs the off-taker’s variable payment obligation and therefore directly affects the VIE’s level of exposure to commodity prices that the off-taker absorbs. Note that the dispatch rights, in and of themselves, may not necessarily lead to consolidation by the off-taker. To weigh the significance of commodity-price risk in the context of the VIE’s overall risk profile, a reporting entity must consider (1) the other risks created and passed along to variable interest holders and (2) which parties have the power to direct the activities related to those risks. See Section E.5.4.3 for additional information.
Example E-5
A local utility enters into a long-term PPA with a single-plant legal entity. The PPA is a prerequisite to the legal entity’s acquisition of bank financing. The PPA is structured such that the local utility reimburses the legal entity for certain production costs, including fuel.
Although the single-plant legal entity is not a merchant operation, its risk
profile is similar to that of a merchant generator.
That is, the risks the legal entity is exposed to
are likely to include commodity price risk (fuel and
electricity), O&M risk (including efficiency and
technology risk), residual value risk, remarketing
risk, credit risk, regulatory risk, catastrophic
risk, construction risk,8 and, in some cases, tax risk. In this example,
even though the local utility absorbs 100 percent of
the legal entity’s fuel price risk, that risk is
still relevant to the analysis because it is
absorbed by a variable interest holder, albeit not
an equity owner. This view would also apply to
scenarios involving tolling arrangements in which
the off-taker provides the fuel input. Like the PPA,
a tolling arrangement is another example of risk
allocation through contracting, but the base risks
remain those of a merchant generator. Further, there
is no substantive difference between the provision
of the fuel by the off-taker and the billing of the
off-taker by the generator for fuel it procures on a
dollar-for-dollar basis.
Once the risks have been identified, the reporting entity is required to identify the activities related to those
risks. It is appropriate to exclude from the analysis uncontrollable risks. On the other hand, there may be
situations in which the activities related to the risks are asserted to be “outside” the entity and should be
included in the analysis. See Section 4.3.10.1 for a discussion of the SEC’s views on “activities around the entity.”
The example above describes the identification of risks in a single-plant entity or merchant operation. However, the risks identified could differ depending on the nature of the legal entity. For example, there may be unique considerations for equipment-leasing entities (including those related to uninstalled gas turbines, rail cars, etc.).
E.5.4.2 Risks With No Activities
While reporting entities should consider all the VIE’s risks, the VIE may be exposed to risks that do not have direct activities related to them. Accordingly, the evaluation should focus on any substantive ongoing activities that are expected to have a significant effect on the economic performance of the VIE rather than on risks that may be significant to the legal entity but are not subject to control by any party. For example, the exposure to electricity price risk in a renewable project is a function of production, which is typically affected by external factors, such as wind volume. Similarly, the occurrence of a catastrophic loss event is a noncontrollable risk that would not affect the power analysis.
E.5.4.3 Identifying the Significant Activities
After a reporting entity has identified the risks of the legal entity that are expected to have the most significant effect on the legal entity’s economic performance, the reporting entity would need to consider the level of decision making and activities related to those risks. Such decisions and related activities may include, for example, choices about when to operate the facility (dispatch rights), how to operate the facility, the purchasing of raw materials, the selling of excess output, the maintenance of the facility, the hiring and firing of employees, remarketing at the end of the PPA term, and the disposition of the plant at the end of its useful life (e.g., the decision to refurbish or dismantle the plant).
Typically, commodity price risk (electricity price risk and fuel price risk) and O&M risk will be the most significant controllable risks of a single-plant legal entity with a fossil-fuel generating asset. However, the reporting entity may need to use significant judgment in identifying the related relevant activities because the types of decisions, and the weight of those decisions, may vary on the basis of the design of legal entity being evaluated.
E.5.4.3.1 Fossil-Fuel Generating Assets
The significance of certain decisions may depend on whether the legal entity’s
primary asset is a fossil-fuel generating facility (e.g., a coal-fired
power plant) or a renewable energy facility (e.g., a wind or solar
farm). For example, commodity price risk is inherent in a
fossil-fuel-powered plant’s inputs (i.e., fuel) and outputs (i.e.,
electricity). Some have argued that because of the importance of
O&M, it would generally be the plant’s most significant activity.
However, in certain instances (see discussion below), the opportunity to
recognize enhanced (or deteriorating) returns on the basis of superior
(or inferior) O&M performance (i.e., the opportunity to affect the
efficiency of the generating asset) may not outweigh the activities that
affect the potential volatility that results from commodity price risk.
Accordingly, in those instances, we would expect more weight to be
placed on the power to decide when to run the
plant (i.e., dispatch) than on the power to decide how to run the plant (O&M). The fuel source and expected
run profile of the facility (e.g., baseload, peaking) may be relevant in
the reporting entity’s assessment of the potential variability
associated with commodity price risk. The nature of the off-taker’s
commodity exposure (e.g., full exposure to input or output price
volatility as opposed to a net exposure to the spark spread9) should also be considered. Finally, availability guarantees,
minimum production guarantees, and guaranteed heat rates are examples of
features that may need to be considered in the assessment of the
potential variability associated with O&M.
A baseload plant is designed to run substantially all the time regardless of market conditions. Therefore,
although a reporting entity (typically the power purchaser) may have the ability to make the dispatch
decisions, the plant is not designed such that those decisions are likely to be exercised or have a
significant impact on the plant’s economic performance. Rather, the economic performance may be
most closely associated with the cash inflows from a capacity payment. Capacity cash flows typically vary
only according to the availability of the plant (i.e., a payment is “all or nothing”), and therefore O&M may
be the most significant activity ensuring that the plant is available and the cash inflows are received.
Accordingly, on the basis of facts and circumstances, O&M and other important decisions may most
significantly affect the plant’s economic performance.
On the other hand, a peaking plant is designed to be dispatched in times of peak load, when the market
price of electricity is economic in comparison to the cost of producing the electricity. That is, the off-taker
will dispatch when the spark spread is favorable since every dispatch decision effectively involves a
purchase of fuel (e.g., natural gas) and a contemporaneous sale of electricity. If commodity price risk is
the risk that most significantly affects the legal entity’s economic performance, the reporting entity that
makes dispatch decisions (e.g., the off-taker) would typically be deemed to have the power over the most
significant activities of the VIE unless another variable interest holder has powers that, in the aggregate,
exceed the effect of dispatch. The reporting entity should consider all facts and circumstances, including
the extent to which the primary dispatch decision is affected by market economics or by the off-taker’s
decisions.
In all cases, a reporting entity should document its considerations related to the design, purpose, risks,
and significant activities of a fossil fuel-powered plant housed in a VIE when determining which party, if
any, is the primary beneficiary of the VIE.
E.5.4.3.2 Renewable Generating Assets
If no party makes dispatch decisions, which may be the case for certain renewable energy technologies
such as wind and solar farms, the analysis of the power to direct the activities that most significantly
affect the VIE’s economic performance should focus on the other ongoing activities (e.g., O&M).
E.5.4.4 No Ongoing Activities
In the financial services industry, there are certain so-called “auto-pilot” structures (e.g., certain resecuritization structures) that have limited, if any, ongoing activities other than the administration of payments. Many believe that for these structures, the ongoing activities do not have a significant impact on the economic performance of the legal entity and that control over such activities is not indicative of a controlling financial interest. Consequently, design decisions and risk-and-reward profiles carry more weight in the consolidation analysis. However, such an approach is not likely to apply outside of pure financial structures since most operating entities (including those with physical assets) will generally involve some ongoing activities that are expected to have a significant impact on the economic performance of the legal entity.
When there are substantive ongoing activities that are expected to have a significant effect on the economic performance of the legal entity, little or no weight would be placed on decisions made at the legal entity’s inception as part of its design, including the location of the facility. Companies in the renewable sector will need to consider whether ongoing activities (e.g., O&M) are substantive and contribute significantly to the economic performance of the legal entity. For example, if the decisions about O&M are expected to have a significant impact on the productive output of the generating unit, these activities would be deemed to contribute significantly to the economic performance of the legal entity.
E.5.4.5 Activities Over the Life of the VIE10
The evaluation of whether a reporting entity has power over a VIE should focus
on the ongoing activities performed throughout the life of the VIE. Thus,
variable interest holders should reassess their power related to the
significant activities as their rights change or simply as their power
relative to that of other variable interest holders changes over time. In
other words, it is not necessary for a discrete change in power (e.g., based
on a new contract) to occur for there to be a change in the primary
beneficiary; the primary beneficiary could change over time as one party
ceases to direct the most significant activities of the VIE (e.g., as the
contract that gives the party power expires). For example, a PPA holder with
dispatch rights may have power over the most significant activities of a VIE
when making the consolidation assessment at inception of a long-term PPA.
However, that same party may conclude that it no longer has power over the
most significant activities of the legal entity as the PPA expires. This may
be the case when another party has agreed to purchase the plant output at
expiration of the current PPA or when the equity holder will operate the
plant on a merchant basis for the remaining useful life of the facility. On
the other hand, further analysis may be required when the terms of the
arrangement indicate that the off-taker has the ability to remain in power
after the PPA expires (see discussion below of puts, calls, and
term-extending options). For nonfinancial assets or in-substance
nonfinancial assets, depending on the guidance that applies to them (e.g.,
they may be within the scope of ASC 606, ASC 610-20, ASC 810, or other U.S.
GAAP), an entity should evaluate whether there are conditions that may
hinder the ability to derecognize the generating facility once it has been
recognized on the balance sheet through consolidation. In other words, an
entity that reaches a conclusion that deconsolidation under ASC 810 is
appropriate may have to apply additional guidance, depending on the nature
of the transaction, which may make derecognition challenging.
In assessing power over the remaining life of the VIE, the reporting entity
must consider all contractual rights and obligations, including those that
will arise in the future (e.g., a fixed-price call option or a residual
value guarantee on a power plant on the expiration of the PPA) pursuant to
contracts in existence as of the balance sheet date. It is not appropriate
to ignore these rights simply on the basis that they are not currently
exercisable. These rights are often central to the design of the VIE and
should not be disregarded in the primary-beneficiary analysis. The existence
of such rights, in isolation, may not be determinative in the identification
of the party with power over the activities that are most significant to a
VIE’s economic performance, but they are often informative in the
determination of which party has that power and should be incorporated into
the analysis. Relevant considerations may include the pricing of the feature
(e.g., in the money) and other business factors (e.g., a utility holds a
call option on a facility that it needs to serve its native load). See
Section 7.2.9.1 for more information about forward
starting rights and the primary-beneficiary assessment.
Although forward starting rights (including puts, calls, and forward contracts) are not ignored in the consolidation analysis, it is likely that such rights (depending on their terms) have a more meaningful impact on the analysis for VIEs with a limited life or a limited range of activities. For example, a call right held by a party on another party’s interest in an operating venture may not be given significant weight in the power analysis until exercisable if the other party’s interest gives it the substantive ability to unilaterally make the significant decisions of the VIE until its interest is bought out. On the other hand, a future call right on an asset (e.g., power plant) of a VIE whose business revolves around that asset might be given more weight in the power analysis before becoming exercisable, particularly when the party holding the call right is already exerting some degree of power over the VIE through another variable interest (e.g., an off-taker that controls dispatch under a PPA).
E.5.4.6 Multiple Parties Involved in Decision Making
It is important to remember that the primary-beneficiary analysis should take into account all parties that have power; a party with power over multiple significant activities may determine when those powers are aggregated that it has the power to direct the most significant activities of the legal entity. This concept is illustrated in ASC 810-10-25-38E.
Example E-6
Party A controls an activity that is deemed to significantly affect the economic performance of a legal entity, and Party B controls four activities, none of which individually affects the economic performance of the legal entity as significantly as the activity directed by A, but in the aggregate affect the economic performance of the legal entity more significantly than the activity controlled by A. In this example, B would have the power to direct the activities that most significantly affect the economic performance of the legal entity. This scenario might apply to an off-taker that has one significant power (e.g., dispatch) while another variable interest holder, such as the owner-operator, has several powers that are individually less significant but in the aggregate exceed the effects of the dispatch rights.
In identifying the significant risks and activities that affect the economic performance of a legal entity, as well as in assessing the “power to direct” those activities, a reporting entity must remember that ASC 810-10-25-38G indicates that the level of a reporting entity’s economic interest may indicate the amount of power that the reporting entity holds. If an off-taker concludes that the design of a legal entity and the overall substance of its PPA give it substantially all the benefits and obligations of plant ownership, but it also concludes that it is not the primary beneficiary of the VIE, the off-taker should carefully consider whether it has appropriately identified the risks and activities that affect the economic performance of the VIE and its powers related to such activities.
E.5.4.7 Multiple Parties Have Power Over the Same Activity
When multiple unrelated parties are responsible for the same significant activity or activities that most significantly affect the economic performance of different portions of the VIE, and consent is not required, a party with power over the majority of the significant activity or activities (if such party exists) has power over the VIE. To determine which party has power over the majority of the significant activities, the reporting entity will need to use judgment and consider all facts and circumstances.
E.5.4.8 Impact of Curtailment Rights
There have been questions about the effects of curtailment rights (which are often held by off-takers in renewable PPAs) on the primary-beneficiary analysis. Such questions have included whether a curtailment right (which is effectively the inverse of a dispatch) could represent the power to direct the significant activities of a VIE. If a PPA is a variable interest or the off-taker has another variable interest in the legal entity, curtailment rights may represent the power to direct an activity of the VIE. However, in most circumstances, the effects of such rights on the economic performance of the legal entity will be relatively minor. In addition, the significance of such rights will depend on the type of curtailment rights in the PPA. Emergency curtailment is unlikely to contribute significantly to economic performance because of the remote and contingent circumstances associated with their exercise.
Further, voluntary or economic curtailment rights that are not contingent upon other circumstances are rarely invoked because the scenarios that make them economical to exercise (e.g., excessive negative locational marginal pricing at the delivery location) are fairly uncommon in most markets. In assessing the effects of these rights, reporting entities should consider the expected significance of the rights in the context of overall economic performance of the VIE. In many cases, this will dilute the effects of curtailment rights and lead to a relatively low weighting in the assessment of the power to direct.
E.5.4.9 Impact of Liquidation and Withdrawal Rights
In some cases, withdrawal rights are tantamount to kick-out or liquidation rights and should be treated as such. Section 7.2.10.3 discusses situations in which withdrawal rights should be considered in a manner similar to liquidation rights in the primary-beneficiary analysis. The existence of liquidation rights (or withdrawal rights that are in-substance liquidation rights) may be applicable, for example, when a VIE owned by an engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) contractor is established to house the construction of a new generating facility and the utility has the right to exit the VIE, take the underlying assets, and hire a replacement EPC contractor to finish the construction.
E.5.4.10 Approval of Maintenance Schedules
Approval rights over planned maintenance schedules would not represent power over O&M (unless the approval rights are accompanied by other rights related to O&M decisions). Off-takers frequently have these rights but have no ability to influence the actual work done on the facility (other than requiring compliance with prudent utility practice). These rights would generally be more akin to protective rights than participating rights of the off-taker.
E.5.5 Other Items
E.5.5.1 Separate Presentation
Given the prevalence of non-recourse-project financing in the P&U industry, reporting entities should ensure that they comply with the presentation requirements in ASC 810-10-45-25. Under those requirements, separate presentation on the face of the balance sheet is required for (1) assets of a consolidated VIE that can be used only to settle obligations of the VIE and (2) liabilities of a consolidated VIE for which the creditors do not have recourse to the general credit of the primary beneficiary. Such information is required to be presented gross (i.e., assets and liabilities cannot be “linked” or netted). See Section 11.1.1 for more information about separate presentation.
Footnotes
6
In many situations, the evaluation of whether a PPA
is (or contains) a lease may be relatively simple; however, there is
diversity in practice related to how this evaluation should be
performed. See Section E.5.2.1.1 for additional information.
7
See discussion in Section 3.4.4.2 on ASU
2017-01, which narrowed the definition of a business. As a result of
the ASU, fewer legal entities (such as single-plant entities) may
meet the definition of a business on a prospective basis.
8
In this example, it is assumed
that the evaluation is being performed over the
entire life of the entity. See Section
7.2.9.2 for a discussion of evaluating
entities that have multiple distinct stages.
9
“Net exposure to the spark spread” means that
the off-taker’s contract is designed to absorb only the
difference between the market price of electricity and the cost
of producing that electricity.
10
The guidance in this section generally applies to
single-plant legal entities in the operational phase. Before achievement
of commercial operations, reporting entities should consider whether the
power to direct the VIE’s most significant activities changes as the
reporting entities move through discrete phases such as development and
construction. In these scenarios, the relative certainty of successfully
completing each stage is likely to be relevant to the analysis. See
Section
7.2.9.2 for more information about assessing VIEs that go
through discrete operational stages or phases of development.
E.6 NFP and Health Care Entities
As discussed in Section
3.4.1, an NFP13 is not required to determine whether to consolidate a legal entity under the
VIE model. An NFP that qualifies for the scope exception in ASC 810-10-15-17(a)
would instead apply ASC 958-810 and ASC 954-810 for NFP and health care entities,
respectively. Considerations related to applying those subsections are discussed
below. In addition, the AICPA
Audit and Accounting Guides Not-for-Profit Entities
(Chapter 3) and Health Care Entities (Chapter 12) provide interpretive
guidance on those subsections.
E.6.1 Overview
ASC 958-810
05-1
This Subtopic provides guidance on the following:
-
Reporting relationships between a not-for-profit entity (NFP) and another NFP that potentially result in consolidation
-
Reporting relationships with special-purpose entity lessors (either for-profit entities or NFPs)
-
Reporting a noncontrolling interest in an acquiree
-
Reporting relationships between an NFP and a for-profit entity that is other than a limited partnership or similar legal entity (incremental guidance only).
-
Reporting relationships between an NFP that is a general partner or a limited partner and a for-profit limited partnership or similar legal entity.
The consolidation considerations for NFPs depend on whether the NFP’s
relationship is with another NFP (see Section E.6.2), an SPE lessor (see Section E.6.3), or a for-profit entity (see Section E.6.4). ASC 958-810 also provides guidance on
presenting and disclosing noncontrolling interests (see Section E.6.5.1).
E.6.2 Reporting Relationships Between an NFP and Another NFP
The following flowchart (reproduced from ASC 958-810-55-3) can be used to analyze relationships
between one or more NFPs:
ASC 958-810-55-3
E.6.2.1 Nature of the Relationship Between One or More NFPs
ASC 958-810
05-2 An NFP may be related to one or more other
NFPs in numerous ways, including any of the following:
-
Ownership
-
Control
-
Economic interest.
05-4 The
nature of the relationship between the entities
determines the following:
-
Whether the financial statements of an NFP and those of another NFP should be consolidated
-
Whether the other NFP should be reported using a method similar to the equity method (see Subtopic 958-20)
-
The extent of the disclosure that should be required, if any.
As discussed in ASC 958-810, NFPs may be related through ownership, control, or an economic interest.
The nature of the relationship determines whether one NFP should consolidate another NFP or report
its interest in the NFP by using a method similar to the equity method under ASC 958-20.
E.6.2.1.1 Ownership
ASC 958-810
05-3
Because NFPs may exist in various legal forms,
ownership of NFPs may be evidenced in various
ways. Examples include:
-
Corporations issuing stock
-
Corporations issuing ownership certificates
-
Membership corporations issuing membership certificates
-
Joint ventures
-
Partnerships.
A parent corporation typically owns stock in a for-profit entity, whereas a sole corporate member holds (all)
membership rights in an NFP.
ASC 958-810-05-3 indicates that evidence of an NFP’s ownership of another NFP can include stock
or ownership certificates in an NFP corporation as well as interests in NFP joint ventures or NFP
partnerships. Some NFPs may also be structured as membership corporations. In a membership
corporation, the corporate decision making that is typically granted to the NFP’s board of directors is
granted to the corporate members identified in the NFP’s articles of incorporation. When a membership
corporation consists of a single member, that single member is referred to as the sole corporate
member and is generally considered equivalent to a sole shareholder since it typically has the unilateral
power to appoint and terminate the NFP’s board and dissolve the NFP.
E.6.2.1.2 Control
ASC 958-810-20 defines control as the “direct or indirect ability to determine the direction of
management and policies through ownership, contract, or otherwise.” As discussed below, an NFP may
have control over another NFP through a majority voting interest or a majority voting interest in the
board, as the sole corporate member, or through other means, such as a contract.
E.6.2.1.3 Economic Interest
ASC 958-810-20 defines the term “economic interest” as follows:
ASC 958-810 — Glossary
Economic
Interest
A not-for-profit entity’s
(NFP’s) interest in another entity that exists if
any of the following criteria are met:
-
The other entity holds or utilizes significant resources that must be used for the purposes of the NFP, either directly or indirectly by producing income or providing services.
-
The NFP is responsible for the liabilities of the other entity.
See paragraph 958-810-55-6 for
examples of economic interests.
In addition, ASC 958-810-55-6 provides some examples of economic interests, including the assignment
of significant functions to another entity or residual interests held by an NFP in another NFP. However,
the determination of whether an NFP has an economic interest in another NFP involves significant
judgment and requires consideration of the facts and circumstances.
ASC 958-810
55-6 The
following are examples of economic interests:
-
Other entities solicit funds in the name of and with the expressed or implied approval of the NFP, and substantially all of the funds solicited are intended by the contributor or are otherwise required to be transferred to the NFP or used at its discretion or direction.
-
An NFP transfers significant resources to another entity whose resources are held for the benefit of the NFP.
-
An NFP assigns certain significant functions to another entity.
-
An NFP provides or is committed to provide funds for another entity or guarantees significant debt of another entity.
-
An NFP has a right to or a responsibility for the operating results of another entity. Or upon dissolution, an NFP is entitled to the net assets, or is responsible for any deficit, of another entity.
Example E-7
Church P is a religious NFP corporation with over 1,000 local churches in the United States. Under P’s corporate
structure, P is a legal entity, and each local church is a separate legal entity. To ensure that each local church is
operating in accordance with P’s mission as a nonprofit organization, P supports the professional development
of ministry leaders at the local churches as well as the growth and development of local church programs. In
exchange, P is entitled to 10 percent of the general offerings that each local church receives. As a result of P’s right to 10 percent of the offerings received by each local
church, P has an economic interest in each local church.
Example E-8
Foundation F is an NFP formed by School S, an NFP university, to provide estate planning services, planned
giving services, and trust administration for individuals with multiple charitable interests. Foundation F has
historically served as a conduit for donors to contribute to S and holds approximately $30 million in donations
provided by outside donors specifically for the benefit of S. These amounts cannot be used for any other
purpose by F. In addition, F and S entered into a gift agreement under which F would transfer funds from F to S
over future years. The gift agreement is irrevocable, binding on and enforceable against F and S, and designed
to provide S with both up-front payments and a steady stream of funds. The gift is restricted to specific
purposes and is to be added to existing funds held by F for the benefit of S. Since F is committed to providing
funds to S through the gift agreement as well as holding amounts for the benefit of S, S has an economic
interest in F.
E.6.2.2 Consolidation Framework for an NFP’s Relationship With Another NFP
ASC 958-810
25-1 A
relationship with another not-for-profit entity
(NFP) can take any one of the following forms, which
determines the appropriate reporting:
-
A controlling financial interest through direct or indirect ownership of a majority voting interest or sole corporate membership in the other NFP (see the following paragraph)
-
Subparagraph not used
-
Control of a related but separate NFP through a majority voting interest in the board of that NFP by means other than ownership or sole corporate membership and an economic interest in that other NFP (see paragraph 958-810-25-3)
-
An economic interest in the other NFP combined with control through means other than those listed in (a) through (c) (see paragraph 958-810-25-4)
-
Either an economic interest in the other NFP or control of the other NFP, but not both (see paragraph 958-810-25-5).
Under ASC 958-810-25-1, an NFP’s relationship with another NFP may take a number
of different forms, including those noted above.
E.6.2.2.1 Controlling Financial Interest Through a Majority Voting Interest or Sole Corporate Membership
ASC 958-810
25-2 An NFP with a
controlling financial interest in another NFP
through direct or indirect ownership of a majority
voting interest or sole corporate membership in
that other NFP shall consolidate that other NFP,
unless control does not rest with the majority
owner or sole corporate member (for example, if
the subsidiary is in legal reorganization or
bankruptcy), in which case consolidation is
prohibited, as discussed in paragraph
810-10-15-10. Sole corporate membership in an NFP,
like ownership of a majority voting interest in a
for-profit entity, shall be considered a
controlling financial interest, unless control
does not rest with the sole corporate member (for
instance, if the other [membership] entity is in
bankruptcy or if other legal or contractual
limitations are so severe that control does not
rest with the sole corporate member).
25-2A In
some situations, certain actions require approval
by a supermajority vote of the board. Such voting
requirements might overcome the presumption of
control by the owner or holder of a majority
voting interest. For related implementation
guidance, see paragraph 958-810-55-4A.
55-4A
This paragraph provides implementation guidance on
the application of paragraph 958-810-25-2A to
situations in which certain actions require
approval by a supermajority vote of the board.
That paragraph states that such voting
requirements might overcome the presumption of
control by the owner or holder of a majority
voting interest. An NFP shall exercise judgment in
evaluating such situations. If supermajority
voting requirements exist—for example, a specified
supermajority of the board is needed to approve
fundamental actions such as amending the articles
of incorporation or dissolving the entity, an NFP
shall consider whether those voting requirements
have little or no effect on the ability to control
the other entity’s operations or assets or,
alternatively, whether those voting requirements
are so restrictive as to call into question
whether control rests with the holder of the
majority voting interest. The guidance in
paragraphs 810-10-25-2 through 25-14 may be
helpful in considering whether the inability of
the majority voting interest to unilaterally
approve certain actions due to supermajority
voting requirements is substantial enough to
overcome the presumption of control.
When an NFP has a controlling financial interest in another NFP through either direct or indirect
ownership of a majority of the voting interest or through a sole corporate membership, consolidation is
required unless control does not rest with the majority owner or sole corporate member (for instance,
if the other (membership) entity is in bankruptcy, or other legal or contractual limitations are so severe
that control does not rest with the sole corporate member). See Sections D.1.3.2 and D.3 for further
discussion of instances in which the holder of a majority voting interest lacks control. NFPs should
also consider specific voting requirements (e.g., supermajority) that may overcome the presumption
of control. The guidance in ASC 810-10-25-2 through 25-14 on the effect of noncontrolling rights on
consolidation may help NFPs determine whether the presumption of control by the majority voting
interest holder or sole corporate member has been overcome. See Section D.2 for more information
about the effect of noncontrolling rights on consolidation.
Example E-9
NFP X is the sole corporate member of NFP Y and has the power to select and appoint all five directors on Y’s
board. No other NFP retains corporate membership rights over Y; thus, all control rests solely with X. NFP X and
Y do not hold any economic interests in each other. Therefore, X should consolidate Y in accordance with ASC
958-810-25-2, which states, “Sole corporate membership in an NFP, like ownership of a majority voting interest
in a for-profit entity, shall be considered a controlling financial interest, unless control does not rest with the
sole corporate member.”
Example E-10
Assume the same facts as in the example above except that NFP X only has the
power to select and appoint three out of five directors on NFP Y’s board.
NFP Z has the power to select and appoint the remaining two directors on
Y’s board. A unanimous vote of all five directors on Y’s board is needed
to approve fundamental actions, including selecting, terminating, and
setting the compensation of management and establishing operating and
capital decisions (including budgets). NFP X determines that these
unanimous voting requirements related to the fundamental actions of Y
restrict X’s ability to control Y’s operations. Therefore, control does
not rest with X as the sole corporate member in Y.
E.6.2.2.2 Majority Voting Interest in the Board
ASC 958-810
25-3 In
the case of control of a related but separate NFP
through a majority voting interest in the board of
the other NFP by means other than ownership or
sole corporate membership and an economic interest
in that other NFP, consolidation is required,
unless control does not rest with the holder of
the majority voting interest, in which case
consolidation is prohibited. An NFP has a majority
voting interest in the board of another entity if
it has the direct or indirect ability to appoint
individuals that together constitute a majority of
the votes of the fully constituted board (that is,
including any vacant board positions). Those
individuals are not limited to the NFP’s own board
members, employees, or officers. For
implementation guidance on a majority voting
interest in the board of another entity, see
paragraph 958-810-55-5.
55-5 A
majority voting interest in the board of another
entity, as referred to in paragraph 958-810-25-3,
is illustrated by the following example. Entity B
has a five-member board, and a simple voting
majority is required to approve board actions.
Entity A will have a majority voting interest in
the board of Entity B if Entity A has the ability
to appoint three or more of Entity B’s board
members. If three of Entity A’s board members,
employees, or officers serve on the board of
Entity B but Entity A does not have the ability to
require that those members serve on the Entity B
board, Entity A does not have a majority voting
interest in the board of Entity B.
Generally, a majority voting interest in an NFP will result when the NFP’s articles of incorporation grant
the right to appoint a majority of its fully constituted governing board (including any vacant board
positions) to another NFP. However, if a majority of an NFP’s board consists of another NFP’s board
members, employees, or officers, that NFP would not have a majority voting interest in the board if it
lacked the ability to require that those members serve on the NFP’s board.
When control by an NFP of a related but separate NFP is through (1) a majority voting interest in the
board of the NFP by means other than ownership or sole corporate membership and (2) an economic
interest in the other NFP, consolidation is required unless control does not rest with the holder of the
majority voting interest in the board. This requirement is similar to that related to a majority voting
interest or sole corporate membership discussed in Section E.6.2.2.1, except that it involves voting
interests conveyed through means other than ownership (either direct or indirect). The guidance in
ASC 810-10-25-2 through 25-14 on the effect of noncontrolling rights on consolidation may help an
NFP determine whether the presumption of control by the holder of the majority voting interest in the
board has been overcome (see ASC 958-810-55-4A and Section E.6.2.2.1). See Section D.2 for further
discussion of the effect of noncontrolling rights on consolidation.
Paragraph 3.78 of Not-for-Profit Entities provides the following example
of control by a majority voting interest in the board of another NFP:
An NFP may be related to another NFP that performs political
activities that the reporting entity does not wish to perform, perhaps because
performing those activities may threaten the reporting entity’s tax exempt status,
the reporting entity is precluded from conducting such activities, or for other
reasons. For example, a membership entity may establish and sponsor a political
action committee (PAC) whose mission is to further the interests of the membership
entity. The resources held by the PAC are used for the purposes of the membership
entity and the governing board of the PAC is appointed by the board of the
membership entity. In the circumstances described, both control and economic
interest are present and the PAC should be consolidated. Control through a majority
voting interest in the board of the PAC exists because the governing board of the
PAC is appointed by the board of the membership entity. An economic interest exists
because the PAC holds significant resources that must be used for the purposes of
the membership entity.
E.6.2.2.3 Control by Other Means
ASC 958-810
25-4
Control of a related but separate NFP in which the
reporting entity has an economic interest may take
forms other than majority ownership interest, sole
corporate membership, or majority voting interest
in the board of the other entity; for example,
control may be through contract or affiliation
agreement. In circumstances such as these,
consolidation is permitted but not required.
Consolidation is encouraged if both of the
following criteria are met:
-
The reporting entity controls a separate NFP in which it has an economic interest and that control is not control through either of the following means:
-
A controlling financial interest in the other NFP through direct or indirect ownership of a majority voting interest
-
A majority voting interest in the board of the other NFP.
-
-
Consolidation would be meaningful.
When an NFP holds both (1) an economic interest (see Section E.6.2.1.3) in another NFP and (2) control
through means other than a majority ownership interest, sole
corporate membership, or a majority voting interest in the board, consolidation is
permitted but not required. Other means of control may include a contract or
affiliation agreement (see Section
D.3.4 for further discussion of situations in which an entity may be
controlled through a contract). Consolidation is encouraged in these circumstances if
it would be meaningful. Such determination involves judgment and requires
consideration of the facts and circumstances. The indicators in paragraph 3.118 of
Not-for-Profit Entities used to help an NFP determine whether to consolidate
a for-profit entity can also help it determine whether to consolidate another NFP.
Considerations related to this determination include, but are not limited to, the
following:
-
“The size of the for-profit subsidiary in relation to the NFP parent.”
-
“The activities of the for-profit subsidiary in relation to the mission of the NFP parent.”
-
Other quantitative and qualitative considerations relevant to the financial statement users.
E.6.2.2.4 Control or an Economic Interest, but Not Both
ASC 958-810
25-5 The
existence of control or an economic interest, but
not both, precludes consolidation.
Consolidation is prohibited if an NFP holds either an economic interest in
another NFP or control of the other NFP, but not both. However, there
may be certain scenarios in which an NFP should consolidate a legal
entity when it holds an economic interest and does not have direct
control of that legal entity’s board. It is important to view the
ownership interests and rights to the residual interest as indicators of
indirect control when direct control of the board is not present. An NFP
is presumed to have indirect control, and should therefore consolidate a
legal entity, if the NFP possesses the following:
-
An ownership interest of 100 percent of the legal entity or the right to the residual interest in it.
-
Representation on the board of the legal entity when no party directly controls the board.
See Section D.1.3.1, which discusses control in the absence of a majority voting interest, for additional
factors to consider in the determination of substantive control of a legal entity.
E.6.3 SPE Lessors
ASC 958-810
25-8
Notwithstanding the guidance in this
Subtopic, an NFP that is engaged in leasing transactions
with a special-purpose-entity (SPE) lessor shall
consider whether it should consolidate such lessor.
Specifically, such an NFP shall consolidate an SPE
lessor if all of the following conditions exist:
-
Substantially all of the activities of the SPE involve assets that are to be leased to a single lessee.
-
The expected substantive residual risks and substantially all the residual rewards of the leased asset(s) and the obligation imposed by the underlying debt of the SPE reside directly or indirectly with the lessee through means such as any of the following:
-
The lease agreement
-
A residual value guarantee through, for example, the assumption of first-dollar-of-loss provisions
-
A guarantee of the SPE’s debt
-
An option granting the lessee a right to do either of the following:
-
To purchase the leased asset at a fixed price or at a defined price other than fair value determined at the date of exercise
-
To receive any of the lessor’s sales proceeds in excess of a stipulated amount.
-
-
-
The owner (or owners) of record of the SPE has not made an initial substantive residual equity capital investment that is at risk during the entire lease term. This criterion shall be considered met if the majority owner (or owners) of the lessor is not an independent third party, regardless of the level of capital investment.
25-10 If all of the conditions in paragraph
958-810-25-8 exist, the assets, liabilities, results of operations, and cash
flows of the SPE shall be consolidated in the lessee’s financial statements.
This conclusion shall be applied to SPEs that are established for both the
construction and subsequent lease of an asset for which the lease would meet
all of the conditions in paragraph 958-810-25-8. In those cases, the
consolidation by the lessee shall begin at lease inception rather than the
beginning of the lease term. [For related implementation guidance, see
paragraphs] 958-810-55-7 through 55-16.
An NFP that is engaged in leasing transactions with an SPE lessor must apply the consolidation guidance
in ASC 958-810 to determine whether it should consolidate the SPE lessor.
An NFP is required to consolidate an SPE lessor if all of the following three conditions are met:
- Substantially all the activities of the SPE involve assets that are to be leased to a single lessee (see Section E.6.3.1).
- The expected substantive residual risks and substantially all the residual rewards of the leased asset(s) and the obligation imposed by the underlying debt of the SPE reside directly or indirectly with the lessee (see Section E.6.3.2).
- The SPE’s owner or owners of record have not made an initial substantive residual equity capital investment that is at risk during the entire lease term. This criterion would be considered met if the majority owner or owners of the lessor are not independent third parties, regardless of the level of capital investment (see Section E.6.3.3).
ASC 958-840 also contains guidance on NFP transactions with SPE lessors related to leases that do not
meet all three conditions for consolidation.
Note that in February 2016, the FASB issued ASU 2016-02 (ASC 842), which
requires a lessee to account for most leases on its balance sheet, including those leases
that have historically been accounted for as operating leases. ASC 842 changes the
definition of certain terms in ASC 958-810, such as lease term, and therefore reporting
entities should determine the effect of the adoption of ASC 842 on their application of
the consolidation guidance on SPE lessors. See Deloitte's Roadmap Leases for further
discussion.
E.6.3.1 Substantially All the Activities of the SPE Involve Assets to Be Leased to a Single Lessee
ASC 958-810
55-8
This implementation guidance addresses the
application of paragraph 958-810-25-8(a) to a
transaction involving all of the following
characteristics:
-
An SPE is formed to acquire two separate properties that are to be leased to two unrelated lessees.
-
The two asset acquisitions are financed with the proceeds from two nonrecourse borrowings that do not contain cross-collateral provisions; that is, in the event of default, each borrowing is collateralized only by a pledge of the respective assets leased to a single lessee and an assignment of the respective lease payments under the related lease.
-
The SPE has no assets other than the leased properties and the related leases.
55-9 The
use of nonrecourse debt with no cross-collateral
provisions effectively segregates the cash flows and
assets associated with the two leases and,
therefore, in substance, creates two SPEs. For
purposes of applying the provisions of paragraph
958-810-25-8, each lessee would be considered to
have satisfied the condition in paragraph
958-810-25-8(a). For either lessee to be in a
position of not satisfying that condition, the
assets of the SPE (subject to the two leases) would
need to be commingled such that, in the event of
default, both lenders to the SPE would have equal
rights (that is, pari passu) to the cash flows and
assets related to both leases of the SPE. In this
regard, the amounts of the cash flows from each
lease and the fair values of the individual assets
subject to the leases must represent more than a
minor amount (that is, more than 10 percent) of the
aggregate cash flows from all leases and the
aggregate fair value of all assets of the SPE,
respectively.
The “substantially all” threshold is high and is applied in a manner similar to the business scope
exception discussed in Section 3.4.4.7 and the VIE determination discussed in Section 5.4.2. A reporting
entity should consider both quantitative and qualitative factors in evaluating whether substantially all
the activities of the SPE involve assets that are to be leased to a single lessee. As the guidance above
demonstrates, there may be circumstances in which the condition in ASC 958-810-25-8(a) is satisfied
even when there are multiple properties in a single SPE lessor with multiple lessees.
E.6.3.2 Expected Substantive Residual Risks — Substantially All the Residual Rewards of the Leased Asset(s) and the Obligation Imposed by the Underlying Debt of the SPE Reside Directly or Indirectly With the Lessee
This condition may be satisfied as a result of any of the following:
- The lease agreement.
- A residual value guarantee through, for example, the assumption of first-dollar-of-loss provisions.
- A guarantee of the SPE’s debt.
- An option granting the lessee a right to do either of the following:
- Purchase the leased asset at a fixed price or at a defined price other than fair value determined as of the date of exercise.
- Receive any of the lessor’s sales proceeds in excess of a stipulated amount.
E.6.3.3 SPE Owner Has Not Made an Initial Substantive Residual Equity Capital Investment at Risk During the Entire Lease Term
ASC 958-810
25-9 To
satisfy the at-risk requirement in item (c) in the
preceding paragraph, an initial substantive residual
equity capital investment shall meet all of the
following conditions:
-
It represents an equity interest in legal form.
-
It is subordinate to all debt interests.
-
It represents the residual equity interest during the entire lease term.
55-10
This implementation guidance addresses the level at
which an entity should apply the conditions in
paragraph 958-810-25-8 to a transaction having all
of the following characteristics:
-
Sponsor forms an SPE, SPE A.
-
SPE A acquires property with the proceeds from nonrecourse debt and leases the property to Lessee A.
-
SPE A has no other activities and the terms of the lease satisfy the condition in paragraph 958-810-25-8(b), which discusses the residual risks and rewards associated with the leased assets and related debt.
-
The sponsor owns 100 percent of SPE A’s voting common stock.
-
The sponsor contributes the common stock of SPE A to capitalize another SPE (SPE B) that is formed to own and lease assets to Lessee B.
-
The other assets of SPE B are financed entirely with nonrecourse debt and are subject to a lease, the terms of which also satisfy the condition in paragraph 958-810-25-8(b).
Thus, SPE B, which is wholly owned by the sponsor, becomes the parent of SPE A.
55-11
Consistent with the implementation guidance in
paragraph 958-810-55-8 that addresses multiple
properties within a single SPE, the conditions set
forth in paragraph 958-810-25-8 shall be applied at
the lowest level at which the parties to a
transaction create an isolated entity, whether by
contract or otherwise. Therefore, in the situation
described in the preceding paragraph, the test for
compliance with the condition in paragraph
958-810-25-8(a) should be applied to the parent-only
financial statements of SPE B.
55-12 In
the transaction described in paragraph
958-810-55-10, assume the assets of SPE B will
include the common stock of SPE A and the assets
leased to Lessee B. Ownership of the stock of
another SPE that is engaged in leasing property
would not constitute an activity contemplated by the
condition in paragraph 958-810-25-8(a). Accordingly,
in this situation, the lessee shall consider that
condition to be satisfied in evaluating the
activities of SPE B. In addition, the sponsor’s
contribution of the stock of SPE A to capitalize SPE
B shall not be considered an initial substantive
residual equity capital investment, as contemplated
by the condition in paragraph 958-810-25-8(c),
because a sponsor’s investment shall not be used to
capitalize more than one SPE for purposes of
applying that condition.
Payments to Equity Owners of an SPE During the Lease Term
55-13
The characterization of any payments made by the
SPE-lessor to its owners of record shall be based on
the SPE’s GAAP basis financial statements. That is,
distributions of the SPE-lessor’s GAAP basis change
in net assets shall be considered a return on equity
capital, but any distribution in excess of
previously undistributed GAAP change in net assets
shall be considered a return of equity capital,
which would reduce the amount of the equity capital
investment that is at risk. If the amount of the
equity capital investment is reduced below the
minimum amount required as a result of a
distribution in excess of previously undistributed
GAAP change in net assets, the owner of record would
have to make an additional investment to continue to
avoid the condition in paragraph 958-810-25-8(c). An
owner of record would not be required to make an
additional equity capital investment if residual
equity capital is reduced below the minimum amount
required because of losses recorded by the SPE in
accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles.
Fees Paid to Owners of Record of an SPE
55-14 Paragraph 842-10-30-5(e) states that, for a
lessee, lease payments include fees that are paid by the lessee to the
owners of the special-purpose entity for structuring the lease transaction.
Paragraph 842-10-30-5(e) states that such fees shall be included as part of
lease payments (but shall not be included in the fair value of the
underlying asset) for purposes of applying the criterion in paragraph
842-10-25-2(d). With respect to the SPE and the application of the guidance
in paragraph 958-810-25-8, the fees paid by the lessee to the owners of the
SPE shall be considered a return of the owners’ initial equity capital
investment. To the extent that the fees reduce the equity capital investment
below the minimum amount required, the owners of record would not be
considered to have a substantive residual equity capital investment that is
at risk during the entire term of the lease.
Source of Initial Minimum Equity Investment
55-15 If
the source of the funds used to make the initial
minimum equity investment in an SPE lessor is
financed with nonrecourse debt that is
collateralized by a pledge of the investment, the
investment shall not meet the at-risk requirement in
paragraph 958-810-25-8(c). Similarly, that at-risk
requirement shall not be met if the owners purchased
residual insurance or obtained a residual guarantee
in an amount that would ensure recovery of their
equity investment. If the initial minimum equity
investment is financed with recourse debt from a
party not related to the lessee, the owners
(borrowers) shall have other assets at risk to
support the borrowing to avoid the condition in
paragraph 958-810-25-8(c). Thus, if the loans were
full recourse loans and if the fair value of the
residual equity investment serves as collateral for
the debt, the lessor-owner shall be considered at
risk to the extent that the owners of record are
liable for any decline in the fair value of the
residual interest and have, and are expected to
continue to have during the term of the lease, other
significant assets, in addition to and of a value
that exceeds their equity investment, that are at
risk.
Payment to Owners of Record of an SPE Before the Lease Term
55-16 In
some build-to-suit lease transactions involving
SPEs, the lease or related construction agreement
provides that the SPE will construct, or cause to be
constructed, the property that is to be leased. The
terms of the construction or lease agreements
provide that payments are to be made by the SPE to
the owners of record during the construction period,
which, in some cases, may be several years. Such
payments generally are made to provide the owners of
record with a cash yield on their equity capital
investments. Payments made by the SPE to the owners
of record of the SPE during the construction period
shall be deemed to be a return of their initial
equity capital investment as opposed to a return on
their equity capital investment. To the extent that
those payments reduce the equity capital investment
below the minimum amount required under paragraph
958-810-25-8, the owners of record of the SPE shall
not be considered to have made an initial
substantive residual equity capital investment that
is at risk during the entire lease term.
To evaluate whether this condition is satisfied, an NFP must first determine whether the SPE owner’s
residual equity capital investment is at risk. The SPE owner’s residual equity capital investment is at risk if
(1) it is legal-form equity, (2) it is subordinate to all debt interests, and (3) it represents the residual equity
interest during the entire lease term. The NFP should consider the source of the funds used by the SPE
owner to make the initial minimum equity investment in an SPE lessor as well as any other agreements
entered into by the SPE owner. For instance, if the SPE owner’s investment is financed with nonrecourse
debt collateralized by a pledge of the investment, or if the SPE owner purchased residual insurance
or obtained a residual guarantee in an amount that would ensure recovery of its equity investment, the investment would not meet the at-risk requirement. In addition, if the source of funds is recourse
debt from a party unrelated to the lessee, the SPE owner must have other assets at risk to support the
borrowing.
Paragraph 3.110 of Not-for-Profit Entities provides the following
guidance on the minimum acceptable investment that would qualify as an initial,
substantive, residual equity capital investment:
FinREC believes
that 3% is the minimum acceptable investment to qualify as an initial, substantive,
residual equity capital investment. A greater investment may be necessary depending on
the facts and circumstances, including the credit risk associated with the lessee and
market risk factors associated with the leased property. For example, the cost of
borrowed funds for the transaction might be indicative of the risk associated with the
transaction and whether an equity investment greater than 3% is needed. Additional
information about the application of the preceding criteria and guidance for
consolidation of the SPE is located in FASB ASC 958-810.
Any payments made by the SPE-lessor to its owners of record that are considered returns of investment
(on the basis of the SPE’s GAAP-basis financial statements) would reduce the amount of the equity
capital investment at risk. Fees paid by the lessee to the owners of the SPE for structuring the lease
transaction, and payments made by the SPE to the owners of record during the construction period
(in some build-to-suit lease transactions), are deemed returns of investment and therefore would also
reduce the amount of the equity capital investment at risk. If the amount of the equity capital investment
is reduced below the minimum amount required as a result of these returns of investment, the owners
of record would not be considered to have a substantive residual equity capital investment at risk during
the entire term of the lease unless the owners make an additional investment.
E.6.4 Reporting Relationships Between NFPs and For-Profit Entities
ASC 958-810
15-4 Additional guidance for reporting relationships
between NFPs and for-profit entities resides in the following locations in the
Codification:
-
An NFP with a controlling financial interest through direct or indirect ownership of a majority voting interest in a for-profit entity that is other than a limited partnership or similar legal entity shall apply the guidance in the General Subsections of Subtopic 810-10. However, in accordance with paragraph 810-10-15-17, NFPs are not subject to the Variable Interest Entities Subsections of that Subtopic.
-
An NFP that is a general partner or a limited partner of a for-profit limited partnership or a similar legal entity (such as a limited liability company that has governing provisions that are the functional equivalent of a limited partnership) shall apply the guidance in paragraphs 958-810-25-11 through 25-29 and 958-810-55-16A through 55-16I. However, the guidance in those paragraphs does not apply to the following:
-
A general partner or a limited partner that reports its partnership interest at fair value in accordance with (e)
-
Entities in industries, such as the construction or extractive industries, in which it is appropriate for a general partner to use the pro rata method of consolidation for its investment in a limited partnership (see paragraph 810-10-45-14).
-
-
An NFP that owns 50 percent or less of the voting stock in a for-profit entity shall apply the guidance in Subtopic 323-10 unless the investment is measured at fair value in accordance with applicable GAAP, including the guidance described in (e). If the NFP is unable to exercise significant influence, the NFP shall apply the guidance for equity securities in Topic 321.
-
An NFP with a more than minor noncontrolling interest in a for-profit real estate partnership, limited liability company, or similar legal entity shall report its noncontrolling interests in such entities using the equity method in accordance with the guidance in Subtopic 970-323 unless that interest is reported at fair value in accordance with applicable GAAP, including the guidance described in (e). An NFP shall apply the guidance in paragraph 970-810-25-1 to determine whether its interests in a general partnership are controlling financial interests or noncontrolling interests. An NFP shall apply the guidance in paragraphs 958-810-25-11 through 25-29 and 958-810-55-16A through 55-16I to determine whether its interests in a for-profit limited partnership, limited liability company, or similar legal entity are controlling financial interests or noncontrolling interests. An NFP shall apply the guidance in paragraph 323-30-35-3 to determine whether a limited liability company should be viewed as similar to a partnership, as opposed to a corporation, for purposes of determining whether noncontrolling interests in a limited liability company or a similar legal entity should be accounted for in accordance with Subtopic 970-323 or Subtopic 323-10.
-
An NFP that is not within the scope of Topic 954 on health care entities may elect to report the investments described in (b) through (d) and paragraph 958-325-15-2 at fair value, with changes in fair value reported in the statement of activities, provided that all such investments are measured at fair value.
ASC 958-810-55-4 contains a flowchart (included below), which can be used to
analyze relationships between NFPs and for-profit entities.
ASC 958-810
55-4 The
following flowchart and related footnote indicate the
order in which an NFP applies the guidance elsewhere in
the Codification to determine the accounting for its
relationship with a for-profit entity.
As discussed below, ASC 958-810-15-4 specifies that NFPs should also apply other relevant ASC
guidance on reporting relationships between NFPs and for-profit entities.
E.6.4.1 NFP With a Controlling Financial Interest in a For-Profit Entity
An NFP with a controlling financial interest in a for-profit entity through direct or indirect ownership of a
majority voting interest in that entity should apply the voting interest entity model in the same manner
as any for-profit entity. Under the voting interest entity model, a controlling financial interest typically
exists when a reporting entity owns more than 50 percent of the outstanding voting shares of another
entity. However, there are exceptions to this general principle. See Appendix D for more information
about the application of the voting interest entity model.
E.6.4.2 NFP That Is a General Partner of a For-Profit Limited Partnership or a Similar Entity
In response to questions from stakeholders on when NFPs that are general
partners should consolidate for-profit limited partnerships (or similar
entities), the FASB issued ASU 2017-02 in January 2017. The ASU:
-
Amends the consolidation guidance in ASC 958-810 to retain the accounting under which an NFP that is a general partner is presumed to control a for-profit limited partnership or similar entity, regardless of the extent of the general partner’s ownership interest, unless the limited partners are able to exercise substantive kick-out or participating rights. The definitions of substantive kick-out and participating rights are consistent with those used in the definition of voting interest entity in ASC 810-10 (see Section 2.4, Section 2.6, and Appendix D for more information).
-
Adds new guidance to ASC 958-810 on when an NFP limited partner should consolidate a for-profit limited partnership. Under the new guidance, a limited partner that owns, either directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the limited partnership kick-out rights is deemed to have a controlling financial interest and must consolidate the limited partnership. However, if noncontrolling limited partners have substantive participating rights, a limited partner with a majority of kick-out rights would not have a controlling financial interest.
E.6.4.3 NFP That Owns 50 Percent or Less of the Voting Stock in a For-Profit Business Entity
An NFP that owns 50 percent or less of the voting stock in a for-profit business entity should apply ASC
323-10 unless it reports the investment at fair value (see Section E.6.4.5).
E.6.4.4 NFP With More Than a Minor Interest in a For-Profit Real Estate Partnership, Limited Liability Company, or Similar Entity
ASC 958-810-15-4(d) discusses the accounting for NFPs with more than a minor interest in a for-profit
real estate partnership, limited liability company, or similar entity. To determine whether their interests
are considered more than minor, many NFPs refer to ASC 323-30-S99-1, which reflects the SEC staff’s
understanding that practice generally has viewed investments of more than 3 percent to 5 percent to be
more than minor.
If an NFP has more than a minor interest in a for-profit real estate partnership, limited liability company,
or similar entity, it should determine whether it holds a controlling financial interest or a noncontrolling
interest in the for-profit real estate entity. ASC 970-810-25-1 through 25-3 provide the guidance below
to help NFPs make this determination.
ASC 970-810
General Partnerships
25-1 A
general partnership that is controlled, directly or
indirectly, by an investor is, in substance, a
subsidiary of the investor. Paragraph 810-10-15-8
states that the usual condition for a controlling
financial interest is ownership of a majority voting
interest, and, therefore, as a general rule
ownership by one entity, directly or indirectly, of
over 50 percent of the outstanding voting shares of
another entity is a condition pointing toward
consolidation. However, if partnership voting
interests are not clearly indicated, a condition
that would usually indicate control is ownership of
a majority (over 50 percent) of the financial
interests in profits or losses (see paragraphs
970-323-35-16 through 35-17). Paragraph 810-10-15-8
states that the power to control may also exist with
a lesser percentage of ownership, for example, by
contract, lease, agreement with other stockholders,
or by court decree. The power to control may also
exist with a lesser percentage of ownership by
agreement with other partners.
25-2 On
the other hand, the majority interest holder may not
control the entity if one or more of the other
partners have substantive participating rights that
permit those other partners to effectively
participate in certain significant financial and
operating decisions that are made in the ordinary
course of business. The determination of whether the
rights of the other partners are substantive
participating rights shall be evaluated in
accordance with the guidance for substantive
participating rights in paragraphs 810-10-25-2
through 25-14. If the other partners have
substantive participating rights, the presumption of
control by the majority interest holder is overcome.
A controlling investor shall account for its
investment under the principles of accounting
applicable to investments in subsidiaries.
Accordingly, interentity profits and losses on
assets remaining within the group shall be
eliminated. A noncontrolling investor in a general
partnership shall account for its investment by the
equity method and should be guided by the provisions
of Topic 323.
Limited Partnerships
25-3 If
a limited partnership does not meet the conditions
in paragraph 810-10-15-14 and, therefore, is not a
variable interest entity, limited partners shall
evaluate whether they have a controlling financial
interest according to paragraph 810-10-15-8A. The
guidance in Subtopic 810-10 on consolidation shall
be used to determine whether any limited partners
control the limited partnership:
-
If no single partner controls the limited partnership, the general and limited partners shall apply the equity method of accounting to their interests, except for instances when a limited partner’s interest is so minor that the limited partner may have virtually no influence over partnership operations and financial policies (see paragraph 323-30-S99-1).
-
Subparagraph superseded by Accounting Standards Update No. 2015-02.
-
If a single limited partner controls the limited partnership, that limited partner shall consolidate the limited partnership and apply the principles of accounting applicable for investments in subsidiaries in Topic 810.
In accordance with the guidance above, if the for-profit real estate entity is a
general partnership, an NFP should apply the voting interest entity model to determine
whether it holds a controlling financial interest in the general partnership (see
Appendix D). Similarly,
if the for-profit real estate entity is a limited partnership, an NFP should apply the
voting interest entity model to determine whether any of the limited partners control
the limited partnership (see Appendix D).
If an NFP does not have a controlling financial interest in the for-profit real
estate entity, the NFP should first apply ASC 323-30-35-3 to determine whether it should
consider an interest in a limited liability company as an interest in a partnership
instead of a corporation. ASC 323-30-35-3 specifies that “[a]n investment in a limited
liability company that maintains a specific ownership account for each investor —
similar to a partnership capital account structure — shall be viewed as similar to an
investment in a limited partnership for purposes of determining whether a noncontrolling
investment in a limited liability company shall be accounted for in accordance with the
guidance in Topic 321 or the equity method.”
If an NFP has a noncontrolling interest in a partnership or a limited liability
company that is similar to a partnership under ASC 323-30-35-3, the NFP should use the
equity method in accordance with ASC 970-323 to report such noncontrolling interest
except when it elects to report the interest at fair value under ASC 825-10 (see
Section E.6.4.5).
If an NFP has a noncontrolling interest in a limited liability company that is
similar to a corporation, the NFP should use the equity method in accordance with ASC
323-10 to report the noncontrolling interest except when it elects to report such
interest at fair value under ASC 825-10 (see Section
E.6.4.5).
E.6.4.5 Reporting an NFP’s Investment at Fair Value
If consolidation is not required, an NFP with an investment in a for-profit entity could (1) be required to carry its investment
at fair value (if it is an equity security with a readily determinable fair value or any debt security) or (2)
elect the fair value option in accordance with ASC 825-10-25-1.
E.6.5 Presentation and Disclosures for NFPs
E.6.5.1 Presentation of Noncontrolling Interests
ASC 958-810
25-6 An
interest by an NFP in another NFP may be less than a
complete interest. For example, an NFP may appoint
80 percent of the board of the other NFP. For NFPs
other than those within the scope of Topic 954, if
the conditions for consolidation in paragraphs
958-810-25-2, 958-810-25-3, or 958-810-25-4 are met,
the basis of that consolidation would not reflect a
noncontrolling interest for the portion of the board
that the reporting entity does not control, because
there is no ownership interest other than the
interest of the reporting entity.
45-1
Noncontrolling interests in the equity (net assets)
of consolidated subsidiaries shall be reported as a
separate component of the appropriate class of net
assets in the consolidated statement of financial
position of a not-for-profit entity (NFP). That
amount shall be clearly identified and described
(for example, as noncontrolling ownership
interest in subsidiaries) to distinguish it
from the components of net assets of the parent,
which includes the parent’s controlling financial
interest in its subsidiaries. See paragraphs
958-810-50-4 through 50-5 for additional guidance on
the requirement related to disclosure of
noncontrolling interests either on the face of the
statement of activities or in the notes. The effects
of donor-imposed restrictions, if any, on a
partially owned subsidiary’s net assets shall be
reported in accordance with Subtopics 958-205 and
958-220. Example 1 (see paragraphs 958-810-55-17
through 55-25) illustrates the reporting
requirements.
If the conditions for consolidation discussed in Section E.6.2.2.1, Section E.6.2.2.2, or Section E.6.2.2.3 are met, an NFP would not reflect a
noncontrolling interest in its consolidated financial statements for the portion of the
board of directors the NFP does not control, because the NFP is the only entity that
holds an ownership interest.
When noncontrolling interests of consolidated subsidiaries are required to be presented, they should
be clearly identified and included as a separate component of net assets in the NFP’s consolidated
financial statements. ASC 958-810-55-17 through 55-25 illustrate how an NFP may present and disclose
noncontrolling interests in accordance with ASC 958-810.
The effects of donor-imposed restrictions on a partially owned subsidiary’s net assets should also be
reported. ASC 958-810-20 defines a donor-imposed restriction as follows:
ASC 958-810 — Glossary
Donor-Imposed
Restriction
A donor stipulation (donors include
other types of contributors, including makers of
certain grants) that specifies a use for a
contributed asset that is more specific than broad
limits resulting from the following:
-
The nature of the not-for-profit entity (NFP)
-
The environment in which it operates
-
The purposes specified in its articles of incorporation or bylaws or comparable documents for an unincorporated association.
Some donors impose restrictions that
are temporary in nature, for example, stipulating
that resources be used after a specified date, for
particular programs or services, or to acquire
buildings or equipment. Other donors impose
restrictions that are perpetual in nature, for
example, stipulating that resources be maintained in
perpetuity. Laws may extend those limits to
investment returns from those resources and to other
enhancements (diminishments) of those resources.
Thus, those laws extend donor-imposed
restrictions.
Paragraphs 3.113 and 3.114 of Not-for-Profit Entities emphasize that the
determination of whether net assets are restricted as a result of donor-imposed
stipulations (or other restrictions) should be made from the perspective of the NFP
reporting entity as a whole and should take into account the existence of separate
consolidated entities. Because the consolidated entity may serve a broader purpose than
the separate subsidiary, “[a]ll or a portion of a subsidiary’s net assets without donor
restrictions might need to be reported as net assets with donor restrictions in the
consolidated financial statements.” Conversely, it may also be true, albeit less likely,
that “all or a portion of a subsidiary’s net assets with donor restrictions might need
to be reported as net assets without donor restrictions in the consolidated financial
statements.”
Paragraphs 3.22, 3.113, and 3.114 of Not-for-Profit Entities contain the
following examples, which demonstrate the concepts discussed above:
3.22 [A] voluntary health and welfare entity has a broad
mission of helping low income families and is the parent of an NFP that has a mission
of running a day care and after-school care center for children in the county. The
subsidiary NFP received a gift of a small office building subject to the donor’s
restriction that it be used for providing day care or after-school care or for the
administrative support of those programs. In the separate financial statements of the
subsidiary, those assets are not separately reported as restricted assets because the
use of the assets is no narrower than the nature of the NFP and the purposes specified
in its articles of incorporation and bylaws. However, when the subsidiary NFP is
consolidated with its voluntary health and welfare entity parent, the office building
would be reported separately with related disclosures because the donor-imposed
restriction to use the building for day care, after-school care, or the administrative
support of those two programs is narrower than the broad mission of helping low income
families of the reporting entity. . . .
3.113 [A] membership association has a subsidiary foundation that has as its
sole mission to provide scholarships. Donors make contributions to the subsidiary with
the intent that the subsidiary use the contributions to support its mission without
restriction, including granting scholarships and incurring fund-raising and general
and administrative expenses. The gifts to the subsidiary are therefore classified as
increases in net assets without donor restrictions in the separately issued financial
statements of the subsidiary. However, when the subsidiary’s financial statements are
consolidated with those of the membership association, the classification of the net
assets of the subsidiary would be changed to reflect that they are net assets with
donor restrictions from the perspective of the consolidated financial statements.
Likewise, investment income on donor-restricted endowment funds of the subsidiary
would be reported as net assets with donor restrictions in the consolidated financial
statements if they were required to be used for scholarships, even if an appropriation
had released the time restriction.
3.114 [A]n NFP adoption agency has a subsidiary whose mission is to raise funds
for various children’s causes, including adoption, foster care, and parental training.
If donors restrict their contributions for adoption services, the subsidiary
classifies them as increases in net assets with donor restrictions. However, when the
subsidiary’s financial statements are consolidated with those of the adoption entity,
the classification of the net assets of the subsidiary would be changed to reflect
that they are without donor restrictions from the perspective of the reporting entity,
which remains primarily an adoption agency.
E.6.5.2 Disclosures for Noncontrolling Interests
ASC 958-810
50-1 If
consolidated financial statements are presented, the
reporting entity (parent) shall disclose any
restrictions made by entities outside of the
reporting entity on distributions from the
controlled not-for-profit entity (NFP) (subsidiary)
to the parent and any resulting unavailability of
the net assets of the subsidiary for use by the
parent.
50-4 An
NFP (parent) that has one or more consolidated
subsidiaries with a noncontrolling interest shall
provide a schedule of changes in consolidated net
assets attributable to the parent and the
noncontrolling interest either in notes to the
consolidated financial statements or on the face of
financial statements, if practicable. That schedule
shall reconcile beginning and ending balances of the
parent’s controlling interest and the noncontrolling
interests for each class of net assets for which a
noncontrolling interest exists during the reporting
period.
50-5 The
schedule required by the preceding paragraph shall,
at a minimum, include:
-
A performance indicator, if the entity is a not-for-profit, business-oriented health care entity (see Section 954-10-15)
-
Amounts of discontinued operations
-
Subparagraph superseded by Accounting Standards Update No. 2015-01.
-
Changes in ownership interests in a subsidiary, including investments by and distributions to noncontrolling interests acting in their capacity as owners, which shall be reported separate from any revenues, expenses, gains, or losses and outside any measure of operations, if reported
-
An aggregate amount of all other changes in net assets without donor restrictions and net assets with donor restrictions for the period.
50-6
Paragraph 958-810-55-25 illustrates the required
disclosures using a reconciling schedule in notes to
the consolidated financial statements.
An NFP that presents consolidated financial statements and has one or more consolidated subsidiaries with a noncontrolling interest must provide the disclosures discussed above. ASC 958-810-55-17 through 55-25 illustrate how an NFP may present and disclose noncontrolling interests in accordance with ASC 958-810.
E.6.5.3 Disclosures Required When Consolidated Financial Statements Are Not Presented
ASC 958-810
50-2 If,
as described in paragraph 958-810-25-4, an NFP (the
reporting entity) controls a related but separate
NFP through a form other than majority ownership
interest, sole corporate membership, or majority
voting interest in the board of the other entity and
has an economic interest in that other NFP, the
reporting entity shall disclose all of the following
information if it does not present consolidated
financial statements:
-
Identification of the other NFP and the nature of its relationship with the reporting entity that results in control
-
Summarized financial data of the other NFP, which shall include the following information:
-
Total assets, liabilities, net assets, revenue, and expenses
-
Resources that are held for the benefit of the reporting entity or that are under its control.
-
-
The disclosures required by paragraphs 850-10-50-1 through 50-6.
50-3 The
existence of control or an economic interest, but
not both, as described in paragraph 958-810-25-5,
requires the disclosures in paragraphs 850-10-50-1
through 50-6. (The existence of an economic interest
does not necessarily cause the entities to be
related parties. However, the disclosures in those
paragraphs are required if an economic interest
exists.)
If an NFP holds both (1) an economic interest in another NFP and (2) control through means other than
a majority ownership interest, sole corporate membership, or a majority voting interest in the board (see
Section E.6.2.2.3), it must disclose the quantitative and qualitative information required by ASC 958-810-50-2 if it does not present consolidated financial statements.
If an NFP holds either an economic interest in another NFP or control of the other NFP, but not both
(see Section E.6.2.2.4), it must disclose the information required by ASC 850-10-50-1 through 50-6.
E.6.5.4 Disclosures Required When an NFP Consolidates a For-Profit Entity
ASC 958-810 does not provide specific presentation and disclosure requirements
for an NFP that has a controlling financial interest in a for-profit entity. Paragraph
3.118 of Not-for-Profit Entities states that in determining the relevance of the
for-profit subsidiary and the presentation and disclosures that would be most meaningful
to financial statement users, an NFP should consider the following factors:
-
The size of the for-profit subsidiary in relation to the NFP parent. The larger the for-profit subsidiary is in relation to the NFP, the more likely it is that discrete information about the for-profit subsidiary would be meaningful to financial statement users.
-
The activities of the for-profit subsidiary in relation to the mission of the NFP parent. The more marginal the activities of the for-profit subsidiary are to the mission of the NFP, the more likely it is that discrete information about the for-profit subsidiary would be meaningful to financial statement users.
-
The need for creditors to have separate information about the for-profit subsidiary, including information about guarantees of the for-profit subsidiary’s debt or limitations on transferring cash to or from the subsidiary. If the assets of a for-profit subsidiary are encumbered (for example, by mortgages, contracts, or other matters), it may be meaningful to include discrete information about the for-profit subsidiary’s total assets, equity, and changes in equity, similar to the disclosures required to be reported by business entities pursuant to FASB ASC 280.
In addition, paragraphs 3.121 through 3.126 of Not-for-Profit Entities
provide the following three examples (not all-inclusive) of ways an NFP may present
information related to for-profit subsidiaries:
Example A
3.121 NFP Trade
Association creates a wholly owned for-profit subsidiary (For-Profit Training
Facility) to provide continuing professional education to its members. For-Profit
Training Facility subsidiary incurs debt in order to build a classroom building. The
debt is secured solely by a mortgage on For-Profit Training Facility’s assets. NFP
Trade Association’s mission includes providing training to its members. Although
members could obtain training from other service providers, the training is integral
to NFP Trade Association’s overall mission.
3.122 It may be most meaningful to report For-Profit Training
Facility’s assets, liabilities, revenues, expenses, and cash flows as part of the
overall activities of NFP Trade Association, without discrete information presented on
the face of the financial statements about For-Profit Training Facility. However, the
notes to the financial statements would include any material disclosures that relate
only to the For-Profit Training Facility, such as to disclose any collateral-based
debt for which the For-Profit Training Facility is obligated or any assets restricted
solely for the use of the Facility.
Example B
3.123 NFP College
creates a wholly owned for-profit subsidiary, For-Profit Day Care Center, that
operates a day care center for the benefit of its students and faculty. The College
does not use the day care center as a teaching resource for its students. For-Profit
Day Care Center has no outstanding debt.
3.124 Because the day care center provides services to students, but is
peripheral and incidental to the mission of the college, it may be most meaningful to
report the assets, liabilities, activities, and cash flows of For-Profit Day Care
Center in a manner similar to an auxiliary operation in the college’s financial
statements. (Auxiliary operations typically are reported on the statement of
activities with one line for total revenues and one line for total expenses; the
statement of financial position and statement of cash flows do not separate
information associated with auxiliary operations.) Alternatively, it may be meaningful
to present the operations of the day care center separately on the statement of
activities.
Example C
3.125 NFP Community Organization received a
contribution of 100% of the voting common stock of a For-Profit Plastics Company. The
terms of the contribution agreement state that For-Profit Plastics Company’s net
income may be used for NFP Community Organization’s general operations. NFP Community
Organization is not involved in the day-to-day management of For-Profit Plastics
Company.
3.126 If For-Profit
Plastics Company is material to NFP Community Organization’s financial statements, it
may be meaningful to report the assets, liabilities, activities, and cash flows of
For-Profit Plastics Company separately from those of NFP Community Organization.
Acceptable methods of doing so include, but are not limited to, presenting (a)
consolidating financial statements, or (b) consolidated financial statements
with note disclosure of the assets, liabilities, net assets, activities, and cash
flows of For-Profit Plastics Company.
E.6.6 Health Care Entities
ASC 954-810
05-2 An
integrated health care system typically consists of
multiple related entities, operating both for-profit
entities and not-for-profit entities (NFPs). A
not-for-profit parent entity may be the sole corporate
member or, through other means, it may control other
entities such as a not-for-profit hospital, a
not-for-profit medical foundation that contracts with a
for-profit physician group, or other not-for-profit
providers such as a long-term care center, a substance
abuse center, a surgery center, or an outpatient clinic.
The system also may own stock in various for-profit
ventures such as health maintenance organizations or
insurance entities that may or may not provide patient
care. Fundraising typically is accomplished through a
separate foundation. Foundations, auxiliaries, guilds,
and similar entities frequently assist and, in many
instances, are related to the health care entity.
05-3 The
rights and powers of the controlling entity may vary
depending on the legal structure of the controlled
entity and the nature of control. The majority owner of
a for-profit entity’s voting stock or the sole corporate
member of an NFP may not only have the ability to
determine the direction of the controlled entity but
also have the proportionate right to (or the
responsibility for) operating results and a residual
interest in the net assets upon dissolution. However, in
other situations, the rights of the controlling party
may be more limited. For example, in the case of a sole
general partner in a limited partnership, the limited
partners — and not the general partner — may be entitled
to the net assets upon dissolution.
45-1
Whether the financial statements of a reporting health
care entity and those of one or more other for-profit
entities or not-for-profit entities (NFPs) shall be
consolidated, whether those other entities shall be
reported using the equity method, and the extent of
disclosure that is be required (if any) if consolidated
financial statements are not presented, shall be based
on the nature of the relationship between the entities.
See paragraphs 954-810-15-2 through 15-3.
Applying the consolidation rules to health care entities may be complex because, as described above, an
integrated health care system generally consists of several related entities that may be NFPs or for-profit
entities. See Sections E.6.6.1 and E.6.6.2 for a discussion of how to determine the correct accounting
model to apply.
E.6.6.1 Accounting Model for a Reporting Entity That Is an Investor-Owned Health Care Entity
ASC 954-810
15-2 If
the reporting entity is an investor-owned health
care entity, this Subtopic provides consolidation
guidance for reporting relationships with other
entities in addition to the guidance in the
following locations:
-
Pursuant to paragraph 810-10-15-3(a), if an investor-owned health care entity has an interest in an entity, it must determine whether that entity is within the scope of the Variable Interest Entities Subsections of Subtopic 810-10 pursuant to paragraph 810-10-15-14. If that entity is within the scope of the Variable Interest Entities Subsections, the investor-owned health care entity shall first apply the guidance in those Subsections. Paragraph 810-10-15-17 provides specific exceptions to applying the Variable Interest Entities Subsections.
-
Pursuant to paragraph 810-10-15-3(b), if the investor-owned health care entity has an interest in an entity that is not within the scope of the Variable Interest Entities Subsections of Subtopic 810-10 and is not within the scope of the Subsections mentioned in paragraph 810-10-15-3(c), it shall use only the guidance in the General Subsections of Subtopic 810-10 to determine whether that interest constitutes a controlling financial interest.
-
Pursuant to paragraph 810-10-15-3(c), if the investor-owned health care entity has a contractual management relationship with another entity (for example, a physician practice) and that other entity is not within the scope of the Variable Interest Entities Subsections of Subtopic 810-10, it shall use the guidance in the Consolidation of Entities Controlled by Contract Subsections of Subtopic 810-10 to determine whether the arrangement constitutes a controlling financial interest.
-
Subparagraph superseded by Accounting Standards Update No. 2015-02.
-
Pursuant to Section 810-30-15, if the investor-owned health care entity is a sponsor in a research and development arrangement, it shall apply the guidance in Subtopic 810-30.
The table below summarizes the guidance above on determining which accounting
model to apply when a reporting entity is an investor-owned health care entity (not an
NFP) that has a reporting relationship with another entity.
Table
E-2 Investor-Owned Health Care Entities
Reporting Relationship | Accounting Model |
Interest in an entity that does not qualify for any
of the scope exceptions in ASC 810-10-15-17 to
application of the VIE model (see Section 3.4) | |
Interest in an entity that qualifies for one of the
scope exceptions in ASC 810-10-15-17 to application
of the VIE model (see Section 3.4) | Apply the voting interest entity model (see Appendix D) |
Contractual management relationship with another
entity (e.g., a physician practice) not within the scope
of the VIE guidance | Apply the contract-controlled entity model to determine whether the arrangement
represents a controlling financial interest (see Section D.3.4) |
Sponsor in a research and development arrangement | Apply ASC 810-30 (see Section
D.3.3) |
E.6.6.2 Accounting Model for a Reporting Entity That Is an NFP Business-Oriented Health Care Entity
ASC 954-810
15-3 If
the reporting entity is a not-for-profit
business-oriented health care entity, this Subtopic
provides consolidation guidance for reporting
relationships with other entities in addition to the
guidance in the following locations:
a. Pursuant to paragraph 810-10-15-17,
not-for-profit business-oriented health care entities are not subject to
the Variable Interest Entities Subsections of Subtopic 810-10 unless the
not-for-profit entity is used by a business entity in a manner similar
to a VIE in an effort to circumvent the provisions of those Subsections.
b. If the not-for-profit, business-oriented
health care entity has an investment in a
for-profit entity, it shall use the guidance in
the General Subsections of Subtopic 810-10 to
determine whether that interest constitutes a
controlling financial interest.
c. If the not-for-profit, business-oriented
health care entity has a contractual management
relationship with another entity (for example, a
physician practice), it shall use the guidance in
the Consolidation of Entities Controlled by
Contract Subsections of Subtopic 810-10 to
determine whether the arrangement constitutes a
controlling financial interest.
d. Subparagraph superseded by Accounting
Standards Update No. 2015-02.
dd. If the not-for-profit, business-oriented
health care entity is the general partner or
limited partner of a for-profit limited
partnership or similar legal entity (such as a
limited liability company that has governing
provisions that are the functional equivalent of a
limited partnership), it shall apply the guidance
in paragraphs 958-810-25-11 through 25-29 and
958-810-55-16A through 55-16I.
e. If the not-for-profit, business-oriented
health care entity is a sponsor in a research and
development arrangement, it shall apply the
guidance in Subtopic 810-30.
f. If the not-for-profit, business-oriented
health care entity has a relationship with another
not-for-profit entity that involves control, an
economic interest, or both, it shall apply the
guidance in Subtopic 958-810.
g. If the not-for-profit, business-oriented
health care entity is engaged in leasing
transactions with a special-purpose-entity (SPE)
lessor, it shall consider whether it should
consolidate the lessor in accordance with the
guidance in paragraphs 958-810-25-8 through 25-10.
h. Except where it elects to report such
interests at fair value in accordance with the
Fair Value Option Subsections of Subtopic 825-10,
a not-for-profit, business-oriented health care
entity that owns 50 percent or less of the common
voting stock of an investee and can exercise
significant influence over operating and financial
policies shall apply the guidance in Subtopic
323-10.
i. Except where it elects to report such
interests at fair value in accordance with the
Fair Value Option Subsections of Subtopic 825-10,
a not-for-profit, business-oriented health care
entity shall report noncontrolling interests in
for-profit real estate partnerships, limited
liability entities, and similar entities over
which the reporting entity has more than a minor
interest under the equity method in accordance
with the guidance in Subtopic 970-323. A
not-for-profit, business-oriented health care
entity shall apply the guidance in paragraph
970-323-25-2 to determine whether its interest in
a for-profit partnership, limited liability
entity, or similar entity is a controlling
interest or a noncontrolling interest. A
not-for-profit, business-oriented health care
entity shall apply the guidance in paragraph
323-30-35-3 to determine whether a limited
liability entity should be viewed as similar to a
partnership, as opposed to a corporation, for
purposes of determining whether a noncontrolling
interest in a limited liability entity or a
similar entity should be accounted for in
accordance with Subtopic 970-323 or Subtopic
323-10.
NFPs are not subject to the VIE guidance (see Section 3.4.1). The following table summarizes how a
business-oriented health care NFP reporting entity that has a reporting relationship
with another entity can determine which accounting model to apply:
Table E-3 NFP
Business-Oriented Health Care Entities
Reporting Relationship | Accounting Model |
Investment in a for-profit entity | Apply the voting interest entity model (see Appendix D) |
Contractual management relationship with another
entity (e.g., a physician practice) | Apply the contract-controlled entity model to determine whether the arrangement
represents a controlling financial interest (see Section D.3.4) |
Sponsor in a research and development arrangement | Apply ASC 810-30 (see Section
D.3.3) |
Relationship with another NFP that involves control,
an economic interest, or both | Apply ASC 958-810 (see Section
E.6.2) |
Engaged in leasing transactions with an SPE lessor | Apply ASC 958-810-25-8 through 25-10 (see Section E.6.3) |
Ownership of 50 percent or less of the common
voting stock of an investee and ability to exercise
significant influence over operating and financial
policies | Apply ASC 323-10 except when electing to report such interest at fair value in
accordance with ASC 825-10 (see Section E.6.4.3) |
Noncontrolling interests in for-profit real estate
partnerships, limited liability entities, and similar
entities over which the NFP has more than a minor
interest |
See Section E.6.4.4 |
E.6.6.3 Presentation and Disclosures for a Reporting Health Care Entity
ASC 954-810
45-2
Paragraph 958-810-25-2A explains that, in some
situations, certain actions require approval by a
supermajority vote of the board. That paragraph
states that such voting requirements might overcome
the presumption of control by the owner or holder of
a majority voting interest. (For related
implementation guidance, see paragraph
958-810-55-4A.) Pursuant to paragraph
810-10-15-17(a) a not-for-profit, business-oriented
health care entity is not subject to the Variable
Interest Entities Subsections of Subtopic 810-10,
except that it may be a related party for purposes
of applying paragraphs 810-10-25-42 through 25-44.
Also, if a not-for-profit, business-oriented health
care entity is used by business entities in a manner
similar to a variable interest entity (VIE) in an
effort to circumvent the provisions of the Variable
Interest Entities Subsections of Subtopic 810-10,
that not-for-profit entity shall be subject to the
Variable Interest Entities Subsections of that
Subtopic.
45-3A A
parent corporation typically owns stock in a
for-profit entity, whereas a sole corporate member
holds membership rights in a not-for-profit entity.
Sole corporate membership in a not-for-profit
entity, like ownership of a majority voting interest
in a for-profit entity, shall be considered a
controlling financial interest, unless control does
not rest with the sole corporate member (for
instance, if the other [membership] entity is in
bankruptcy or if other legal or contractual
limitations are so severe that control does not rest
with the sole corporate member).
45-3B
When consolidated financial statements are required
or permitted by Section 958-810-25, a noncontrolling
interest shall be provided if such interest is
represented by an economic interest whereby the
noncontrolling interest would share in the operating
results or residual interest upon dissolution. (See
presentation and disclosure requirements in Sections
958-810-45 and 958-810-50, respectively.)
45-3C
Not-for-profit, business-oriented health care
entities shall not report an investment in an entity
at fair value, as described in paragraph
958-325-35-6, if that entity is required to be
consolidated.
Medical Malpractice Claims
45-4 In
general, a trust fund, whether legally revocable or
irrevocable, shall be included in the financial
statements of the health care entity. A portion of
the fund equal to the amount of assets expected to
be liquidated to pay malpractice claims classified
as current liabilities shall be classified as a
current asset; the balance of the fund, if any,
shall be classified as a noncurrent asset. Revenues
and administrative expenses of the trust fund are
included in the statement of operations. In some
circumstances, the foregoing may not be possible
(for example, if a common trust fund exists for a
group of health care entities; if the health care
entity is part of a common municipality
risk-financing internal service fund; or if the
legal, regulatory, or indenture restrictions prevent
the inclusion of a trust fund in a health care
entity’s financial statements).
50-1 The
existence of the trust fund and whether it is
irrevocable shall be disclosed in the financial
statements.
Noncontrolling Interests
50-2 A
not-for-profit, business-oriented health care entity
shall include the performance indicator in the
schedule required by paragraphs 958-810-50-4 through
50-5. Paragraph 958-810-55-25 illustrates the
required disclosure using a reconciling schedule in
notes to the consolidated financial statements.
Much of the above guidance on presentation and disclosures for health care entities is consistent with
ASC 958-810 (see Section E.6.5).
Footnotes
13
See Section
3.4.1.1 for a discussion of the definition of an NFP.